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DOCTORAL STATEMENT
Eight single-authored, refereed articles (1994-1999) are presented for the degree of
PhD by published work, all of which relate to distinct topics, but which share a
common theme: continuity and change in accounting. The rationale underlying my
research is that the role of accounting in society is widening with improved
information, communications and surveillance technology, changes in the public
sector, and the expansion of the accounting profession into new areas of consulting
expertise, and yet the nature of the discipline is inadequately understood. Why is it
such a powerful force? Is its main function in society to facilitate the effective
allocation of capital in the economy by providing good information to managers,
investors and other stake-holders for decision-making? What are the other issues at
stake? Arguably the best way of approaching these questions is to examine the
components of the world of accounting in an historical context, especially focusing on
the factors that have helped determine its present shape. This is the most direct way
that accounting historians can contribute to modern practice. It is the old adage
revisited, that you cannot see where you are unless you know where you come from.
A study of the factors promoting or retarding change is important; and the articles that
are presented constitute a series of historical "bore-holes" in different situations where
the pressures on existing procedures are likely to have been at their greatest because of
changing environmental factors. Examples of these include the transition from
Republican to Imperial government in 1st century Rome (Oldroyd, 1995), its
subsequent demise in Europe (Oldroyd, 1997), the collapse of the woollen trade in the
middle of the 16th century (Oldroyd, 1998b), industrialisation on Tyneside in the 18th
century (Oldroyd, 1996, 1999b), the rise of intangibles and upsurge in take-over
activity in Britain in the 1990s (Oldroyd, 1994).
The collection reflects the growing importance of historical studies in
accounting research since the landmark publication in 1956 of Studies in the History
of Accounting by A.C. Littleton and B.S. Yamey. This compilation of keynote articles
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by two such distinguished scholars helped legitimise accounting history as an
academic discipline and set the standard for future research (Parker and Yamey, 1994,
pp. 4-5). In particular, there has been a surge of interest in accounting history since
the 1980s, with the number of authors and outlets multiplying. Parker's (1980, pp. 26-
28; 1988, pp. 76-81) accounting history bibliographies provide some indication of
scale. In the nine years to 1977, he cited about 170 authors, compared to about 510 in
the seven years to 1987. The number of outlets for accounting history articles has also
expanded to include most of the generalist accounting journals as well as those
specialising in business and accounting history (Anderson, 1998; Parker, 1999, p. 15).
Much of the impetus to accounting history research over the last twenty years
has come from "critical" or social based accounting researchers, who have questioned
the traditional economic paradigm that has dominated accounting theory since the
publication of The Nature of Capital and Income by Irving Fisher in 1906 (Mouck,
1995). Miller et al (1991) heralded the more eclectic approach of the so called "new"
accounting history which has challenged the hitherto dominant "rule of economics"
(Funnell, 1996, p. 39). The economic "traditionalists" have responded by defending
their position, and there has been a tendency for the debate to polarise, with
researchers from different schools using the past to justify their own perceptions of the
intrinsic nature of accounting, be it Economic-rationalist, Marxist, Foucauldian etc.
(e.g. Tyson, 1992 and 1998; Bryer, 1994; Hoskin and Mac ye, 1996).
These were the findings of the first publication now submitted (Oldroyd,
1999a), which provides a methodological framework for the rest of the articles in the
series. The paper reviewed developments in accounting historiography over the last
twenty-five years in relation to the underlying positioning of the participants. It found
that, as well as becoming more schematic under the impetus of "critical" studies,
accounting history has located itself within the tradition of social science, which
subsumes events into generalisations and generalisations into theory, an unstable
position as far as long-term predictions are concerned, given the unpredictable
catalysts of accident and personality that have played a major part in the development
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of accounting. The articles in the collection contain examples where prominent
individuals, such as Augustus in the 1st century (Oldroyd, 1995) and Ethelwold in the
10th (Oldroyd, 1997), or random events, such as wars and monastic reform in Anglo-
S axon England (ibid.), the failure of the woollen trade in the 1550s (Oldroyd, 1998b),
or the collapse of Polly Peck International plc (Oldroyd, 1994), have influenced the
development of accounting. Other examples include the Black Death, which Harvey
(1984, p. 7; 1994, p. 106) linked to changes in manonal accounting in the 14th
century, the Napoleonic Wars, which helped precipitate the adoption of discounted
cash flow analysis in the coal industry (Brackenborough Ct al., 2000), or the marketing
awareness of Stern Stewart & Co in successfully promoting Economic Value Added as
a new global standard in the face of doubts about its validity (McLaren, 1999).
Paper one proposed an alternative, non-schematic view of accounting history,
that the accounting universe is composed of interlocking causal relationships which
cannot necessarily be subsumed within unifying theories, and which can only be
teased out through careful historical enquiry where explanations are contingent on
evidence. The reality of causal theories of accounting is that several reasons may exist
for a particular action, or what applies in one situation may not be valid in another, or
the weighting of factors may vary between situations. This was demonstrated by the
sixth paper in the series which examined the management arrangements on an 18th
century industrial estate, and found Economic-rationalist and Foucauldian
explanations of the accounting activities not to be mutually exclusive (Oldroyd,
1999b).
However, this is not to deny that there are advantages to generalising.
According to McClelland (1975, p. 86), "the only possible way of arranging facts to
yield any causal explanation is to subsume those facts under a generalisation".
Likewise, Hoskin and Macye (2000, p. 129) maintained
that in any significant interpretive history of an accounting event, there
should be an implicit, if not explicit, attempt to understand its
relationship to events at other times and in other places, a hypothesis at
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least of how it might fit into a broader conception of the history of
accounting.
I would agree with both those views, and although the collection of articles now
presented eschews generalised causal theories because they tend to be too simplistic, it
does highlight certain areas of commonality in the development of accounting practice
that help illuminate the current state of the discipline. Lee (1990, pp. 97-98) adopted
a similar approach, and was able to identify a number of "constants" as well as
changes in the "world of accounting" since earliest times. Four factors in particular
emerge from the present study: rights and obligations, continuity and inertia, distance
from events, and the reciprocal relationship between accounting information and user
needs.
II
Rights and obligations: Baxter (1999, p. 256) summed up the importance of rights
and obligations as follows:
Ruminating on theory, the accounting historian may (rather sourly)
reflect that accounting started as a means of keeping track of debtors,
creditors and cash; and that this is still its main task, without which
business would collapse.
Lee (1990, p. 98) concurred:
The desire for a permanent memory of transaction exchanges, and
resultant possessions and obligations, has been persistent.
An examination of the origins of accounting around 8000 BC in locations as diverse
as Israel, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran - the prehistoric token system described by
Schmandt-Besserat (1992) - confirms this analysis. The advent of token accounting
seems to have been associated with the adoption of fanning in these regions. The
distinguishing feature of agricultural society, compared to hunter-gatherers, is
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property in the form of land and surplus, which has a number of ramifications,
including the creation of ownership and obligation, and reckoning technology to
facilitate economic exchanges (Oldroyd, 2000). It follows that from the beginning,
the raison d'être for accounting systems was rights and obligations, and the articles in
the collection confirm that this has continued to remain true.
Paper two, for instance, argued that the extension of public accounting under
Augustus in the 1st century AD into areas of financial planning and control arose out
of his public expenditure obligations (Oldroyd, 1995). As emperor, his wealth was
immense, and the inadequacy of public revenues obliged him to subsidise the state
heavily out of his own funds. The difficulty was compounded by the absence of
government borrowings, resulting in short-term deficits. The alternative would have
been for the state to default on its obligations, seize large fortunes, or debase the
coinage. Increasingly, therefore, the emperor's personal finances became intertwined
with those of the state, and he had strong personal motivation to increase control of
public spending to reduce his own exposure.
Paper three examined the accounting arrangements on large estates in England
and Gaul in the post Roman period (Oldroyd, 1997). These enforced the rights of the
lord in two main ways. First, estate surveys were compiled periodically to determine
what he possessed and how much it was worth, including the obligations in money and
kind of the tenants. Second, the size of the estates necessitated using stewards, and
accounts to hold them responsible for the discharge of their responsibilities. Both
these forms of accounting were apparent in a series of written instructions issued by
Charlemagne at the end of the 8th century to correct abuses that had crept into the
administration of the royal estates in the Frankish Empire. They were still both being
practised one thousand years later on estates in England, as was confirmed by paper
six, which examined the management practices employed on the Bowes estates c.1700-
1770 (Oldroyd, 1999b). Compared to the earlier period, the major difference was in
the complexity of the contractual arrangements that required a range of supplementary
accounts, if the proprietor's interests were to be safeguarded effectively. The need to
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enforce rights and obligations meant there was a close linkage between the form of the
accounts and the mode of organisational control. This was most clearly illustrated in
relation to coal mining, where different methods of organisational control were used by
the Bowes at different times - leasing, subcontracting, direct mining, and partnerships -
and the estate accounts were adapted accordingly. Another key feature of the
management procedures on the Bowes estates is that the contractual obligations of
third parties were underpinned by written agreements. This legal underpinning of the
business arrangements, combined with the use of accounts to monitor compliance,
extended beyond the estates to the family's other business activities, such as the Grand
Allies. The Grand Allies were a combination of landed families on Tyneside - George
Bowes was a founder member - which aimed to concentrate capital for the purpose of
joint-stock mining and to raise the price of coal by blocking entry to the industry.
Here too, accounting was the mechanism adopted to enforce the terms of the
partnership agreement, as in the right of the respective parties to inspect each other's
books weekly (Oldroyd, 1996).
The importance of estate accounting to the development of financial reporting
practice is widely acknowledged. Chatfield (1977, ch. 2), for example, argued that
medieval agency accounting laid the foundations for the modern doctrines of
stewardship and conservatism. Estate practice also provided a ready model for new
enterprise in the Industrial Revolution, and may even have retarded its progress
(Pollard, 1965, pp. 25, 29-30; Napier, 1997). However, mercantile practice was
probably just as important a formative influence - the universal application of double-
entry today bears witness - and here too the desire to safeguard rights and obligations
was paramount. Paper four examined the role that correspondence played in the
accounting systems of English Tudor merchants (Oldroyd, 1998b). It concurred with
the findings of previous authors, that the main purpose of a merchant's accounts was to
act as a complete record of his transactions, enforceable in law. Accounts were
intended to eliminate errors, to prevent embezzlement, to establish the value of a
business for probate or similar purposes, to keep track of credit dealings, inventories,
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and partners' capital, and to provide evidence in courts of law. Letters played an
important part in this by evincing agents' stewardship, confirming the balances on
personal accounts, generating prime data for the account books, and constituting legal
evidence, as shown in the utilisation of both letters and account books in the
bankruptcy case against the merchant John Johnson.
If accounting has traditionally been about tracking rights and obligations, what
of the future? At one level, Baxter (1999, p. 256) is correct that this situation is bound
to continue or else business would cease to operate. At the overall level of assessing
the effectiveness of directors' stewardship of companies, it is not so certain. Papers
seven and eight in the series highlighted the difficulties in tracking assets caused by the
growth in intangibles since the 1970s (Oldroyd, 1994 and 1998a). Intangible fixed
assets comprise a wide range of "dematerialised products", such as goodwill, computer
and biological software, patents, telecommunications, agricultural quotas, trademarks,
research and development, brands etc. (Tollington and Kleyman, 1997). They now
play a central role in company policy formation, as evidenced by the huge increase that
has occurred since 1970 in the relative size of goodwill for UK and US companies
(Bryer, 1995; McCarthy and Schneider 1995). As paper seven illustrated, the problem
for accountants lies in the very nebulosity of these assets, which makes identifying,
measuring and recognising them in the financial accounts so difficult. Paper eight, for
example, noted that most companies seek synergy gains from their acquisitions,
causing purchased goodwill to quickly lose its separate identity as the acquired
business is integrated within the group. The matching approach to income
measurement, whereby income is viewed as the product of matched costs and revenues
in the profit and loss account, is traditionally most closely associated with stewardship
because of its emphasis on past performance and realised gains. Here the main
accounting problem for intangibles is segregating the expenditure involved in creating
them, which is not necessarily insoluble given that many issues in accounting involve
the jointness of costs, and attempts are made to deal with them (Oldroyd, 1994).
However, accounting standard setters in the UK and internationally have moved away
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from this matching view of income to a balance sheet one, which measures income as
the increase in net worth of a company, or the increase in its ability to generate future
revenues. The logic behind this approach is that it provides more relevant information
to decision makers. The main differences with the matching view are that assets are
valued rather than included at historical cost, and income is augmented by unrealised
holding gains. But, the cost of intangibles is hard enough to quantify, let alone the
future economic benefits that constitute their value. In order to reduce subjectivity in
the accounts there will be a tendency to leave these assets out. Given the importance
of intangibles to modem business, allied to the inherent uncertainties of these assets,
there is inevitable conflict in following the balance sheet approach to measuring
income between the desire to present a complete picture and the desire for reliability,
both of which are necessary if the financial accounts are to fulfil their traditional
stewardship role, or indeed to facilitate decision-making.
The incomplete nature of balance sheets was illustrated by paper eight in
relation to FRS 10, "Goodwill and Intangible Assets", which requires the capitalisation
of purchased intangibles, but prohibits most internally generated ones, such as brands,
from being recognised (Oldroyd, 1998a). Similarly, most intangibles are only allowed
to be revalued downwards following their initial recognition, and not upwards (pars.
14, 45). It is presently unclear whether this conflict between completeness and
reliability is capable of resolution. As the next section will show, accounting is not
just constrained by the financial technologies that are available - the Accounting
Standards Board (ASB) have been innovative here in their use of discounted cash flow
analysis for valuing intangibles - but by the weight of past practice and the inertia
produced.
ifi
Continuity and inertia. Continuity in accounting is a central theme of the articles now
presented. Paper two, for instance, traced the development of financial control in the
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Roman economy in the 1st century AD (Oldroyd, 1995). At the centre of the process
was the emperor's principal financial secretary, the a rationibus, who, by the end of
the century at least, was responsible for forecasting public revenues and expenditure,
in addition to advising on how much coin to issue. But how did the office originate?
Paper two argued that the public accounting records maintained by Augustus, and the
budgetary role of the a rationibus some seventy or eighty years after his death, were
part of the same evolutionary trend, originating in the employment by Augustus of his
personal staff to administer both his public and private finances, which as we have
seen became inextricably linked. Thus he used clerks and accountants from his
private staff at Rome to assist him in supervising the public treasury, which entailed
them having access to the public records held therein. De Ste. Croix's (1956, p. 43)
observation that it was common practice for "men of property" at Rome to keep
accounts to control their households and estates begs the question of whether the
accounts kept by Augustus were themselves a continuation of existing procedures.
The national scope and content of his accounts were after all fully consistent with the
vast size of his property.
Continuity is a key issue in paper three, which examined estate accounting as
well as governmental planning and control in the Anglo-Saxon period (Oldroyd,
1997). According to Harvey (1984, p. 8; 1994, p. 91), written estate accounting
emerged in England during the 13th century, and was precipitated by population
growth that made it more profitable for lords to farm their demesne instead of letting it
to tenants. Paper three, however, argued that written accounts had been produced on
English estates since at least the 10th century, when earlier Carolingian practice,
preserved by the Church, was transmitted to England via the monastic reform
movement. Efficiently managed estates were needed to support the new foundations.
Thus estate surveys in England as late as the 14th century were still following the
format prescribed by the Carolingians on the Continent five hundred years before.
There was also continuity in the public accounting procedures. Domesday Book
(1086), for instance, was in the tradition of those earlier surveys by Frankish kings
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that made use of the sworn inquest. The tax system of Henry Tin the 12th century was
a continuation of the pre-Conquest, Anglo-Saxon geld, that was itself based on a
system of assessment dating back to the 7th or 8th centuries.
According to paper four, the accounting arrangements of the merchant, John
Johnson in the 1540s and 50s were an extension of the formative written procedures
operated by merchants sixty years earlier (Qidroyd, 1998b). Technically, they differed
in their use of double-entry bookkeeping and Arabic numerals, which made
calculations easier, but they shared the same primary objectives of controlling
operations at a distance and dividing up the proceeds on voyages between partners
(Hooper, 1995). The 1550s were a period of transition for English merchants, who
stood on the threshold of a colonial expansion into new international markets, with the
joint-stock company as a new form of commercial organisation to share the increased
risks. These early companies were floated by mercantile capital, and their accounts
continued to perform the same functions as before, with the sharing of proceeds on
voyages becoming formalised in the payment of dividends; perhaps illustrating Lee's
(1990, p. 98) point, that accounting has persistently adapted to a changing
environment "without fundamentally changing its purpose or its main characteristics."
Continuity in accounting was promoted on the Bowes estates in the 1700s
through the estate stewards copying the practice of their predecessors (Oldroyd,
1999b). Thus there are cash books for the Gibside estate covering the period 1728 to
1792, which were kept in the same format, despite a succession of different stewards.
Family dynasties of stewards were quite common; and one generation was able to
teach the next. A similar situation prevailed amongst colliery viewers (mining
engineers/managers), whose duties included providing cost data for forecasting the
profitability of mine workings and for evaluating the relative advantages of capital
improvement projects (Oldroyd, 1996). A common factor which emerges from their
records is that they worked in association with each other, and in particular, that they
learnt their trade as apprentices with established viewers. In this way the succession
of knowledge based on practical experience was assured. The lack of change in
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costing practice was a particular feature of the British coal industry, and subsequent
work in progress demonstrates that the techniques devised by Newcastle viewers in
the 18th century were still being practised in the nationalisation era following the
Second World War (Fleischman and Oldroyd, 2000; Brackenborough et al., 2000).
The longevity of much of accounting practice implies a high degree of inertia.
Paper one defined accounting inertia as the reluctance to adopt new practices and
ideas allied to the hesitancy in discarding old ones, which it maintained imbues past
practice with its own momentum (Oldroyd, 1999a). Lee (1990) and Hines (1991)
observed the same phenomenon. Lee (1990, p. 97) described it as "the self-referential
and recursive nature of accounting." For Hines (1991), the theoretical postulates
underlying financial reporting are reflexively constructed from the established body of
accounting practices and beliefs and have no intrinsic meaning. Arguably, inertia in
accounting has increased as accounting has become embedded in the institutional,
legal, and regulatory framework. Examples of inertia might include the delay in the
adoption of double-entry bookkeeping in industrial accounting or the persistence of
Victorian corporate style reporting to shareholders. Accounting legislation drafted by
the European Community has displayed a tendency to adapt old rules. The same has
been apparent in Eastern Europe following the demise of the U.S.S.R. (Walton, 1995,
p.3).
According to paper seven, inertia has played a major role in the recent debate
over the treatment of intangibles in financial accounts (Oldroyd, 1994). The paper
observed how the accounting profession, firmly grounded in a tradition of
conservatism, initially attempted to exclude brands from the balance sheet altogether
through the imposition of artificial recognition criteria based on the saleability of
these assets, even though they are not generally developed or acquired with the
intention of resale. Where objective verification is lacking, the paper demonstrated
how accounting logic will err on the side of reliability at the expense of restricting
asset recognition. According to Chatfield (1977, ch. 2), this propensity for
understatement can be traced back to medieval agency accounting, where understating
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assets and revenues was a form of self protection for the manorial steward facing
audit, in a situation where he would be held personally liable for any reported
shortfalls. Whilst personal recompense is no longer an issue except in cases of
negligence, the reputation of modern audit firms and of the profession as a whole is at
stake if a company collapses with large amounts of intangible assets in its balance
sheet, or if its assets are subsequently found to be over-valued following a take-over.
Thus paper eight described how the ASB has a vested interest in promoting reliable
information in order to preserve the current regulatory framework and the profession
against further government intervention (Oldroyd, 1998a).
Continuity in accounting implies that one cannot necessarily disassociate a
particular practice from what has gone before, either in the short or long-term, and
casts doubt on Miller and Napier's (1993, p. 631) bold assertion that
there is no "essence" to accounting, and no invariant object to which
the name of "accounting" can be attached.
However, the high level of continuity does not mean that accounting is continuously
improving either, as Littleton (1933) believed. First, the reluctance to change may
imply stagnation, and an inability to respond to the changing needs of business.
Whether this was true of costing practice in the British coal industry, for example,
awaits research. Second, discontinuities in accounting do occur that have a profound
effect on its future direction. An example is the lasting impact that the Nazi
occupation of France has had on the country's financial reporting (Standish, 1990).
Paper one maintained that an important characteristic of accounting inertia is that it
can be overcome by events in ways that would have been difficult to foresee (Oldroyd,
1999a). We have already referred to the important role that accident and personality
have played in precipitating accounting change. Fligstein (1990, p. 9) observed a
similar phenomenon in relation to business organisations. He found that organisations
tend not to change until they are faced with a crisis. Returning to the subject of
intangibles, it remains to be seen whether the increase in the importance of these assets
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to business constitutes just such a "crisis "
 for accounting. The fact that the ASB has
significantly altered its position on intangibles to allow their partial recognition
suggests that it does, particularly given the high level of earlier resistance (Oldroyd,
1998a).
Iv
Distance from events: According to Schmandt-Besserat (1992, p. 160), the first
accounting records, which predated the invention of writing by several thousand years,
represented a cognitive leap for mankind because they enabled "concrete information"
to be translated into "abstract markings" and "knowledge" to be separated from the
"knower". For the first time, economic events could be communicated at a distance
apart from by word of mouth; and distance from events has continued to influence the
development of accounting. In ancient Rome, for example, much of public finance
was conducted at a distance because of the dispersed locations of the provinces, and
accounts were used by the state as a check on the stewardship of its officials. The
governors in the provinces accounted to the treasury in Rome for their expenditure, in
addition to any local receipts, alongside the tax collectors (Oldroyd, 1995). The
Roman authors Pliny the Elder and Columella described a system of management for
large estates that too was dependent on stewards and charge and discharge accounts to
regulate their activities. It may be significant that both these texts were available in the
court library of the Frankish kings c.800, as it was at this time they embarked on their
programme of administrative reform for the royal estates, and adopted the same system
to manage their own vast holdings (Oldroyd, 1997).
According to Rooper (1995), the diversification of English merchants into
overseas markets in the second half of the 15th century explains why they switched
from oral to written accountability. Their traditional oral procedures "became
increasingly inappropriate" (p. 112), whereas written accounts enabled merchants "to
exercise more control over distant agents" as well as permitting greater accountability
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among partners (p. 93). Paper four described how the intemationalisation of English
trade continued apace in the 16th century, widening the network of agents and factors,
and increasing the need for accounts (Oldroyd, 1998b). It was for this reason that
letters and the postal system became vital to Tudor merchants, because they provided a
more flexible and timely information source over wider distances than the account
books.
Distance was an important factor in the management of the Bowes estates in
the 18th century in view of their geographical dispersion. The three main estates were
located at Gibside in the north of County Durham, Streatlam in the south, and
Wemmergill in the west. Each of the estates acted as the centre of a pooi of industrial
activity. George Bowes, the proprietor, travelled frequently to London, and was
himself often distant from events at home. When he was away, he maintained an
active involvement in the day-to-day operations of the estates through correspondence.
An organisational structure was therefore needed that was capable of delegating
tesponsibility to stewards in key areas, whilst, at the same time, retaining control at the
centre. Paper six found that this was achieved through a unified reporting network
(Oldroyd, 1999b). Returns from all the various activities and locations were
channelled through the one estate office at Gibside; and the chief stewards there, who
were answerable directly to the proprietor, were responsible for ensuring their
subordinates complied.
There is always the possibility of a conflict of interests between agent and
principal when responsibility is delegated to stewards. Papers four and six both noted
instances of agents acting opportunistically (Richard Johnson and Nathan Home).
However, the collection of articles shows that from at least the 1st century onwards
people have been aware of the role that accounting can play in governing conflicts of
interest. Lee (1990, p. 97) concurred, describing the process as "a power-knowledge
relationship [that] has been persistent through time." Another example concerns the
General Mining Association, the major coal producer in Nova Scotia during the 19th
century, where detailed costing systems were devised expressly to enable the London
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based directors to exert control over their managers in Canada (Fleischman and
Oldroyd, 2000). Modem agency theory emphasises the importance of contracting in
"maximising the efficiency of the exchange between the principal and the agent", and
of accounting in facilitating contractual relationships (Baiman, 1996, p. 27). Thus the
emphasis on written contracts in the business arrangements of the Bowes estates,
combined with the use of accounts to monitor compliance (see page 10), suggests an
empirical, if rudimentary, understanding of the potential of agency theory for reducing
agency costs. Generally speaking, the use of historical data to validate agency theory is
a possibility that has been recognised in the literature, but is as yet underdeveloped,
notwithstanding that agency theory suffers from the same potential difficulties of over-
simplification as any other generalised causal theories of human behaviour (see page
7). Advocates of an agency approach include Napier (1989, P. 248), who suggested
that "undistorted" pre-regulation data might be useful in the development of Positive
Accounting Theory, and Roy and Spraaknian (1996), who evaluated the development
of the Hudson's Bay Company's management accounting systems in the 19th century in
the light of what Transaction Cost Economics would have predicted.
The papers in the series suggest that distance from events has been as much of
a factor in the creation of agency relationships and accounts as the separation of
ownership from management via the joint-stock company. However, it is not just the
geographical distance that is important, but the speed of communication, which is a
function of technology. Tudor merchants were dependent on letters carried by horse
and sail, and the time delay between sending and receiving letters could cause them
difficulties. There are instances in the Johnson correspondence, for example, where
goods would not have been shipped had the information about changing market
conditions abroad been received sooner (Oldroyd, 1998b). Spraakman and Davidson
(1998, pp. 80, 83) argued that improvements in communication after 1860 through the
availability of railways, river steamboats, and the telegraph reduced "asset specificity"
and "uncertainty" for the Hudson's Bay Company, thereby creating reverse Transaction
Cost Economics pressures to the ones that had existed previously.
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If technology has influenced the development of accounting in the past by
making the world smaller, what will be the effects of global networking and other
technological innovations that shrink it further? According to Previts (2000, p. 17),
not since the advent of double entry have we found ourselves on the
verge of such an important technological development affecting the
process of financial and business reporting.
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting mark up Language), which is intended to
facilitate the "instantaneous preparation, analysis and exchange of financial reports and
other frequent performance data and measures on the web" is a likely indicator of the
shape of things to come (ibid., p. 16). The most obvious impact will be felt by the
accounting profession, whose lack of proprietary control over new technology
threatens its dominance as the main provider of financial information. A similar lack
in the banking industry has allowed non-bank competitors, such as supermarkets, to
diversify into banking markets (Bátiz-Lazo and Wood, 2000). In the United States, the
Elliott Report predicted that new technology would facilitate the entry of non-
accountants into accounting - recent examples include American Express - and warned
of the interlopers lobbying for the removal of the statutory regulations that protect the
profession's traditional rights to conduct audits and related services (AICPA, 1997).
The ultimate effects of new technology on accounting practice are more difficult to
predict, although, at the very least, the public availability of performance data on an
ongoing basis via the web will reduce the relevance of the annual/biannual reports to
accounts' users. The Elliott Report pointed out that new entrants to the market will not
be constrained by the profession's standards and rules. Neither therefore will they be
as constrained by the inertia referred to in the previous section, increasing the
likelihood that time honoured views will come under greater challenge in the future.
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VReciprocal relationship between accounting information and user needs: The final
strand in the papers concerns the ability of accounts' users to extend the purposes of
accounting information beyond the explicit role of enforcing rights and obligations in
order to promote their economic interests. This manifests itself in the collection in
two main ways. First, there are the vested interests that turn accounting into a type of
"game" rather than "a function of principles and professional judgement" (Lee, 1990,
p. 73). Thus Watts and Zimmerman (1979) characterised it as a "market for excuses".
Accounting policies are rationalised in the public interest, whereas in reality they are
supplied to meet the demands of vested interests, who will gain or lose by the view
shown in the accounts. Second, the uses to which accounts are put in practice can
lead to an extension of the function of accounts to embrace decision-usefulness as a
reporting aim. Chambers was one of the first accounting theorists in the modern era
to champion the needs of the user for information relevant to decisions (Previts and
Al-Hogail, 2000), and his plea that providing such information should constitute the
primary objective of financial reporting has been taken up by standard setters
internationally, most recently by the ASB in its Statement of Principles (ASB, 1999,
par. 1.3).
Looking first at the game-play aspect, analysing the motives of the various
players is particularly problematic in an historical context, given the lack of surviving
evidence. The accounts in themselves may be insufficient for imputing why they were
prepared and the uses to which they were put (Hoskin and Mac ye, 2000); and
accounting historians have been criticised for reading too much of present-day
practice into their interpretation of past records (Miller and Napier, 1993).
Corroboration is needed in the form of minutes, correspondence etc. The Strathmore
archive provides the highest incidence of this type of material encountered by the
author to date, and game-play does emerge (Oldroyd, 1999b). Accounting was
commonly used in business negotiations, for example, and surviving memoranda
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indicate that the Bowes were well aware of its potential for gaining an advantage over
the other party in a bargaining situation by furnishing them with information to which
the others were not privy. Accounting pervaded every aspect of the estates' activities,
and it was also used by individual employees to promote their own interests at the
expense of rivals, as in the dispute between John Gibson and Nathan Home. Gibson,
the manager of a lead smelting mill, used accounts to demonstrate his own expertise
and Home's inefficiency in a bid to obtain a salary increase and get his rival sacked.
Returning to the present, the lobbying that takes place prior to the issue of an
accounting standard provides researchers with the opportunity to track the vested
interests in accounting disclosures. This was the import of paper eight, which
examined the lobbying of managers in the fast moving consumer goods sector,
professional brand valuers, and the large accounting firms in relation to a new
accounting standard for brands (Oldroyd, 1998a). It found that all of the parties
concerned, including the ASB itself, stood to gain some benefit from the solution that
was brokered (FRS 10), suggesting that in this case at least, the "market for excuses"
hypothesis does provide a reasonable explanation of the accounting proposals, and
that people act rationally to promote their own interests.
Another way in which accounting can facilitate rational economic behaviour is
through providing decision-influencing information; and "decision-usefulness" is
widely accepted as the most important reporting object in the present-day. This view
was encapsulated by Jenkins (1999, pp. 27-28), the chairman of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board in the USA, when he said that financial reporting should
facilitate the "effective allocation of capital in the economy" by providing good
information to investors and creditors for decision-making. However, the historical
contribution of accounting to economic decision-making is not so certain. The
question of whether accounting encouraged or assisted managers and entrepreneurs in
exploiting the new opportunities arising from the technological, demographic and
market changes of the British Industrial Revolution, for example, has generated much
debate. Despite a tendency over the last fifteen years to question its perceived
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shortcomings (eg. Edwards, 1989; Fleischman and Parker, 1990; Boyns, 1993),
Fleischman and Parker (1997, P. 8) describe how most researchers still take the view
that accounting proved an ineffective management aid to eighteenth and nineteenth
century industrialists. Miller and Napier (1993), for instance, argue that the concept
of economic decision-making is far more recent. Bryer (2000) criticises the
Economic-rationalist school for erroneously imputing decision-making as a motive
when the true purpose of the accounts remained to promote accountability. According
to Hoskin and Macye (2000, p. 105), decision-usefulness in Industrial Revolution
accounting was inhibited by the amount of "noise" in the system inherited from earlier
routines.
There is probably some truth in all of these views, although they do not give
sufficient weight to the intention of the preparers as opposed to the efficiency of the
accounts that were produced. Paper six, for example, highlighted certain defects in
the Bowes' accounts, such as not distinguishing between revenue and capital in the ex
post profit statements. But the intention remained to improve profitability, as shown
by their attempts to forecast the incremental costs and revenues arising from
alternative business strategies, such as whether to process lead or sell it raw (Oldroyd,
1999b). For Hoskin and Macye (2000, p. 99), the main challenge is to "explain the
fullness of modem accounting's power", and here they perceive efficiency as being
more important than intention. For them, accounting was, and possibly still is, a
creaking gate as far as efficient decision-making is concerned (P. 106), and its true
power must therefore lie elsewhere, as a normalising force in human relations (p. 99).
However, intention is arguably just as important a factor in an historical context where
one is attempting to trace the antecedents of modem practice, as well as the wider
organisational and social linkages; and the articles now presented suggest that
accounts' users from earliest times have recognised accounting's potential for
informing the economic choices that were available to them.
Accounts were used primarily by the Roman state to control the operations of
the Treasury and Imperial Mint, and also the financial dealings of the state's officials
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in the provinces. However, the possible uses of this information went beyond
facilitating the minting operations; and it was during the reign of Augustus that its
potential as an aid to imperial planning and budgeting was first recognised (Oldroyd,
1995). Financial planning was also evident in the fiscal and monetary systems that
existed in late Anglo-Saxon England. The land tax known as the geld demonstrated
the power of the state in operating a sophisticated system of assessment on a national
level for defence against the Danes. Evidence of planning also exists in the systematic
withdrawal and reissue of the coinage at fixed intervals, with subtle and deliberate
variations in weight (Oldroyd, 1997).
Although the prime purpose of the account books and letters of Tudor
merchants was to facilitate accountability and control, the scope of the information
conveyed in the letters was wider, thereby forming the basis of decisions about what
commodities/currencies to buy and sell, when to trade, in what markets, and on what
terms (Oldroyd, 1998b). As Yamey (1981, p. 133) recognised, this was another
consequence of the merchants' distance from events, which obliged them to rely on
information supplied by others.
A similar situation prevailed on the Bowes estates in the 18th century. The
majority of the accounts were designed to keep track of rights and obligations, and yet
the survival of cost analyses, profit statements and especially planning data indicates
that profitability was also an important issue - the estates were not simply treated as
units of consumption - and that accounting informed business decisions (Oldroyd,
1999b). Colliery viewers were instrumental here. Financial estimation was relatively
sophisticated in the Tyneside coal industry from an early date. Amongst the tasks that
the viewers performed was the provision of cost data for forecasting the profitability
of mine workings and for evaluating the relative advantages of capital improvement
projects (Oldroyd, 1996).
If accounting has been about promoting economic interests in the past, what is
the difference between then and now? As Mac ye (1985) suggested, the answer partly
lies in the expanding range of economic choices available now compared to in earlier
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times. In this respect, modernity can be defined by the increased range of available
choices rather than by a fundamental change in the nature of accounts. Another more
subtle difference is that, with the growth of business education and the profession in
the 20th century, theory and practice are now articulated in the literature and in public
debate. It is no longer possible to practise accounting without theorising it. Inevitably
this has led to the recognition that people will use accounts for decisions irrespective
of their intended purpose. In an era where accountants are required to justify what
they do, the upshot is that decision-usefulness is now recognised explicitly as well as
implicitly as a reporting objective. However, the accounting profession faces an
impossible dilemma as a result. On the one hand, this need for self-justification
means that they must promote decision-useful accounting. On the other, they are
constrained by the weight of past practice and the inertia produced (see page 15), as
well as by the inherent uncertainties of the world they represent. The models we use
today, for instance, are very poor in terms of forecasting. We have already alluded to
the difficulties in representing intangibles (see page 12). Taken together with the new
situations created by the rise in intangibles and the revolution in information
technology (see page 20), this need to justify the potentially unjustifiable is a further
indicator that the practice of accounting has reached a crisis point in its development.
VI
The eight papers presented for the degree of PhD by published work range in scope
from the 1st to the 20th centuries, commencing in the early Roman Empire with an
examination of the accounting implications of a centrally managed currency, and
closing in the recent past with an appraisal of the effects of vested interests and
accounting inertia on the standard setting process. Other landmark changes that are
considered include the development of English landed estates, the adoption of new
industry in the 18th century, and the geographical expansion of mercantile commerce
two hundred years earlier, all of which had significant accounting implications that
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help illuminate the current state of accounting practice. This type of field-work will
remain vital on an ongoing basis as it constitutes the only defensible means of making
new discoveries or testing the validity of accepted views in an area, that with one or
two notable exceptions, has been neglected by economic historians. The financial
information flows surrounding activities provide the researcher with a valuable source
of evidence that most historians ignore. Thus, by examining the information flows in
the Roman monetary system in the 1st century I was able to contribute to the debate
over how well the Roman economy was managed from a different angle (Oldroyd,
1995). The same was true in respect of the management of landed estates in the 18th
century. The information flows provided the lens for testing the hypothesis that
estates were essentially unproductive investments, that they were managed as units of
consumption rather than as profit centres to be exploited (Oldroyd, 1999b). Perhaps
the most exciting aspect of this work is its potential for discovery as new situations
are examined and new archives explored. I was, for example, the first researcher to
appreciate the significance of Tyneside viewers to the overall development of costing
in the Industrial Revolution (Oldroyd, 1996), or to consider the role that
correspondence played in the accounting systems of Tudor merchants (Oldroyd,
1998b). In terms of work in progress, my co-authors and I discovered that costing
practice was disseminated from Newcastle to Nova Scotia in the 19th century, in
addition to the timing and circumstances surrounding the adoption of discounted cash
flow analysis in the coal industry (Fleischman and Oldroyd, 2000; Brackenborough et
al, 2000). All of this has helped elevate Newcastle University to a position of
international prominence in this crucial area of accounting research, as testified by its
number one ranking in accounting history journals, 1996-1999 (Carnegie and Potter,
2000). The articles here presented are as significant for the questions they raise as for
the degree of enclosure achieved, and ultimately, the proposed basis for the award of
the degree is the extent to which they have opened up the subject of continuity and
change in accounting for future discussion.
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AN UNSYSTEMATIC VIEW OF
ACCOUNTING HISTORY
Abstract: The article reviews recent developments in accounting his-
toriography in relation to the underlying positioning of the partici-
pants. It finds that accounting history has located itself within the
tradition of social science, which subsumes events into gener.liza-
tions and generalizations into theory. It reviews the efficacy of
causal theories of human behavior and proposes an alternative non-
theoretical approach.
INTRODUCTION
In a thought-provoking, short article, Slocum [1995, p. 21]
suggested that the phenomenon of history repeating itself oc-
curs when the need for survival, coupled to the desire to take
the easiest course, determines the path that is chosen. The im-
plication is that there is a pattern to human activity, and that it
is possible to theorize causal relationships. This chain of rea-
soning underlies the various accounting historiographical para-
digms which seek to explain accounting activities and account-
ing change in terms of the pursuit of wealth through rational
decision making (economic rationalist), the subjection of the
forces of production through capitalism (Marxist), or the exer-
cise of power through knowledge and symbolic representation
(Foucauldian). The resultant causal structures are not the same.
Authors maintain that the economic-rationalist paradigm tends
towards a mechanistic view of cause and effect, whereas the
other schools are more dynamic in that they focus on the proc-
esses of change by which new situations and practices are
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brought into being [Hopwood, 1981, P. 294; Mouck, 1995, pp.
74-78]. The Foucauldian emphasis on discontinuity [Fleisch-
man and Tyson, 1997, pp. 92-97], that it is anachronistic to
interpret the past as an extension of the present, in no way
prevents the "dynamics that come to drive the power-knowl-
edge interaction" [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3] from being theo-
rized. Rather, the question becomes, when did conditions exist
for them to operate? When did the modern world begin [Hoskin
et al., 1997, P
. 2]? These three models are merely illustrative
rather than representative of the full genre of theoretical stud-
ies, which is extremely diverse. Young [1995], for example,
adopted the theoretical concept of "regulatory space," Walker
[1995] that of "critical-conflict," and Walker and Shackleton
[1995] "British corporatism" to explain historical events within
a single volume of Accounting, Organizations and Society.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the limitations of
a theoretical approach to accounting history. It is therefore
unashamedly reactionary, as theoretical history has gained
ground in recent years [Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 97].
Undoubtedly, the discipline of accounting history has been
stimulated as a result, although some "traditional" accounting
historians have felt that they are being "goaded and ridiculed"
by the "energetic proponents of the new" [Funnell, 1998, p.
14 2]. The article commences by reviewing trends in accounting
historiography over the last 25 years, before moving on to con-
sider the nature and limitations of causal theories of account-
ing behavior. It argues that (1) the terminology that has been
applied to research directions in accounting history is confused;
that (2) accounting historiography has become more theoretical
under the stimulus of "critical" scholarship; that (3) causal
theories are undermined by the volatile elements of accident
and personality which are not susceptible to prediction; and
that (4) the present emphasis on theorizing causation is a re-
flection of the accounting discipline's own search for identity,
coupled to the anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which
places the historian at the center of the historical universe and
uses the past to justify his/her view of the present.
HISTORIO GRAPHY
In recent years, accounting history has moved closer to the
center of accounting research, and the nature and aims of the
discipline have come under increasing scrutiny. Table 1 illus-
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accounting history over the last 25 years, as scholars have at-
tempted to rationalize accounting history's place in accounting
research. These classifications and their linkages are useful be-
cause they illumine the underlying historiographical trends.
TABLE 1
Chronological Categorization of Accounting History
Author	 Classifications	 Linkages	 Author	 Classifications	 Linkages
1970	 Intellectual,	 1987	 Technical.	 Progressive
AAA	 Utilitarian	 Hopwood	 rationalist	 improvement
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TABLE 1 (Continued)















































































Different layers of meaning can be deduced from the table.
First, as new research methodologies have manifested them-
selves, the exponents of the "new" have been keen to draw a
distinction between their brand of history and what has gone
before, the "traditional." However, the nature of this dichotomy
is confused, which the table's linkages clearly show. For in-
stance, the Foucauldian and Marxist worldviews have been
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characterized as "critical" because they try to render the famil-
iar economic-rationalist view unfamiliar, by focusing on the
hidden, unarticulated aspects of the accounting discipline [Me-
rino and Mayper, 1993, pp. 238-239]. Thus, the economic
rationalist viewpoint has been said to constitute "traditional"
history, although the term also applies to studies which are
descriptive in nature rather then interpretive [Fleischman et al.,
1996b, p. 66], and which chart the technical development of
accounting practice without contextualizing it [Hopwood, 1981,
p. 295] . In this scheme, the discovery of technical data by "tra-
ditionalists" is still regarded as useful, albeit at the least pub-
lishable level of historical activity [Flesher and Samson, 1990,
p. 3], because it provides fodder for the "contextualisers" to
theorize [Napier, 1989, p. 2 50]. But, this implies a lack of inter-
est on the part of traditional historians in causal relationships,
which is quite inconsistent with the notion that they are also
economic rationalists. Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 14] ac-
knowledged this situation by linking critical and economic-
rationalist studies together as both encouraging particular
modes of explanation. Furthermore, "traditional" accounting
histories have also been critiqued as those which follow an evo-
lutionary or Darwinian model of accounting improvement from
a less perfect past to a more perfect present [Hopwood, 1987,
pp. 209-210; Napier, 1989, p. 2 44], a view also known as the
"Whig interpretation of history" [Butterfield, 1973, p. 9], imply-
ing a causal model based on the natural selection of accounting
techniques in which the "strongest" survive. It follows that
there is some confusion in the terms that have been applied to
accounting history over the last 25 years, which have multiplied
as researchers have attempted to resolve disagreements over
research aims and to rationalize the place of history in main-
stream accounting research.	 -
Second, Table 1 illustrates the extent to which research
directions in accounting history have become an issue in the
1990s. This paradigmatic diversity is both a reflection of its
increasing maturity as a discipline and the continuing rise in
numbers of new entrants, since 1980, who come from different
backgrounds, replete with their own baggage and agendas.
Miller et al. [1991, p. 396] cited anthropology, economics, his-
tory of science, organization theory, and sociology as providing
examples. Parker's [1980, pp. 26-28; 1988, pp. 76-81] account-
ing history bibliographies give some indication of scale. In the
nine years to 1977, he cited about 170 authors, compared to
about 510 in the seven years to 1987. Cooper and Puxty [1996,
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p. 306] referred to the "proliferation" in the number of histo-
ries, historians, and ideological frameworks. In any discipline,
new knowledge is largely incremental to the knowledge base
and beliefs of the researcher. Looking at causation, interpreting
the evidence will usually take place against a model that is
dependent upon the researcher's objectives and background.
Diversity in accounting history is therefore inevitable, and it is
fruitless for individual schools to claim preeminence for their
own point-of-view. Moreover, the large cluster of articles in the
1990s reflects the increased opportunities for publication aris-
ing through diversity. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is not in
the interests of accounting academics to close down particular
lines of inquiry. Indeed, conflicting woridviews allow account-
ing historians to examine or reexamine issues from different
angles and to draw contrasts, either in partnership or in opposi-
tion [e.g., Tyson, 1992; Fleischman et al., 1995; Hoskin and
Macye, 1996].
Third, research directions in accounting history, as re-
flected by Table 1, are not divorced from trends in accounting
theory. The idea of accounting progressing through time to-
wards an ideal state is consistent with a normative-deductive
approach to accounting theory. If Mouck [1995, pp. 55, 60] is
correct that this type of study peaked in the 1960s and early
1970s as a result of the "unprecedented concern" in U.S. busi-
ness schools at the time over the lack of scientific theory in
management education, its subsequent decline has coincided
with the overt rejection of the Darwinian model by most ac-
counting historians. In 1975, Johnson [1975, p. 449] wrote
about the "evolution of accounting procedures in large corpora-
tions" as an impetus to national economic growth, whereas by
1986, he was referring to the possibilities offered by the "new"
accounting history that was by then challenging the evolution-
ary view [Johnson, 1986, pp. 74-75]. In 1981, Parker [p. 281]
defended the notion of evolution on the grounds that "no ac-
counting historian has discerned revolutions in accounting
practice," but all subsequent entries in Table 1 tend to regard
that idea as passé. This is not to say that the evolutionary model
in accounting history is as defunct as the table suggests since
'the Foucauldian focus on discontinuities in management ac-
counting history has been paralleled by a search for continu-
ities between the modern world and the past by their critics
[e.g.; Edwards et al., 1995, pp. 34-35]. Moreover, discontinuity
and evolution need not preclude each other. In a true Darwin-
ian sense, evolution does not imply progressive improvement,
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but the adaptation of species to suit their environment best.
There will be extinctions and new starts along the way as the
environment changes, as well as continuity and development.
The main evolutionary question in accounting, then, concerns
the way accounting has interacted with the environment (i.e.;
social, political, economic, calculable, etc. contexts) in which it
has operated at particular points in time and space, which is
relevant to Marxists, economic rationalists, and Foucauldians
alike. Has the interaction between accounting and its contexts
been dysfunctional, congruous, or synergetic? Evidence of con-
gruity/synergy would support the idea that accounting evolves.
An example might be the growth of power systems in U.S. soci-
ety from around 1800 in response to "the rise and rise of sus-
tained cognitive growth" as the use of writing, examination,
and numerical grading spread [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3].
Returning to the theme that developments in accounting
theory and historiography are linked, the best example is shown
by the post-1980 references in Table 1 to "critical" accounting
history, which reflect the current vogue in "critical" or social-
based accounting research. As Funnell [1996, p. 38] observed:
Central to much of the critical accounting research
which has sought to question the legitimacy of existing
institutions, distributions of power and the role of ac-
counting in sustaining and perpetuating dominant
capitalist forms of discourse has been an emphasis on
history.
The number of references to critical studies in the table is a
measure of the impetus that critical accounting research has
given to accounting history in recent years.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the debate over research aims
has moved from looking at what we do and why we do it, to
what we ought to be doing. Accounting historiography has be-
come more schematic in the process. The early articles cited in
the table followed in the wake of the American Accounting
Association's (AAA) [1970] report on accounting history by de-
fining the scope and utility of the discipline. Goldberg [1974]
developed the AAA Committee's arguments concerning the ben-
efits to be derived from accounting history [pp. 406-408] and
suggested the interrelationship between accounting practice
and thought as a worthwhile field of sti.idy [pp. 409-410].
Johnson [1975, p. 444] supported the AAA's contention that
accounting history would lead to a better understanding of eco-
nomic history, focusing on the contribution that accountants
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could make by studying the development of organizational
methods in large corporations. By 1977, however, Baladouni
[1977, pp. 59-67] was developing more sophisticated cultural,
technological, and social frameworks, which he hoped would
provide a "methodological backbone" to facilitate empirical and
theoretical research in accounting history. The range of classifi-
cations in the table shows that from then on methodological
issues have assumed a greater significance as the hitherto
dominant "rule of economics" [Funnell, 1996, p. 39] has come
under increasing challenge from social theorists. The econo-
mists have responded by defending their position. By question-
ing the nature of accounting history under the stimulus of
"critical" scholarship, there has been a tendency to theorize it,
which has culminated in the paradigmization of cause and ef-
fect along fairly rigid lines of demarcation. 	 -
Most of the authors cited in Table 1 are active historians at
a field-level, and there is no reason to suppose that the field-
work of authors in general has not been affected either offen-
sively or defensively by these historiographical trends. Witness
the call in Fleischman et al. [1996a, p. 332] for an eclecticism
that has been backed by collaborative ventures or Tyson's
[1998, p. 224] rebuttal of Foucauldian terminology. Proof, how-
ever, would entail reviewing all the accounting history studies
now being published over a series of years. Anderson [1998]
cited some 280 for 1995-1996 alone. It would be insufficient
just to review the articles appearing in the mainstream account-
ing history journals, as these are now in a minority. Out of the
total of 280, only about 60 were published in Accounting Histo-
rians Journal; Accounting, Business and Financial History; and
Accounting History. Furthermore, to concentrate on a narrow
band of articles would be especially futile if journal titles act as
"Baudrillardian signs," possessing value and meaning in them-
selves [Cooper and Puxty, 1996, p. 292], and by implication,
tend to attract articles of the same type.
CAUSALITY
Whitley [1988] examined the role of scientific models in
accounting theory and drew a distinction between those derived
from natural sciences and those based on the social, both of
which he found present. The essence of a good, natural-scien-
tific theory is that it both accurately describes a large class of
observations on the basis of a model containing only a few
arbitrary elements, and that it makes definite predictions about
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the results of future observations [Hawking, 1988, P
.
 9]. This
type of model has been used by positivist accounting research-
ers to explain and predict the workings of financial markets,
and has been extended into the behavioral field by "positive
accounting theory" [Whitley, 1988, pp. 632-634]. Essentially
economic-based, such studies derive from the same natural-
scientific root that underpinned the "normative apriorist"
movement of the 1960s and early 1970s [Whitley, 1986, pp. 171-
172; Mouck, 1995, p. 64]. Social models, on the other hand, are
more value-laden because of their need for descriptions and
terms that have "positive or negative connotations, both in the
scientists' own culture and in the one being analyzed," and are
of more limited applicability because of variations in cultural
norms [Whitley, 1988, pp. 637-638]. However, this difference
has not prevented social researchers from sharing the natural
scientist's aim of using events to establish causal relations that
can be generalized [McClelland, 1975, p. 86; Fleischman et al.,
1996b, p. 63]. Haddock [1980, p. 150] described how "the claim
that history should approximate a social science adhering
closely to the methods of the natural sciences" first "attained
the status of an orthodoxy" in the mid-l9th century, and how it
has continued to be "a central and contentious issue." Accord-
ing to Stone [1981], "the climatic years of the conversion of
historians to an interest in the social sciences" were the late
1960s [p. 15], although he warned of the "growing mood of
skepticism abroad about the value to historians of much of the
newest and most extreme social science methodology" [p. 43].
The increased theoretical bent of accounting history since the
1980s grounds it firmly in that tradition.
The focus of the social scientist is on the present
[Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 63]. Knowledge of the past is not
relevant for its own sake, but because it helps to illuminate the
present and feeds into current issues. Such an opinion would
be shared by many general historians [Evans, 1997, p. 61], but
with accounting historians there is also the need to justify one-
self in the accounting discipline where historical perspectives
do not have a mature tradition. Indeed, the need for validity
could explain the current emphasis on theoretical studies, as
the term "atheoretical" has tended to become derisory in ac-
counting history literature. Arguably, the postmodernist view
that the past is essentially unknowable will never gain serious
ground in accounting history, as this would render the disci-
pline redundant to accounting researchers. For the same rea-
son, historical studies which view the past as an object in itself
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tend to be dismissed as "antiquarianism." Accounting practice
is regarded as a dynamic process, devised in historical situa-
tions. A study of the practice in relation to the situations en-
ables one to question the manner in which the circumstances
have changed and to assess the implications for modern prac-
tice [Whitley, 1988, p. 640; Edwards, 1989, p. 5]. Proponents of
this view argue that we can learn from the past and see history
as being capable of supporting contemporary research into
policy making and standard setting, for example [Previts et al.,
1990, p. 3].
Some accounting historians go one step further and would
like to be able to predict the future. Evans [1997, pp. 53-62]
traced this idea back to the 1860s, but expressed severe misgiv-
ings about history's predictive ability. Not many accounting his-
torians have attempted to predict the future [Parker, 1981, p.
284], but various statements of intent by journal editors have
suggested it as a desirable goal. Flesher and Samson [1990, p.
3] wrote that those studies which offered "the possibility for
predicting or -influencing future events" would be the ones that
stood the best chances of publication. Whilst stopping short of
advocating "predictions," Carnegie [1996, p. 5] did refer to the
"considerable potential" that critical and interpretive research
has for providing "insights into accounting's present and fu-
ture." The stated objectives of papers that are published in Ac-
counting, Business and Financial Histoiy include helping to pre-
dict possible future developments. Are such predictions
possible? Goldberg [1974, pp. 408-409] and Baxter [1981, p. 5]
argued they are not. Other writers have sounded a cautionary
note [Edwards, 1989, p. 6]. Perhaps the answer depends on
whether one takes a typical historical or typical social-scientific
perspective, the latter being the more deterministic of the two
[Mills, 1993, p. 802; Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 64] . Theoretical
histories derive useful insights by making predictions about
past relationships, and it will be interesting to see whether the
current trend towards theoretical history results in more pre-
dictions of future ones.
One of the main difficulties of causal theories of human
behavior is that they do not acknowledge freewill or personality
as a potential source of forecast error. This charge has been
countered on the grounds that causal theories predict only the
choices dictated by human dispositions rather than the result-
ant outcomes [McClelland, 1975, p. 71] . The distinction is a fine
one, however, .as such theories tend to assume a reduction in
the number of acceptable choices, given similar dispositions
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exposed to similar stimuli [McClelland, 1975, p. 8 6] . Thus,
"counterfactual" analysis changes the stimuli to predict what
would have happened if historical circumstances had been dif-
ferent [McCloskey, 1987, p. 1 6]. Accident is another source of
forecast error not recognized by historical predictions. Evans
[1997, pp. 129-138] identified accident as a key factor in "the
study of causes." Wars provide many examples where accident
and personality have rendered the course of events unpredict-
able. For instance, the Battle of Britain was lost by Germany as
a result of the accidental bombing of civilians in London on
August 23, 1940, which prompted retaliatory raids on Berlin,
and diverted the war away from British airfields towards Brit-
ish cities [Shirer, 1964, pp. 931-934]. Accounting itself is not
immune from these unpredictable catalysts, witness the lasting
impact of Nazi economic planning on French financial report-
ing [Standish, 1990, p. 350 ] . Walton [1995, p. 8] commented on
the important part that wars have played in generating account-
ing change, and Nobes and Parker [1995, pp. 19-20] listed acci-
dent as one of seven key determinants of the nature of account-
ing in any particular country. What would have been the effects
on future accounting practice had the Battle of Britain resulted
in the German occupation of Great Britain? What shape would
accounting have taken had not the Moslem advance into west-
ern Europe been halted at Tours in 732, given the importance
of both Frankish rulers and the Roman Christian Church to its
subsequent development [Oldroyd, 1997, pp. 18-22]? What ef-
fect did the unexpected collapse of Folly Peck International plc
have on the regulation of U.K. financial reporting in the 1990s?
Arguably, it led to more restrictive practice by U.K. standard
setters in an attempt to restore confidence in the accounting
profession [Oldroyd, 1994, p. 3 7 ] . What has been the influence
of particular individuals on the development of a new profes-
sion/theoretical discipline? The current interest in biographical
studies in accounting history literature suggests that it has been
great. The "crucial discontinuity" in Hoskin and Mac ye's [1988,
p. 46] Foucauldian thesis concerning the development of mod-
ern "managerialism" in the U.S. depended on the meticulous
nature of Sylvanus Thayer.
Accident and personality impact primarily on events rather
than systems. Accounting has been described as a social system
[Lee, 1990, p. 7 5] . Such a view underplays the significance of
particular happenings. Eventually one ends up at the same
place through deterministic forces which govern the interaction
of humanity with itself and the environment. Hoskin and
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Macye [1988, P. 66] spoke of the demise of the "memorable
man" under the welling-up of disciplinary knowledge within
society. However, any systematic view of the world of account-
ing must take inertia into account. Lee [1990, p. 97] described
inertia as "the self-referential and recursive nature of account-
ing," an important characteristic that can be overcome by
events which are not always susceptible to prediction. Account-
ing inertia is both the reluctance to adopt new practices and
ideas and the corresponding hesitancy to discard old ones. The
inclination to follow what has been done before imbues past
practice with its own momentum. Fligstein [1990, p. 9] ob-
served the same phenomenon in relation to business organiza-
tions. He found that organizations tend not to change until they
are faced with a crisis. Arguably, inertia in accounting has in-
creased as accounting has become embedded in the- institu-
tional, legal, and regulatory framework. Examples of inertia
might include the delay in the adoption of double-entry book-
keeping in industrial accounting or the persistence of Victorian
corporate style reporting to shareholders. Accounting legisla-
tion drafted by the European Community has displayed a ten-
dency to adapt old rules. The same has been apparent in East-
ern Europe following the demise of the U.S.S.R [Walton, 1995,
p. 3]. In short, there are many models that are possible to ex-
plain accounting activities beyond those that have been articu-
lated already. By focusing on the resistors/catalysts of change,
inertia could provide as complete a model as any other except
that predictions would be tenable only in the indeterminate
short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced. Ac-
counting history would assume a central importance as a cata-
lyst of change through its role in questioning the appropriate-
ness today of "time-honoured concepts and ideas" [Edwards,
1989, p. 6].
POSITIONING
Causal theories of accounting behavior suffer from the
anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which uses the past to
justify the historian's view of the present, thereby placing him!
her at the center of the historical universe. The anthropic prin-
ciple in physics states that we see the universe the way it is
because if it were different, we would not be here to see it
[Hawking, 1988, p. 183]. At one level, any theory of the universe
must include the evidence of humanity's existence. At another,








Oldroyd: Historiography, Causality, and Positioning 	 95
nature of the cosmos is contingent on our ability to witness it.
There may be other universes or regions of the same universe
obeying different laws, but if there are no observable conse-
quences, they can afford to be ignored [Hawking, 1988, P
. 125].
From an historical perspective, our understanding of the past is
contingent on our location in the present, and history is useful
to us because it helps identify and explain who we are. The
tendency to place ourselves at the center of history accounts for
the disparate nature of the historical universe. Children are
taught their own history at school. The recent debate over the
establishment of a national history curriculum in British
schools emphasized the keen interest of government that Brit-
ish children should learn the important "landmarks" in British
history. Protestant schools in Northern Ireland learn British
history and Catholic schools Irish. Ultimately, accounting his-
tory exists as a distinct region of the historical universe because
of the existence of the accounting profession. As Funnell [1996,
p. 39] observed, the problem is that the academic community is
uncertain whereabouts in the present accounting is located, at
the heart of economic or social and political theory, and so the
past is being used by accounting researchers to jostle for posi-
tion and to justify their own perceptions of where we stand
(Figure 1). Accounting history is useful to researchers as a me-
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If history in general is prone to the fallacy of taking one's
present position back into the past in order to find material to
justify it, the flaw is accentuated in theoretical histories. This
was observed by Merino and Mayper [1993, p. 245], who said
that the danger of imposing current beliefs on the past "in-
creases exponentially when researchers use a theoretical frame-
work." The efficacy of causal theories depends on their ability
to predict the results of future observations. The theoretical
historian, therefore, comes to a problem having already pre-
dicted what the outcome will be (in this respect history be-
comes intrinsically uncritical) and looks for supporting evi-
dence. Bryer [1987, p. 3] unwittingly summarized this view.
Reviewing a paper on what he described as "the final stages of
the transition from feudalism to investor capital," he wrote:
If we can agree this [that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between the feudal and capitalist modes of pro-
duction], then we have a conceptual and an historical
basis for understanding the lords' 'ways of thinking',
their 'aristocratic attitudes' (and platitudes), the over-
lap and contradiction of these notions of surplus in the
aristocratic mind.
Marxism shows us how to interpret historical evidence before
we have started to look. There is no suggestion of deliberate
deception or that theoretical historians ignore available data or
data sources. But, given the incompleteness of the historical
record, together with the difficulties in accurately interpreting
historical data, it is often possible to find evidence to support
whatever claim. Maximizing wealth, commodifying labor, and
regularizing relationships within the organization are not, after
all, incompatible. In reality, there may be several reasons for a
particular action, or what applies in one situation may not be
valid in another, or the weighting of factors may vary between
situations. An alternative, nontheoretical view of the accounting
universe is that it is composed of interlocking causal relation-
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FIGURE 2
Interlocking View of Causation
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The best that can be achieved in history is an hypothesis rather
than a causal theory. The task of the historian is to select the
hypothesis which best fits the available evidence, given or con-
structed, neutral or biased [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79],
while recognizing its intrinsic limitations together with his/her
own.
CONCLUSION
The article has reviewed recent developments in accounting
historiography in relation to the underlying positioning of the
participants. -Accounting history has become more schematic
under the impetus of "critical" studies. It has located itself
within the tradition of social science, which subsumes events
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into generalizations and generalizations into theory. Causal
theories are undermined by the unpredictable catalysts of acci-
dent and personality which impinge on accounting inertia. It
follows that predictions can only be tenable in the indetermi-
nate short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced.
Furthermore, causal theories suffer from the anthropic fallacy
of historical reasoning, which uses the past to justify the
historian's view of the present, thereby placing him/her at the
center of the historical universe. The difficulty with accounting
is that it is uncertain whether it is located at the center of
economic or social and political theory, and so accounting
theorists are using the past to jostle for position. An alternative,
nontheoretical view has been proposed in which it is accepted
that the best that can be achieved in history are hypotheses
whose intrinsic limitations are recognized. 	 -
Are there any implications for future research? First, theo-
retical history is fine and can yield useful insights, providing its
limitations are recognized. Essentially, the article is a plea for
more modest claims to be made on behalf of theoretical history.
History is a multicellular creature, and the essence of historical
inquiry lies is recognizing there are other points of view. It is
not suggested that all views "are equally valid," or that it is
impossible to resolve differences through "diligent search of the
available evidence" [Fleischman and Parker, 1997, p. 218]. But
uncertainty will remain. Second, the limitations of causal theo-
ries reinforce the need for more empirical studies to get as close
as possible to the individual circumstances in which accounts
were produced, the uses to which they were put, and the full
range of participants involved. Despite the increased risks of
belief transference, many theoretical historians use archival
data to test their predictions. There are also those archivists,
however, who through attempting "to stand apart from the
paradigmatic debates" are in danger of becoming marginalized
[Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 102], and it is their work par-
ticularly that the article supports. Finally, using the past to
cross-reference our position in the present fulfills a psychologi-
cal need, which explains why all societies produce histories,
either in written form or oral tradition. The great science fic-
lion writer, Isaac Asimov [1986, p. 59] wrote:
There never can be a man so lost as one who is lost in
the vast and intricate corridors of his own lonely mind.
There never was a man so helpless as one who
cannot remember.
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The relevance of accounting history goes deeper than the utili-
tarian view which measures it in terms of in-feeds to modern
practice. If this were all there is, the past would become less
useful to us the further it were removed from the present, and
one could agree with Stevelinck [1985, p. 1] that "there is little
of interest to the present-day accountant in the study of primi-
tive and obsolete accounting practices" of the ancient world.
However, this view runs contrary to the historical imperative of
going as far back in time as possible in the search for roots.
Witness the genealogies of King David in the Bible going back
to Adam and Eve or the genealogies of Anglo-Saxon kings going
back to the Norse gods. Accounting history helps us to know
who we are, where we came from, and how we got here
[Baladouni, 1977, p. 54]. One should be careful in dismissing
any historical study as antiquarianism. Furthermore, -if, as this
need for identity suggests, the raison d'être of accounting his-
tory is the existence of accountants, its future existence as an
academic discipline ultimately depends on the future success of
the accounting profession. If the profession were to decline,
accounting historians would be returned to other types of histo-
rians, those who would remain interested in history, but only in
so far as it impacted on their own place in the historical uni-
verse and their own fields of vision.
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THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND
MONETARY POLICY IN THE FIRST
CENTURY AD ROMAN EMPIRE
Abstract: Previous authors have argued that Roman coinage was used
as an instrument of financial control rather than simply as a means
for the state to make payments, without assessing the accounting
implications. The article reviews the literary and epigraphic evidence
of the public expenditure accounts surrounding the Roman monetary
system in the first century AD. This area has been neglected by ac-
counting historians. Although the scope of the accounts supports the
proposition that they were used for financial control, the impetus for
keeping those accounts originally came from the emperor's public
expenditure commitments. This suggests that financial control may
have been encouraged by the Financial planning that arose out of the
exigencies of funding public expenditure. In this way these two as-
pects of monetary policy can be reconciled.
INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the literary and epigraphic evidence of
the accounts which surrounded the Roman monetary system.
Although these provide an early example of public finance ac-
counting, it is an area which has tended to be neglected by
accounting historians and classicists alike. The former have con-
centrated their efforts on the accounts of private individuals
rather than of the state, whereas the latter are more interested in
the economic implications of Roman monetary policy. Duncan-
Jones [1990 & 1994], for example, offers an authoritative and
detailed study of the various aspects of money in the Roman
economy, but makes scant mention of public accounting or the
information flows surrounding the Roman monetary system. A
consideration of these factors can provide useful insights into
the management of the Roman economy. If, for instance, one
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were to agree with Sugden [1993, P. 235] that Roman coinage
was deliberately used by the state as a means of financial con-
trol, one might expect to find some evidence of financial plan-
ning. Sugden [1993, p. 231], however, does not deal with the
accounting implications of his thesis, apart from a brief allusion
to the budgetary role of the emperor's principal financial secre-
tary, the a rationibus. This article explores the rationale behind
Roman public accounting in the first century AD. In so doing it
contributes to the ongoing debate over the uses of coinage to the
Roman state from a different angle. It starts by describing this
debate, before moving on to consider Roman accounting histori-
ography. It then examines the role of public accounting at both
operational and strategic levels within the Roman monetary sys-
tem.
ROMAN MONETARY POLICY
There are two opposing schools of thought regarding the
management of the Roman monetary system. The first was
summed up by Finley [1973, pp. 160-66] when he asked the
question: What did the Roman emperors contribute that was
nw to the management of the economy, with their
"unprecedently greater power and greater resources," compared
to the Greek city-states, of say, five hundred years before? The
answer was "virtually nothing." The emperors were governed by
the "satisfaction of material wants" rather than any conception
of economic policy or the "needs of the economy." As for the
money supply, "money was coin and nothing else." Its principal
use was to enable the state to make payments, usually to the
troops. This echoed the views of Crawford [1970, p. 48], who
argued that the Roman government lacked a monetary policy.
The alternative view is that the Roman Empire was highly
monetized, and that the government attempted to maintain a
stable coinage for economic reasons. Sutherland [1951, p. 173]
described the imperial coinage as "an indispensable element" of
a centrally controlled economy. Lo Cascio [1981, p. 76] argued
that the stability of the Roman monetary system in the late
Republic and early Empire was "not a necessary one nor the
result of chance." Rather, it was achieved deliberately through
monetary policy. More recently Sugden [1993, pp. 230-31] main-
tained that although control of the coinage alone was not suffi-
cient to ensure successful financial management, nevertheless
the state used it to influence revenues and expenditures.
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Financial control might have taken different forms. Lo
Cascio [1981, P. 76] stated that the Roman authorities had an
empirical understanding of monetary policy, which they used
both to maintain fixed relationships between the different de-
nominations of coin, and to supply the market with an adequate
means of exchange. Sugderi [1993, pp. 229 & 231] identified
direct and indirect means of financial control. Directly, the state
profited by reducing the gold and silver content of coins, to
allow for their minting in greater numbers. The effectiveness of
this policy depended on Rome's ability to enforce an enclosed
currency system. Indirectly, the state was able to increase both
its tax-take and money-stock through the increase in inter-re-
gional trade, which according to Hopkins [1980, p. 10 1 ], re-
sulted from the payment of taxes in money.
Additional evidence from literature, papyrus documents and
coin-finds has resulted in a swing of opinion towards the mon-
etary view of the Roman economy [Greene, 1986, pp. 50, 169].
For example, Howgego [1992, P. 1] wrote that "the possibility of
using old coin for making payments means that, at least as re-
gards the restriking of existing coin, decisions to coin might be
taken for reasons other than the requirements of expenditure."
The evidence is inconclusive, however, and recent studies have
undermined the monetary view by questioning the extent of
monetization within the Roman economy. Howgego [1992, P.
30] maintained that although the Roman world was monetized,
in the sense that money was the normal means of exchange for
goods, "agricultural produce, particularly corn, played a sub-
stantial role alongside money in taxation, rents, wages, and
credit." Based on a study of Roman coin-survivals, Duncan-
Jones [1994, p. 32] concluded that the level of monetization in
the Roman Empire was "restricted and uneven," and "exchange
based on barter was probably widespread below the surface."
Such conclusions undermine Hopkin's [1980] trade and taxes
theory, and Sugden's [1993] suggested corollary, concerning the
implications for financial control.
It follows that there is still doubt over the function of money
in the Roman economy. Study of the problem from an account-
ing perspective helps reconcile the opposing views, as it provides
clues to the sophistication of Roman monetary policy by an-
swering two key questions: (i) What was the scope of the ac-
counts surrounding the Roman monetary system in the first
century AD? (ii) Why were these public accounts brought into
being?
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ROMAN ACCOUNTING HISTORIOGRAPHY
Previous Roman accounting studies have concentrated on
the level of sophistication of the accounting techniques. De Ste.
Croix [1956, pp. 60-61] demonstrated the rudimentary nature of
Roman bookkeeping and the absence of double-entry. Most
[1979, pp. 8-11] identified certain flaws in de Ste. Croix's argu-
ment concerning the categorization of "debit" and "credit," the
use of columns, and the numerical notation of accounts. While
rejecting Most's criticism, Mac ye [1985, pp. 234-57] expanded de
Ste. Croix's paper in relation to taxation and business manage-
ment. He questioned de Ste. Croix's observation that the primi-
tive nature of Roman accounting prevented the state from tax-
ing income rather than capital, arguing that the converse was
true. Roman accounts did not calculate income because the
state saw no need to tax it. Similarly, Mac ye did not agree that
rational economic decision-making was inhibited by accounting.
Rather it was the lack of opportunity of Roman estate owners to
benefit from alternative courses of action which resulted in the
lack of systematic profit calculations. Other authors have fo-
cused on particular accounting records, such as Columella's
profitability calculations in his first century textbook on agricul-
ture [Carandini, 1983], or the accounts of the Appianus estate in
third century Egypt [Rathbone, 1994].
In all of these cases the authors are concerned principally
with the accounts of private individuals rather than of the state.
The distinction between the two is not always clear, however,
given the difficulty in separating the state's finances from those
of the emperor personally [Millar, 1977, p. 189].
A factor which emerges from these works is a consciousness
among Romans of the general advisability of keeping accounts.
De Ste. Croix [1956, p. 43] notes, for example, that "it seems
fairly safe to conclude that men of property at Rome often did
write up their permanent account-books about every month."
Personal wealth was both "necessary and good" [Finley, 1973, p.
35]. The fact that a citizen's rights were connected to the
amount of property he declared was an incentive for keeping
accounts [Edwards, 1989, p. 2 8]. In some cases political expedi-
ency determined the need for accounts. In a litigious society in
which state officials could be prosecuted for extortion or em-
bezzlement for political ends [de Ste. Croix, 1956, pp. 44-46],
and in which the normal activity of young political aspirants
was the launching of prosecutions in the law-courts [Grant,
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1969, p. 27], it might be beholden on such officials to keep
accounts for their own protection.
THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTING IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
AND MONETARY POLICY
Turning now to the scope of the accounts surrounding the
Roman monetary system, there are two levels at which accounts
played a facilitating role in the quantification and storage of
bullion in the Aerariui'n (treasury), and its issues to the Imperial
Mint. First, there is the operational level at which the process
was conducted; and second, there is the strategic level, at which
decisions were made regarding the timing and quantity of coin-
age issued, and the mix of metals used.
Howgego [1992, p. 4] has described the various factors af-
fecting the supply of bullion to the Aerarium. These included the
gains or losses associated with conquest, the productivity of the
mines and the balance of payments with the East. The relative
importance of these factors fluctuated over the course of Roman
history, as did the number and location of the mints in opera-
tion at any one time. Nevertheless when one speaks of the Ro-
man monetary system which existed at particular points in time,
one is able to draw analogies with earlier or later periods, be-
cause of the marked degree of continuity over a prolonged pe-
riod [Bolin, 1958, p. 47; Howgego, 1992, p. 2]. In particular
there was continuity in the central control exercised by the state
[Sutherland, 1951, p. 9], and in the translation of procedures
from the late Republic to the early Empire [Jones, 1968, p. 101].
Operational Role
Looking at the operational level first, there was a formal
organizational structure within the Aerarium and Imperial Mint,
which included supervision of the staff of freedmen and slaves,
and specified lines of reporting. Included on the Mint staff were
the dispensatores, or accountants, who kept the books. The other
workmen can be categorized as skilled artists, unskilled workers
or nurnmulariL These were probably state bankers, whose duty
it was to receive bullion and obsolete coin, and to bring new
issues on to the market [Mattingly, 1923, pp. lvii-lx; 1960, pp.
129-13 1]. Although there is a complete lack of surviving records,
it is possible to infer the existence of inventories from the Natu-
ral History of Pliny the Elder, who was able to list the amounts
of gold and silver, in cash and bullion, contained within the
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Aerarium at various points in time to 49 BC [Pliny, Natural
History, xxxiii, 55-56]. For instance, he noted that in 156 BC
"the Roman treasury contained 17,410 pounds of gold, 22,070
pounds of silver, and in coin 6,135,400 sesterces." Such invento-
ries could have been used to exercise physical control over the
stocks of precious metals. We do not know the source of Pliny's
information. Its inclusion in his encyclopedia suggests its reten-
tion within the public records, as it preceded the time of writing.
Effective control of production was established during the
Republic. In addition to the inventories, this was achieved by a
system of control-marks on the coins and dies, and by stringent
mint regulations [Mattingly, 1982, pp. 22-24]. There are occa-
sions when issues of coin contained the inscription "EX
A(rgento) PV(blico)," to indicate that they were struck from pub-
lic bullion rather than bullion drawn directly from the treasury.
Mattingly [1982, p. 23] suggests that the moneyers were using
state money on its way to the treasury, and that the suffix repre-
sented a control-mark, forming part of the procedures for check-
ing the amount of bullion involved.
Finally at the operational level, accounts were used by the
state as a check on the stewardship of its officials. Much of
-public finance was conducted at a distance because of the dis-
persed locations of the provinces. Accounts were kept to enable
the state to exert some control over the inflows and outflows of
revenues and expenditures. The governors in the provinces ac-
counted to the Aerariuin in Rome for their expenditure, in addi-
tion to any local receipts alongside the publicani (tax collectors)
[Jones, 1968, p. 103] . These accounts or rationes evolved in the
Republic to provide a retrospective check on the individual gov-
ernors, rather than as an aid to imperial planning and budgeting
[Millar, 1964, p. 38] . Millar suggests that they were used in this
novel way for the first time by Augustus, which leads to a dis-
cussion of the extent to which accounting played a strategic role
in the monetary system.
Strategic Role
In many respects Augustus was a watershed in Roman his-
tory. His rise to power as principal citizen and commander-in-
chief of the army followed a turbulent period of civil wars. He
remained in control for forty years until his death in AD 14, and
in so doing restored peace. During this time Augustus sought to
control the organs of state; and the nature of government
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changed to become consolidated in the person of the emperor.
This applied not only to politics, but also to the monetary sys-
tem, which Augustus took under his control. Arguably he could
not have done this without the use of accounting information,
which is known to have existed, and is discussed in due course.
It has been suggested that the archives and stores of infor-
mation which were at the emperor's disposal consisted mainly
of the acts and pronouncements of himself and his predecessors
[Millar, 1977, p. 2 66]. Thus his role has been seen as essentially
passive, making decisions in response to initiatives from below,
rather than actively seeking information. Accounting informa-
tion, however, represents one of the major exceptions, certainly
in the early Empire at least. We know something of the content
of these records from literary references and from the Res
Gestae (The Acts of Augustus), copies of which were inscribed
on temple walls throughout the Empire.
LITERARY AND EPIGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF
ACCOUNTING'S STRATEGIC ROLE
The dependency of the Roman currency on the supply of
• precious metals implies that it would have been a limiting factor
in any budget. Corroborative evidence comes from the debase-
ments following periods of heavy spending, and from the ur-
gency with which the precious metal resources of new provinces
were exploited following conquest. Archaeological finds of date-
stamped ingots in Britain, for example, suggest that Britain's
lead resources, from which silver was prouced by cupellation,
were developed rapidly following the Claudian invasion in AD
43 [Frere, 1974, pp. 321-24; Ireland, 1986, pp. 221-24]. Thus, one
might ascribe a more proactive role to the inventories alluded to
by Pliny, as being needed not solely to safeguard the stocks from
theft, but also to plan expenditure and coinage issues, and ulti-
mately to indicate the need to replenish stocks by securing new
supplies.
Suetonius [Augustus, xxviii] and Dio [liii, 30,2] record that
in 23 BC, Augustus, fearing he was about to die after a long
illness, handed over an account (rationaritun), which listed pub-
lic revenues and armed forces. Suetonius [Augustus, ci] informs
us that on his death in AD 14 Augustus left "a summary of the
condition of the empire" (breviariun'z totiits imperii), which
Tacitus describes as containing "a list of the national resources.
It gave the numbers of regular and auxiliary troops serving in
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the army; the strength of the navy, statistics concerning the
provinces and dependent kingdoms; direct and indirect taxation;
recurrent expenditure and gifts" [Annals i, 11, 4]. Suetonius and
Dio note that it also listed the amounts of cash in the Aerariurn,
in the provincial fisci, and in the hands of the publicani, and that
it included the names of the freedmen and slaves from whom a
detailed account could be obtained [Suetonius, Augustus ci; Dio,
lvi, 33, 2]. The closeness of this information to the executive
authority of the emperor is attested by Tacitus' statement that it
was written out by Augustus himself.
There is evidence that the imperial accounts were continued
beyond Augustus' reign. Suetonius [Caligula, xvi] and Dio [lix, 9,
4] commented that the "accounts of the empire" (rationes
imperii), which had been made public regularly by Augustus,
were allowed to lapse by Tiberius (AD 14-37), and revived by
Caligula (AD 37-4 1). It would have been surprising had they not
been continued beyond Augustus' lifetime, when one considers
the evolutionary character of Roman political institutions in the
first century AD. Revolutionary change did not follow the eclipse
of the Republic. Rather, Augustus "proceeded by a slow process
of trial and error, feeling his way forward with patient care."
The system of government he established was enduring, and
"gave the world a large measure of peace and stable government
for over two hundred years." [Scullard, 1976, p. 215].
The Res Gestae is a remarkable account to the Roman
people of Augustus' stewardship. It listed and quantified his
public largesse, which encompassed distributions to the people,
grants of land or money to army veterans, subsidies to the
Aerariurn, building of temples, religious offerings, and expendi-
tures on theatrical shows and gladiatorial games. It was not an
account of state revenue and expenditure, but was designed to
demonstrate Augustus' munificence. The significance of the Res
Gestae from an accounting perspective, lies in the fact that it
was compiled retrospectively towards the end of Augustus' life.
This illustrates that the executive authority had access to de-
tailed financial information, covering a period of some forty
years, which was still retrievable after the event.
Viewed in conjunction with the literary references, one is
struck by the scope of the accounting information at the
emperor's disposal, which suggests that its purpose encom-
passed planning and decision-making, particularly when one
considers its closeness to the executive authority. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine that financial control could have been exercised
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without some financial planning. Although, by itself, the sophis-
ticated nature of the accounts surrounding the Roman monetary
system in the first century AD cannot prove that financial con-
trol took place, it does corroborate that view.
Origins
It remains to consider why these accounts were brought
into being. The evidence indicates that the answer lies in the
emperor's public expenditure commitments. He was obliged to
subsidize the state heavily from his own private funds (fiscus),
because of the inadequacy of public revenues which resulted in
large budget deficits. The scale of these subsidies, and the
wealth of the emperor, is apparent from the 2.4 billion sesterces
noted in the Res Gestae as having been spent by Augustus on the
Aerariurn, the people and the veterans alone [Res Gestae, Sum-
mary, 1], compared to annual public revenues, which have been
estimated hypothetically in the region of 500 million sesterces
[Millar 1977, p. 1 9 1] . Increasingly, therefore, the emperor's per-
sonal finances became intertwined with those of the state
[Millar, 1977, pp. 189-201], and he had strong personal motiva-
tion to exercise budgetary control over public spending [Brunt,
1966, p. 89].
Dc Ste. Croix's [1956, p. 43] observation that it was com-
mon practice for men of property to keep accounts begs the
question of whether the accounts kept by Augustus were a con-
tinuation of this. Their national scope and content were fully
consistent with the extent of his property. As principal citizen
his property transcended that of anyone else, and over the pe-
riod of his reign became difficult to separate from that of the
state. It was not unnatural, therefore, that his accounts should
be of national significance. 	 -
The manner in which the process was administered further
illustrates the connection with the emperor's personal finances.
At the center of the management of the Roman monetary system
was the emperor's principal financial secretary, the a rationthus.
The most detailed description of his duties comes from the poet
Statius [Silvae, iii, 3], from whom we can deduce that in addi-
tion to advising on how much coin to issue, he was required to
forecast public revenues, and estimate public expenditure.
Statius was writing about the reign of Domitian (AD 8 1-96),
which indicates the importance of this office some seventy years
after Augustus' death. But how did the office evolve? Brunt
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[1966, P. 89] suggests its origins lay in the employment by
Augustus of the same staff to administer both his public and
private finances, which as we have seen became inextricably
linked. Thus he used clerks and accountants from his private
staff at Rome to assist him in supervising the public treasury,
which entailed them having access to the public records held
within the Aerariurn. If this scenario is correct, the public ac-
counting records maintained by Augustus, and the budgetary
role of the a rationibus under Domitian, can be viewed as part of
the same evolutionary trend; and there is no reason to suppose
that it excluded the emperors in between. In the case of
Claudius (AD 41-54), for example, his private secretaries, includ-
ing Pallas, his a rationibus, seem to have enjoyed unprecedented
political status [Millar, 1977, pp. 74-77].
The dependency on the emperor for subsidies was height-
ened by the absence of government borrowings, which exposed
the state to short-term deficits. These could result in the state
defaulting on obligations, seizing large fortunes, or debasing the
coinage [Duncan-Jones, 1994, pp. 3-5] . Difficulties in funding
army discharge bonuses under Augustus and his immediate suc-
cessor, Tiberius, led to virtual mutiny [Duncan-Jones, 1994, p.
11]
.
 It follows that although there has been a shift away from
the view that coin was minted solely to enable the state to make
payments, this role remained vital. Furthermore, the origins of
the emperor's accounts in the first century AD appear firmly
linked to the state's public expenditure requirements. In this
respect, the evidence from the accounts runs contrary to the
view that money was used for financial control, because it em-
phasizes the importance of money to the state for making pay-
ments. These two aspects of monetary policy are not mutually
exclusive, however, and the one may have been the logical out-
come of the other. Effective financial control depended on fi-
nancial planning, which was initiated by the keeping of the ac-
counts that arose from the emperor's public expenditure
obligations. This supports Lo Cascio's [1981, p. 77] argument,
that even when the "primary purpose" of government measures
was to make payments, "this result was attained by a govern-
ment aware of, and interested in, what happened to its coinage
once it was in circulation."
CONCLUSION
The scope of the accounting information surrounding the
Roman monetary system in the first century AD supports the'
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view that coinage was used for financial control. Accounts en-
abled the state to control the operations of the Aerarium and the
Imperial Mint, and also the financial dealings of the state's offi-
cials in the provinces. The possible uses of this information went
beyond facilitating the minting operations; and it was during the
reign of Augustus that its potential as an aid to imperial plan-
ning and budgeting was first recognized. This represents an ex-
ception to the normally passive role of the emperor in not ac-
tively seeking information. The Res Gestae together with the
literary references indicate a wide range of financial informa-
tion over a prolonged period of time, suggesting that its purpose
included planning and decision-making, particularly when one
considers its closeness to the executive authority of the emperor.
There is evidence in the role of the a rationibus under subse-
quent emperors, and from literature, that these accounts were
continued beyond Augustus' lifetime.
The emperor had strong personal motivation to exercise
budgetary control over public spending owing to the inadequacy
of public revenues, which required him to provide large subsi-
dies. The dependency on the emperor was increased by the ab-
sence of government borrowings. Increasingly his personal fi-
nances became intertwined with those of the state. This was
apparent in the government office of a ration ibus which evolved
out of the management of the emperor's private estate. It follows
that although the scope of the accounts supports the proposition
that they were used for financial control, the impetus for keep-
ing those accounts originally came from the emperor's public
expenditure commitments and the need for the state to make
payments. This suggests that financial control may have been
encouraged by the financial planning that arose out of the exi-
gencies of funding public expenditure; and in this way these two
aspects of monetary policy can be reconciled-.
The main way forward for research lies in the coins them-
selves. Analysis of quantities, composition and geographical dis-
tribution provides evidence of the adjustments to the coins' rela-
tive weight and content, decisions on when and how much to
mint, and the extent to which the currency system was enclosed,
all of which have been put forward by previous authors as indi-
cators of financial control. Inevitably the evidence is incomplete
owing to the haphazard nature of the coin-survivals. The evi-
dence is still being augmented by the discovery of new finds and
the publication of old ones. Studies from alternative perspec-
tives, such as the present one, are useful because they compli-
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ment the incomplete evidence from coins. The process can work
the other way, however. In this respect, the major inference to
be drawn from this article is that financial control, which de-
pended on planning, is likely to have become more developed
under Augustus and his successors than before, because it was
Augustus who initiated systematic planning information. Coin-
research in this direction could help confirm or deny the role of
accounting as a facilitator of financial control.
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The Anglo-Saxon period has been characterised as playing no
part in accounting history. The article appraises whether this
view can be sustained in the light of current knowledge. A
review of the use of written English, accounting in the Church,
governmental financial planning, the dissemination of
accounting practice from Europe, and the use of money values
in Anglo-Saxon law-codes, provides evidence to the contrary.
Evidence of accounting exists in the surviving documentation, in
the sophistication of government finances, in the Anglo-Saxon
mind-set relating to the use of money and monetary values, and
in the continuity between earlier and later periods.
Keywords: Early medieval; public accounting; Church;
estates; monetary values.
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Oldroyd: Accounting in Anglo-Saxon England
Introduction
The Anglo-Saxon period (c.450-c.1066) has been characterised as playing no part
in accounting history. The conventional view is that government accounting
commenced in England in the twelfth century, and manorial accounting in the
thirteenth. In Europe, accounting was preserved in the Roman Church following the
eclipse of the Roman Empire in the West, and at the court of Charlemagne in the
ninth century. Apparently, neither source influenced the development of accounting
amongst the Anglo-Saxons. They remained an illiterate society, dependent on the
spoken word. Chatfield (1977, p.20) writes that "in pre-Norman England literacy
was so rare, even among the nobility, that a written system of accounts would
hardly have justified its cost. Until the eleventh century, financial data was nearly
always communicated and verified orally, written documents being merely
supplementary to the more important spoken word". This view-is shared by
Edwards (1989, p.32). Perhaps the reason why accounting historians have taken
this line is that the main article on the subject (Jack, 1966) is negative in its
conclusions about account-keeping in England and Europe prior to 1100 (p-i46).
This apparent unanimity is illumined by Parker's (1980, p.9O) only comment on
Jack in his useful bibliography that the article 'argues that medieval accounting was
more efficient than is usually admitted".
However, Anglo-Saxon scholarship has advanced considerably during the last
thirty years; and the purpose of this present study is to appraise whether the
established view, that accounting was virtually non-existent in Anglo-Saxon
England, still seems tenable in the light of current knowledge. The answer is a
cautious negative; although the prime aim of the article is to highlight those areas
that warrant further investigation, rather than to provide definitive solutions. This
type of study, which touches both the ancient and modern worlds, helps answer
Lister's (1983, p.68) criticism that accounting history is a series of disconnected
episodes. An important issue is the difficulty of delineating what constitutes
accounting, particularly in an historical context. The article seeks to resolve this by
looking for evidence of continuity with those earlier or later practices. commonly
regarded as falling within the ambit of accounting history. such as estate renders or
governmental planning and control. The article is not just concerned with Anglo-
Saxon England, therefore, but also looks at the post Conquest period together with
Roman and Frankish Gaul. It attempts to take an overview, although most of the
evidence is concentrated in the tenth and eleventh centuries.
The article starts with Alfred the Great (87 1-899). as he has been singled Out
for particular mention by accounting historians (Jack. [966, pp.141-2: Edwards.
1 989, p.32). It then considers the extent to which the literacy of the society and the
role of the Church were facilitating influences, before moving on to look for
evidence of accounting in the fiscal and monetary systems. the dissemination of
European practice to England, and the use of the monetary unit of measurement.
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Alfred the Great
Alfred's significance for accounting historians lies in his educational programme
which aimed to improve the level of learning and literacy in his kingdom. Edwards
(1989, p.32) writes that "the fact that Alfred, who ruled between 87 1-899, learned
to read and write marks him out as a person of exceptional ability". It was therefore
"extraordinary" rather than typical of the time, "that he arranged for the
maintenance of accounting records and for a periodic inventory of his properties".
Edwards is following Jack (1966, p.14-2), who states "that Alfred, like
Charlemagne, had, or could readily have made, inventories of his lands and those
of his monasteries". Jack juxtaposes this statement with a description of some of
Alfred's financial reforms, which begs the question of whether keeping inventory
records was also an innovation. Jack's surmises are based on a statement by
Alfred's biographer, Asser, that Alfred presented him "with two documents in
which there was a lengthy list of everything which was in the two monasteries
named Congresbury and Banwell" in Somerset (Keynes & Lapidge, 1983, p.97).
Assuming the work not to be a forgery, because its authenticity has recently been
called into question (Smyth, 1995, p.366), the two monasteries were granted to
Asser as an inducement for him to stay at court rather than return home to his
monastery in Wales. The inventory records were only important to him because
they helped illustrate Alfred' s determination that he should stay. Asser (Keynes and
Lapidge 1983, p.105-10), who was himself a monk, did not regard the monasteries'
inventory records as remarkable, in the same way that he enthused about Alfred's
other innovations. It therefore seems unlikely, on the strength of a genuine Asser,
that the recording of property in English monasteries was unusual in the late ninth
century, or that it was initiated by Alfred. If, on the other hand, Smyth (1995, p.226)
is correct, and the work is a forgery that originated at Ramsey Abbey
(Huntingdonshire) in the early eleventh century, one can discount the grant of
monasteries to Asser altogether as being a fabrication that was borrowed from the
anonymous Life of Alcuin.
On both counts, Alfred's significance as an accounting innovator is doubtful.
although his life does touch on several important issues that have accounting
implications. His educational programme, his links with the Church, the tax system
which funded his defence against the Danes, the European orientation of his court,
and his new law-code are all relevant to the rest of the discussion.
How widespread was the use of written EngUsh?
If one accepts Asser's biography of Alfred as genuine, it provides a contemporary
record of Alfred's educational reforms, and the state of literacy in ninth century
England. The general level of illiteracy within Anglo-Saxon society is the main
10
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argument against the use of written accounts. Two main points can be deduced
from Asser's work: 1.) Asser regarded Alfred's desire for learning as exceptional.
This is borne out by the literary output of his reign (Smyth, 1995, p.217). However,
the extent to which Alfred was exceptional is difficult to tell, owing to the lack of
information about other kings. For instance, Bede, who was writing in the first half
of the eighth century, mentioned certain other kings as being learned, without
elaborating. He noted that Sigbert, king of the East Angles, founded a school in the
seventh century "for the education of boys in the study of letters" (Bede, 18).
Bede's history was dedicated to King Ceolwulf of Northumbria, who had an "eager
desire" to learn history, and studied the Scriptures with "diligent zeal" (Bede,
preface). The extent of King Atheistan's (925-39) book collection bears witness to
the scholarly nature of his court (Keynes, 1985, p-i98). 2.) If Alfred was
exceptional, it was not because he could read English. A distinction should be
drawn between English and Latin literacy, the former being more common than the
latter. For Asser, it was Alfred's hunger for knowledge and mastery of Latin in
adulthood that was unusual, rather than his learning to read English as a boy. S myth
(1995, pp.220, 230) dismisses Asser's account as unbelievable, arguing instead that
the maturity of Alfred's writings are suggestive of a man "steeped in a lifetime of
Latin and Old English scholarship". However, the primacy of English over Latin
literacy, which Asser's account implies, is consistent with Alfred's own testimony
that "many could still read things written in English" even though the knowledge
of Latin had "decayed throughout England" (Keynes & Lapidge, 1983, p.126). The
alternate view, that Alfred was exaggerating the decline in Latin (Morrish, 1986,
pp.96-7), and that he himself had a lifelong understanding of the language, would
raise further doubts over the illiteracy of the society.
In the short term, the replacement of English with Latin as the language of
government and administration following the Norman Conquest may have resulted
in a reduced level of literacy in England (Clanchy, 1993, p.27). This would tie in
with Baxter's (1980, p.69) suggestion that the invention of the squared table known
as the "exchequer" was necessary to assist reckoning by illiterate officials.
Galbraith (1948, pp.39, 57) suggests that the inability of Norman officials to
understand written English caused them to discard the pre-Conquest archives,
which could explain their disappearance. Aside from the difference in language, the
Normans did not share the Anglo-Saxon tradition of written history and law-
making; and their administrators were less experienced in the use of written records
than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts (Galbraith, 1961, pp.45-6; Clanchy, 1993,
p.T1).
The implication for accounting historians is that the use of written English by
the Anglo-Saxons was more widespread than they realise. This is backed up by the
common occurrence of inscriptions in churches and jewellery, and by the survival
of a significant number of administrative documents, written in English, that
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include law-codes, wills, leases, memoranda, charters (most charters were written
in Latin), marriage agreements, estate lists and surveys, lists of treasures and stock
inventories (Campbell, 1986, p.158; Kelly, 1990, pp.4.7-51). An extract from one of
these, relating to the assignment of property in the late tenth century, is reproduced
in Appendix 1. This document is more than a list. It places monetary values on the
various items of livestock and deadstock, the totals of which provide evidence of
reckoning.
Campbell (1986, pp.158, 175, 177-8) suggests a possible connection
between the ability of many laymen to read English, and the sophistication of
government administration in late Anglo-Saxon England. He speculates that
the extensive use of the written record for administrative purposes might go
back as far as the eighth century. Throughout the Anglo-Saxon period, royal
charters were written in monasteries working for the king, and letters were used
from the ninth century at the latest. It seems likely that royal scribes were
producing letters, charters and other administrative documents in a type of
secretariat in the mid-tenth century (Keynes, 1980, pp.79-81; Dumville, 1992,
p.182), although Chaplais (1985, pp.4. 3-4, 51) questions whether these were
full-time officials, and argues that clerics rather than laymen continued to
produce documents in Latin. Monasteries may have acted as repositories for the
documents of neighbouring lay magnates, just as they were used to store their
hoards of treasure (Keynes, 1980, p.i48; Loyn, 1986, p.3; Smyth, 1995, p.372).
Viking raids on churches and monasteries, beginning with the raid on
Lindisfarne, Northumberland, in 793, did not favour the preservation of records
(Loyn, 1967, p.41; Dumville, 1992, p.32; Smyth, 1995, pp.3'7l-2). It is not
suggested that documents supplanted the spoken word as a means of doing
business, but there is a weight of evidence that writing was used extensively in
the routine procedures of late Anglo-Saxon England (Keynes, 1990, pp.244,
255-7). Campbell (1986, p.158) maintains that those documents which have
survived are merely representative of a much larger number, suggesting that
English was the ordinary language for much written business. Not all authors
agree (Wormald, 1977). The dispute is not about whether documentation
existed, but about how extensive it was, and how far it went back. These issues
are difficult to resolve (Clanchy, 1993, pp.27-32.). The widespread use of
administrative documents seems likely from at least the tenth century,
however, with important implications for the literacy of the upper levels of
Anglo-Saxon lay society and the use of written accounts.
Did the Church foster the development of accounting practice?
Alfred showed great respect for the papacy, and may have been the first Anglo-
Saxon king to make regular payments of the Peter's Pence levy to Rome (Duckett,
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1956, p.193; Loyn, 199!, p.242). His scholarly advisers were all clerics. Bishops
attended his councils, and even fought in the army against the pagan Vikings (Loyn,
1967, p.48). Alfred is a good example, therefore, of the interdependence of Church
and secular ruler, that became characteristic of England and Gaul in the post Roman
period. Loyn (1991, p.239) writes that nowhere was this "mutual need" more
apparent than in England following its conversion to Christianity. There, the
missionary Church offered a discipline based on the permanent written evidence of
books, which served as an example of "kingship in action". This contradicts Jack's
(1966, p.140) stark observation that the written word "had no particular authority"
throughout the Dark Ages. The utilisation of the authority bestowed by the written
wisdom of the Church is illustrated by Alfred's law-code, which incorporated Old
Testament laws (Whitelock, 1979, p.4O8). It follows that the close involvement of
the Church in secular matters, coupled with a reliance on the Church's written
learning, are important features of Alfred's reign.
This raises the question of whether the written learning of the Church
extended to administrative matters. According to Loyn (1991, pp.233, 283):
there is much more than mere abstraction to the generalisation that in the
Church appeared the true heir of Rome. ... In face of at times most savage
difficulties the GaJlic bishops kept alive the spirit of Roman administration.
In the towns of Gaul, the bishop took the place of the Roman official as the
"characteristic social leader". In the fifth century, bishops in Gaul tended to be
drawn from the old aristocratic senatorial class (Geary, 1988, pp.33-4). For
accounting historians, the Church is significant as the conservator of accounting
practice following the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. Chatfield (1977,
p.20) observes that the receipt and disbursement accounting of the Roman Church
offers the closest parallel to Roman bookkeeping method. For hundreds of years the
Church levied and collected taxes throughout Europe. As early as the sixth century,
deacons were appointed to administer church properties and report on their
revenues. Throughout the Middle Ages, agents of the papal treasury were located
in the provinces and were responsible for forwarding receipts to Rome (Chatfield,
1977, p.20; Yamey, 1982, pp.3-5).
Direct evidence that the Church fostered accounting practice in Anglo-Saxon
England exists in connection with church estates. This is discussed in the section of
the article relating to the dissemination of European accounting practice.
Furthermore, the close involvement of the Church, with its higher level of literacy
and tradition of account-keeping, in the economic life of the community, increases
the likelihood that the Church also had an accounting role in secular Anglo-Saxon
society. This would not be surprising, given the Church's role in producing other
secular documents, such as royal charters in favour of thegns and other laymen
(Chaplais, 1985, pA. 6). Churchmen were involved in the economic life of the
community first through the collection of tithes and customary dues. The laws of
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King me of Wessex indicate that Church-Scot, or payment of the first fruits of the
harvest, was already compulsory by the beginning of the eighth century. The list of
dues in the first code of Cnut in the early eleventh century shows that the Church
collected dues at every stage of the agricultural year (Loyn, 1991, pp.263-6).
Second, the Church's authority extended to "good faith in business" (Loyn, 1991,
p.24.6). Bishops had a responsibility for weights and measures, and churches
arbitrated on the fairness of commercial transactions (Campbell, 1986, p.148).
Finally, there was an intermingling of the administration of Church and government
finances. On the one hand, churches were used to facilitate the collection of state
taxes (Loyn, 1991, p.270), suggesting that the Church assisted the state in
administering the fiscal system. In 872 the bishops of King Burgred of Mercia took
an active role in helping the king to levy and collect tax to buy off the Danes
(Smyth, 1995, p.4. 1). On the, other hand, the government becarie involved in
enforcing the collection of tithe in the latter part of the period, and in prescribing
how it should be used (Godfrey, 1962, pp.325-7; Loyn, 1991, p.265).
Is there any evidence of accounting in the fiscal and monetary systems?
Domesday Book of 1086 is regarded as a landmark in accounting history, primarily
because it heralded a written system of government accounting in England,
notwithstanding that it reflected concepts of accountability, decision-making and
control (Godfrey & Hooper, 1996, p.35). Written government developed further
under Henry I (1100-35), with the creation of the office of the Exchequer, which
brought the agents of local government directly under the control of the Crown
(Barrow, 1956, p.76). The Pipe Roll which commenced in 1130, and recorded the
twice-yearly tax returns of the county sheriffs to the Exchequer, is generally
regarded as the earliest surviving public accounting record in England, although
strictly speaking this is not true. The Geld Rolls, which are related to, but distinct
from, Domesday Book, recorded the amount of tax paid into the treasury at
Winchester in about 1086 by the counties of south-west England. An earlier
account for the county of Northamptonshire dates from the 1070's, which listed the
hides (units of land) in the shire, followed by the number which had paid the geld
(land tax) (Galbraith, 1961, p.8'7; 1974, pp.92-3).
The expansion of written government in England under the Norman and
Angevin kings, allied to the poor survival rate of early documentation, has
encouraged accounting historians to discount its existence prior to the Norman
Conquest. However, the written government of Henry I was based on the system
that existed in 1066. The use of writs (written instructions) by Henry I was inherited
from the Anglo-Saxons, notwithstanding that their form changed (Barrow, 1956,
p.77; Keynes, 1980, pp.136-8; Clanchy, 1993, pp.31-2). Henry's tax system was a
continuation of the Anglo-Saxon geld, which itself was "an advanced institution of
government for it's day and age" (Loyn, 1991, p.316).
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The pre-existence of a sophisticated tax system, together with the survival of
the Geld Rolls and the Northamptonshire Geld Roll, belies Jack's (1966, pp. I45-6)
conclusion that public accounting is unlikely to have predated the invention of the
Exchequer in the twelfth century. Historians have argued that the complexity of the
royal finances as revealed by Domesday suggests that Edward the Confessor (1042-
66) had a "fairly good system of accounting using written record"; and that the
Northamptonshire Geld Roll in particular indicates "that written tax records at least
antedate the [Norman] Conquest" (Gaibraith, 1948, pp.44-5; Campbell, 1986,
p.176). The Northamptonshire Geld Roll (see Appendix 2) is significant because of
its close chronological proximity to the Conquest, and because it was written in
English rather than Latin, which is unusual for a post-Conquest document. These
factors, together with its content, which suggests a routine operation based on
traditional figures that were not open to scrutiny by the collectors, have led to the
conclusion that this type of document was typical of the pre-Conquest period
(Galbraith, 1961, p.95; 1974, p.93; Stenton, 1971, p.644). The Geld Rolls, for their
part, which were written in Latin, indicate that the writing of accounts probably
accompanied the collection of tax, as the collectors of Somerset were allowed a
deduction for the cost of a scribe. Other expenses included the purchase of money-
bags, and the fee for carrying the money to Winchester (Gaibraith, 1961, p.88;
Campbell, 1986, p.174).
Domesday Book itself was in the tradition of those earlier surveys by
Frankish kings that made use of the sworn inquest. Surveys were undertaken for a
variety of purposes, such as the assessment and valuation of property, and could be
consulted by the king to determine both what he possessed and how much it was
worth (Ganshof, 1971, p.294; Campbell, 1986, p.164; Nelson, 1990, p.277).
Harvey (1971, p.'763) identifies certain county lists, traditionally regarded by
historians as by-products of Domesday Book, as being earlier; and concludes that
the lay-out of Domesday was based on existing fiscal documents, some of which
pre-dated the Conquest. Furthermore, it has been shown that the "hidages"
recorded in Domesday Book were partly dependent on the earlier Anglo-Saxon
hidage lists (Campbell, 1986, p.l5'7). The Tribal Hidage daied from the seventh or
eighth centuries, the Burghal Hidage from the late ninth century, and the County
Hidage from the tenth or early eleventh centuries. These lists recorded the number
of hides in an area as a basis for determining its taxable capacity. The "hide" was a
unit of land-division. Traditionally, one hide represented the amount of land
necessary to support a peasant and his household, although it changed to become a
notional unit of assessment (Gaibraith, 1961, pp.47-8; Loyn, 1984, pp.36-8;
Andersen, 1991, p.'75). The assessment of taxes based on hides appears as early as
the seventh century, as soon as there are charters to provide descriptions of land
(Loyn, 1984, pp.38-9; Campbell, 1986, p.172). In some instances, the hidages
attributed to the shires in the County Hidage have been shown to tally with those
15
riTTii1t1 History N5 Vol 2. No 1- 1997
recorded in Domesday Book to "a remarkable degree", providing evidence of
continuity in shire assessment between the Anglo-Saxon and Norman periods (Loyn,
1984, p.120; 1991, p. 319).
Like Domesday Book, the antecedents of the county sheriff's role as a tax
collector predate the Norman Conquest, although it was not until Norman times that
the full potential of the office was realised (Loyn, 1984, pp.139, 196). By 1066
England was already divided into shires, each under a royal official, the sheriff
(Campbell, 1986, p.172). Historians have linked the origins of the sheriff's office to
the collection of traditional renders from estates. The great estates were both centres
of administration and economic resources (Smyth, 1995, p.38). From an early date,
food and labour were supplied to support the king and his household and to maintain
the defence of the kingdom. It became common for these dues to be paid in money.
The task of collection fell on the king's reeves, who also managed the royal estates
and exercised justice in the locality (Whitelock, 1979, p.64). Gradually through time,
the office of the sheriff ("shire-reeve") evolved as the king's chief agent for the
collection and remittance of renders from all the estates in the shire (Loyn, 1991,
p.31 5).
The most important source of public revenue in late Anglo-Saxon England was
the land tax known as the geld, which was assessed at so much per hide. The geld
demonstrated the power of the state in operating a sophisticated system of
assessment on a national level that involved planning. The need for defence against
the Vikings provided an impetus for such a tax system. This is illustrated by the
Burghal Hidage, which assigned men to defend the network of burhs (fortified sites)
that had been set up by Alfred the Great in the 880s. Although the Burghal Hidage
has been dated to the reign of Edward the Elder in the early tenth century, it is likely
that this document is a revision of an earlier one compiled under Alfred (Keynes &
Lapidge, 1983, p.339). The document began by listing all the burhs which formed
part of the network, in addition to the number of hides of land in the vicinity assigned
to each. Each hide would supply one man. The number of hides allocated to a
particular burh depended on the length of its defensive wall, calculated using the
ratio of four men to one pole (5.5 yards) of wall. The document explains:
if every hide is represented by one man, then every pole can be manned by
four men. And so for the maintenance of twenty poles of wall, eighty hides are
required (Keynes & Lapidge, 1983, pp.193-4).
This formula enables one to calculate the length of the fortifications of particular
burhs from the listed hidages. The fact that in many cases the imputed length has
leen shown by archaeologists to correspond to the actual length indicates the
accuracy of the Burghal Hidage as a planning document (Campbell, 1986, p.173).
The possibility that Alfred was forced to pay large tributes to the Danes to secure
peace (Smyth, 1995, pp.38-9, 143) suggests that he also used the hidage system to
raise taxes in money.
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The assessment of taxes based on hides was extended in the late tenth century
with the renewed threat of Viking attack. Geld was assessed both to pay for
defence, and to buy off the Danes (danegeld). The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle records
that danegeld amounting to £137,000 was paid during the reign of Etheired (978-
1016), in addition to £21,000 paid to mercenaries. £82,500 tribute was collected by
Cnut in 1018 following his accession. These figures have been alternately disputed
and defended by scholars (Lawson, 1984 & 1990; Gillingham, 1990); but even
allowing for the scaling-down suggested by the sceptics (Gillingham, 1990, p.944),
the collection of such huge sums in the tenth and eleventh centuries indicates the
efficiency of the tax system. Payment of tax was encouraged by the penalty of
forfeiting lands in cases of default (Lawson, 1984, pp.723-6). Following the peace
settlement with the Danes, geld continued to be levied until 1051 to maintain the
army and the navy. It was reinstated by the Normans, and it was- not until the
twelfth century that the use of hides as the regular basis of assessment began to
decline (Campbell, 1986, p-i80).
It follows that continuity and planning are the key-notes of the fiscal system
that existed in late Anglo-Saxon England. The planning aspects are emphasised
when one considers the possible connections between the fiscal and monetary
systems. Money was in general use in England from at least the eighth century. The
continuous history of the English currency began with King Offa (757-96) of
Mercia. From his reign to that of Henry III in the thirteenth centur y , the English
currency was based on the silver penny, with the king's name on the obverse and
the moneyer's name on the reverse (Stenton, 1971, p.223; Lyon, 1976. p.179).
Analysis of the coin-finds indicates that by the eleventh century money was a
common means of exchange, with coins circulating rapidly over distances of up to
two hundred miles (Metcalf, 1986, p-i33). From the end of Edgar's reign (975), the
monetary system was highly sophisticated compared to other European states. It
was kept under complete royal control. Every six or seven years initially, and later
every two or three, the old coins were called in to be replaced by a new issue (Lyon,
1976, p-I94). The evidence from the surviving coin-hoards indicates that the
withdrawal from circulation of millions of silver pennies, and their replacement
with new stock, was carried out efficiently (Campbell, 1986, p. 155). suggesting an
effective system of mint controls. For instance, dies were produced centrally, and
contained the name of the mintlmoneyer to which they related, as a control-mark
(Laing, 1979, p.158; Loyn, 1986, p.5). The effectiveness of the system is borne out
by the subtle and deliberate variations in weight that were carried out over a wide
range of mints (Lyon, 1976, pp.2l6-7; Loyn, 1986, pp.9-10). According to
Atheistan's laws (c.926), each burh was entitled to a mint, and there were about
thirty-five that were active in his reign (Blunt etal., 1989, p.255). The complexity
of the task of withdrawing and re-issuing coin illustrates the government's interest
in managing the currency. The drain on bullion, caused by the heavy tributes
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exacted by the Danes, was a major incentive (Lyon, 1976, pp.l74 .-5, 203-4).
Deliberate adjustments to the weight of new issues, coupled with evidence that the
Crown insisted on receiving tax only in coin of the current issue, implies a
connection between the fiscal and monetary systems. Thus it has been argued that
the state exploited the enclosure of the fiscal and monetary systems to manipulate
its revenues (Loyn, 1984, p.125; Campbell, 1986, pp.156-7), which if correct, is
further indication of financial planning.
Was European accounting practice disseminated to EngLand'?
There were close ties with Europe throughout the period in trade, monetary policy,
religious, cultural and dynastic affairs (Godfrey, 1962, p.220; Stenton, 1971,
pp.222-4; Laing, 1979, pp.124-7; Campbell, 1986, pp.160, 187; Morrish, 1986,
p.100; Loyn, 1991, p.122; Welch, 1992, p.117-8; Smyth, 1995, pp.201, 228). The
question of whether such contacts resulted in the dissemination of accounting
practice to England is pertinent because of the relatively early existence of estate
accounting on the Continent. In England, estate accounting appears to have
commenced on the great Church estates in the first half of the thirteenth century
(Harvey, 1994, p.91). In Gaul, it is evident in the Capitulare de Villis, a series of
written instructions for the management of the royal estates, inspired by
Charlemagne at the end of the eighth century (Latouche, 1967, pp.1 80-1).
The Capitulare de Villis is the most important of a series of surviving
documents that provide an insight into the organisation and management of the
great estates of Charlemagne's Empire. It was intended to correct abuses that had
crept into the administration of the royal estates (Latouche, 1967, p.181; Yamey,
1982, p.3). Although Ganshof (1971, p.134) doubts that it was universally applied,
more recent work suggests that surveys of ninth century royal estates were not
uncommon (Nelson, 1990, p.274). The existence of the Capitulare de Villis reflects
the importance of these estates as a source of Crown revenue and a basis of political
authority (Previte-Orton, 1971, pp.321-2; Martindale, 1983, pp.160, 165). The
document contains a number of references to accounting, which are reproduced in
Appendix 3. The essential features are as follows: The estates were managed by
stewards, who were responsible for particular districts (clause 5). The steward was
directly accountable to the lord, whereas lower officials were accountable to the
steward (clause 63). The steward was obliged to supply the lord, the household
workers, the women's workshops and the army with produce, and to keep records
of the amounts involved, and surplus left over (clauses 20, 30-3 1, 44, 55). Standard
v'olume measures were used throughout the estate (clause 9). Surplus produce was
sold for cash, which was remitted to the lord on Palm Sunday, after the steward's
accounts had been audited (clause 28). At Christmas time, the steward submitted an
account of the estate's produce for the year, classified by type (clause 62). The
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document makes it clear that written accounts were required (clauses 44, 55, 62),
although it is possible that these were compiled with the help of inissi (itinerant
commissioners) (Yamey, 1982, p.3).
Latouche (l967,.p.l8l) comments on the haphazard nature of the Capitulare
de Villis, which does not follow a set plan. This is the case for the accounting
instructions, although two types of accounting can be distinguished. The first is a
type of charge and discharge accounting, whereby the steward was rendered
accountable for the difference between the income of his district and his payments,
in goods or money. These accounts were subject to audit. The second, which is
evident in the annual Christmas statement (clause 62), is more in the nature of a
survey of possessions and revenues. Such documents were described as
polyptyques or descriptiones in the Carolingian period. Their purpose is unclear.
Latouche (1967, pp.179-80) contends that descriptiones were ordered by
Charlemagne as a control measure to correct "sharp practices". Tin clause 44,
Charlemagne rebuked estate stewards for not having submitted proper returns in the
past. The inclusion of information concerning the gross product of the estate
indicates they could also have been used for planning next year's output. The
detailed nature of this type of information in the Polvptyche of Irminon, which dates
from the time of Charlemagne, led Latouche (1967, p.192) to conclude that the
"main concern" of Irrninon, abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, "was to assess the
average income from his lands". This is borne out by the capitulary known as
Brevium Exempla, which provided a model for estate surveys. The final instruction
in the document, that totals should be given, item by item, "for past and present
amounts, and for amounts still remaining" (Loyn & Percival, 1975, p.105), suggests
an interest in the average. It could also imply the existence of an account with
opening and closing balances. The juxtaposition of estate survey and charge and
discharge accounts in the Capitulare de Villis suggests that both these forms of
accounting went together. This impression is corroborated by similarities between
the Capitulare de Villis and the Brevium Exempla, both of which survived in the
same early ninth century manuscript (Loyn & Percival, 1975, p.98). The
similarities between the two are most apparent in the final section of the Brevium
Exempla relating to the survey of five royal estates. Extracts from one of these are
contained in Appendix 4. The same standard units of measurement are employed,
which in both cases are noted as being set centrally by the palace. The survey of
estates by district is the same, as are the types of headings under which produce is
classified.
It is difficult to tell the extent to which the Capitulare de Villis was an
innovation, as opposed to the encodement of established practice. The capitulary is
pre-dated by a seventh century polyptyque from the abbey of St Martin of Tours,
which listed the names of the tenants grouped in localities together with the yields
owing to the monastery (Wallace-Hadrill, 1983, p.125). The chance survival of this
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document - fragments of it were used in a bookbinding - suggests that such returns
were not necessarily retained on a permanent basis, and implies the existence of
others which were discarded.
In particular, accounting historians would like to know whether there was any
lingering memory of Roman estate-practice. After all, the main aim of Roman
estate accounting seems to have been to expose any losses due to the dishonesty or
negligence of officials (de Ste. Croix, 1956, p.38), which is consistent with the
spirit of the Cap itulare de Villis. Jack (1966, p.143) suggests that the Carolingiaris
should have been aware of Roman practice through the parables in the New
Testament. However, it is likely that there were other more direct sources. First,
there is the possibility that Roman estate-practices never ceased. Authors have
commented on the ready integration of the incoming Germans into Gallo-Roman
country life, following the collapse of the Empire in the West (Latouche, 1967,
p.102; Boussard, 1968, pp.10-12; James, 1988, pp.189-91); witness the continued
use of coloni (small farmers tied to the land) instead of slaves, which was an
important feature of the late Empire (Latouche, 1967, pp.18, 71, 182). According
to Geary (1988, p.96), there was also continuity with late Roman field division,
agricultural techniques and manorial organisation. Second, reference material
existed in the form of preserved classical texts. The Carolingian court and the
i:nonasteries associated with it made a concerted attempt from the late eighth
century to preserve classical knowledge through the collection and copying of
ancient material from Italy (Reynolds, 1983, pp.xxi-xxv; Bischoff, 1994, pp.94-5).
For example, the name forms of the plants and animals listed in the Capitulare de
Villis and the Brevium Exempla correspond to Greek and Latin glossaries that had
been developed from classical sources (Metz, 1960, pp.32-4.3).
Amongst the texts which were copied at this time were Columella's textbook
on agriculture and Pliny the Elder's Natural History. Like the Capitulare de Villis,
both these authors wrote about large estates that were dependent on stewards for
their efficient management, rather than the direct involvement of the owners
(Columella, XII, preface 10). Columella made various references to the estate-
steward submitting charge and discharge accounts to the master (I, viii, 4, 13; XI,
i, 24; XIII, iii, 7), but did not deal with the subject explicitly. The assumption seems
to have been that such accounting was taken for granted. Columella gave a fuller
account of the other duties and responsibilities of estate-stewards (I, vii-viii; XI;
XII), which are also touched on by Pliny (XVffl, vii-viii). In this connection, Pliny
is most significant because he alerted the reader to Columella's existence, by
quoting him as a source for the sections of his work on agriculture (XVII-XVLX).
Correspondence between Alcuin and Charlemagne in 798 and 799 indicates that
Charlemagne had access to Pliny's Natural History in the court library at Aachen
(Reynolds, 1983, pp.309-10; Bischoff, 1994, p.57). It follows that Charlemagne.
with his interest in rationalising his estates, might also have known about
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Columella's work, which was circulating at about this time. Copies of Columella
were made at the abbeys of Corbie and Fulda, and the text was also known at Tours
and Reichenau (Wallace-Hadrill, 1983, pp.336-7; Bischoff, 1994, pp.146, 148,
150). Bischoff (p.150)dated the Fulda manuscript to the 830's, and believed that it
might derive from an earlier copy in the court library. Therefore, there is a
reasonable chance that the text was known to either Charlemagne or his successor,
Louis the Pious. According to Louis' anonymous biographer, he also had an interest
in estate reform (Martindale, 1983, pp.132, 159-60). It is not suggested that the
detailed arrangements in the Capitulare de Villis were drawn verbatim from
Columella, but that the underlying Roman idea of stewardship coupled to
accountability, might well have been.
If continuity with Roman practice in the Capitulare de Villis is a possibility,
what about continuity with later generations? Continuity is evident ii' the tradition
of the Carolingian estate survey which was preserved by the Church in the ninth
century, and transmitted to England in the tenth (Campbell, 1986. p.164). There are
indications that the practice of surveying estates in England increased as a result of
the tenth century monastic reform movement. English monastic reform depended
on European houses, which provided models for both spiritual living and estate
management (Campbell, 1986, pp.165-6; Loyn, 1986, p.6). In the late ninth
-century, King Alfred attempted to revive organised monastic life in England. which
had declined. True revival occurred from the middle of the tenth century, however,
and was inspired by reformed Benedictine observance on the Continent (Godfrey.
1962. pp.294-309; Loyn. 1991, p.251). The spiritual and temporal aspects of the
monastic reform movement are illustrated by the life of Bishop Ethelwold. one of
its prime architects. As a monk himself, he was concerned to promote religious
observance: but this required the building and decoration of elaborate churches and
precincts, together with the acquisition and efficient management of estates to
support the new foundations (Yorke, 1988, pp.5-7).
Corroboration that the European practice of surveying estates was
disseminated to England at this time exists in the form of a handful of surviving
documents from the tenth and eleventh centuries, showing English monasteries
surveying their estates and compiling lists of stocks, treasures and sources of
income (Campbell, 1986, pp.165, 173). An extract from one of these, dating from
around 963, which relates to Etheiwold's revival of the great monastery of
j'vledesliainstede at Peterborough, is reproduced in Appendix 5. The mention of
monastery inventory records by Asser in his Life of Alfred (qv. p.10) is further
evidence of' this trend, if Sm y th (1995, p.366) is correct that the work originated at
Ramsey Abbey in the early eleventh century. Kelly (1990, p.5 1) maintains that it
was common practice by the end of the period for the great monastic houses to keep
detailed records of their estates, tenants, rents, stock and disbursements. If, as has
been suggested, the valuations contained in Domesday Book were based on estate
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surveys compiled by estate stewards (Godfrey & Hooper, 1996, pp.38, 46), the
underlying expertise was already in place before the Norman Conquest.
The adoption of European estate practice in England in the tenth century
raises the question of whether this included charge and discharge accounting, as
this seems to have featured in Carolingian estate practice, alongside the survey. The
chances of estate surveys surviving were relatively good, as they were intended for
use on an ongoing basis. Consequently, they were copied into cartularies or
registers more readily than other manorial records (Harvey, 1984, p.15). An
alternative approach to the question of why charge and discharge accounts emerged
in England in the thirteenth century, therefore, might be to consider those factors
that would have led to their preservation as opposed to their origin.
The estate surveys which have survived from the Anglo-Saxon period tend to
fall into the category of "customals", because they recorded the customary
obligations of the estate's tenants, in money, labour or produce. Such- documents
were still being used in the fourteenth century; and like manorial charge and
discharge accounts, their incidence rapidly increased in the thirteenth century with
the spread of demesne farming. It follows that from the thirteenth century, it is
sometimes possible to check the theoretical obligations of the tenants recorded in
customals against the figures in the charge and discharge accounts (Harvey, 1984,
pp.18-19). Where a valuation was added, these surveys became known as "extents"
(Titow, 1969, p.29). An extract from a fourteenth century extent of the Manor of
Hodsock in Nottinghamshire is reproduced in Appendix 6, which but for the
valuations, would not have been out of place in a Carolingian poh'prcche.
Is there any accounting significance in the money values incorporated
within Anglo-Saxon Law-codes?
There was a tendency in Anglo-Saxon society to attribute monetary values to assets
and obligations, even where settlement took place in kind. For example, wergilds -
the compensation for killing someone - were assessed in currency, although mixed
payments in coin and in kind were common (Loyn, 1991, p.214). Another example
is the practice of valuing rents from dernesne in money, although frequently these
were paid in kind (Gaibraith, 1948, p.44). The inclusion of monetary values in some
of the law-codes for cattle and other livestock would have assisted the conversion
of cash values into kind (Chadwick, 1963, pp.156-7).
The emphasis on money measurement is paralleled by the Anglo-Saxon
tradition, as reflected in the poem Beowuif, that the performance of social
obligations and the value of individuals to society could be measured in terms of
treasure. Although Beowuif probably dates from the eighth or ninth centuries, it
looks back with nostalgia to an earlier time when Anglo-Saxon war-bands followed
their chiefs in search of plunder. Beowulf depicted a society that was dependent on
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the honouring of mutual obligations between a lord and his thegns, as evidenced by
the exchange of treasure. The lord would protect his people and reward his warriors
with treasures in return for loyal service (Beowuif, pp.97-8, 117-8, 137, 142). The
possession of gold, silver, jewellery, weapons and armour signified more than
material wealth. It symbolised the performance of an individual's social obligations
and his standing in society. Campbell (1982, p.54) writes that "the social and
emotional significance of gold-giving and gold-wearing was complex and deep;
and it was not for nothing that Beowulf died to win a treasure hoard".
This fascination with precious objects was probably one of the factors that
encouraged the early use of coinage in England and the adoption of money as a unit
of measurement. The established history of English coinage began in the seventh
century with the issue of imitations of the small gold tremisses, which had been
penetrating south-east England from the Continent for a considerable time (Lyon,
1976, p.176). The association between ornaments and coinage is evident in the
Scandinavian practice of making gold pendants in imitation of Roman coins. Many
of the Roman coins found in Anglo-Saxon graves were pierced as ornaments, and
one was gilded for mounting on a horse's harness (Laing, 1979, p.4.3). The Anglo-
S axon ideal of measuring the performance of social obligations in terms of treasures
meant their easy translation into monetary values. This is apparent in the first law-
codes, dating from the beginning of the seventh century, which graded the
seriousness of offences in monetary terms, usually the shilling. The shilling was a
unit of account rather than an actual coin. It was the silver penny that was the coin
in circulation; and there were regional variations in the number of pence to a
shilling (Chadwick, 1963, pp.12-20; Loyn, 1986, p.2). A central feature of the
various law-codes was the wergild or "man-price", which was common to other
early Germanic societies (Loyn, 1984, p.45; James, 1988, pp.210-il, 216-18).
Every free man and woman was assessed at his/her wergild, which represented
his/her value to society measured in shillings. This was the amount of compensation
for killing someone, and was gradated according to the victim's social status from
the king downward (Duckett, 1956, p.87; Laing, 1979, pp.116-7).
The social significance of treasure stretched back to the early days of the
Anglo-Saxon settlement, and persisted throughout most of the period. There is
some evidence it declined in the tenth century, when kings bought the loyalty of
their thegns with grants of land rather than treasure (Hinton, 1977, pp.193-4;
Smyth, 1995, p.449). By this time, however, the use of money as a unit of
measurement was firmly established, providing a foundation for future
developments, such as the money valuation of landed property in Domesday Book
(Andersen, 1991, p.77).
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Conclusion
The paper has questioned whether the traditional view, that the Anglo-Saxon period
played no part in accounting history, is tenable in the light of current knowledge.
The main findings are summarised as follows:
1. Written English was more important as a language of business and
administration than has been generally acknowledged by accounting historians.
The illiteracy of the society is the main argument against the use of written
accounts in Anglo-Saxon England; and the possibility that this view is
inaccurate opens up further lines of enquiry.
2. The close involvement of the Church, with its higher level of literacy and
tradition of account-keeping, in the economic life of the community, increases
the likelihood that the Church had an accounting role in secular A-nglo-Saxon
society.
3. The survival of the Geld Rolls, the Northamptonshire Geld Roll, and the earlier
hidage lists shows that public accounting in England predated the Norman
Conquest. The only question is how systematic that accounting was. The level
of planning and control achieved by the fiscal and monetary systems in the
latter part of the period, suggests a high degree of systematisation.
4. Direct evidence that the Church fostered accounting practice in Anglo-Saxon
England exists in connection with church estates. The Carolingian practice of
surveying estates was preserved by the Church in the ninth century, and
transmitted to England in the tenth via the monastic reform movement. This
raises the question of whether charge and discharge accounting was also
transmitted from the Continent, as this was a feature of the body of Carolingian
estate practice, alongside the survey. The chances of estate surveys surviving
were relatively good; and an alternative approach to the question of why charge
and discharge accounts emerged in England in the thirteenth century, might be
to consider the factors that would have led to their preservation as opposed to
their origin.	 -
5. There is probably a connection between the Anglo-Saxons' willingness to
attribute monetary values to assets and obligations, even where settlement took
place in kind, and the heroic ideal of measuring the performance of social
obligations and the value of individuals to society in terms of rings, weapons
and other treasures.
To summarise, evidence of accounting exists in the surviving documentation, in the
sophistication of government finances, in the Anglo-Saxon mind-set relating to the
use of money and monetary values, and in the continuity between earlier and later
periods, all of which warrant the attention of accounting historians.
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Appendixi
Extract from the Assignments of Property to Thomey Abbey
(Robertson, 1956, Appendix H, IX)
These are the things which have been supplied to Thorney. First of all 2000
herrings were bought for 40 pence and then 40 pence [went] for bean-seed; 5 ores
[went] to Ethelferth of Newton for his man; 2 ores were for a ship and nets at
Farcet; and for three plots of ground at Thetford ... ores and 12 pence were given;
and a woman worth 5 ores to Stanground; and three harrows worth 3 ores - one was
given to Newton, the second to Yaxley and the third to Stanground - and 15 pence
for bean-seed at Yaxley and ... pence for another ship and nets at Whittlesey Mere,
and 9 ores for a ... at Huntingdon. One ship worth 2 ores was given from Ely to
Whittlesey Mere. This amounts altogether to three and a half pounds less 30 pence.
Then after that 80 swine and the swineherd were transferred from Milton ... ; the
swine were valued at one and a half pounds and the swineherd at half a pound;
and 12 wagons [were obtained] for 180 pence; and 4 ships at 2 ores each for 8 ores
-- one was given to Newton, the second to Yaxley, the third to Stan ground, the
fourth to Whittlesey Mere. And 10 mancuses of gold were given to Elfnoth for mill-
oxen at Huntingdon, and ... worth 5 mancuses of gold to the monk Elfsige. and a
pound for mill-oxen at Yaxley and at ... to Sweta; 10 pounds. And apart from this
the abbot gave the monk Elfsige ... mancuses of gold for the improvement of the
property belonging to Thorney. And 5 ores were for iron for three mills - 2 ores
worth for Huntingdon and 2 for Yaxley and I for Stanground. The value of the total
amount given by Ely to Thorney (apart from the money for their clothes which ..)
is 16 pounds in gold and silver less 40 pence
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Appendix 2
Extract from the Northamptonshire Geld Roll
(Robertson, 1956, Appendix I, III)
To Sutton Hundred belong 100 hides as was the case in King Edward's time, and
of these 21 hides and two-thirds of a hide have paid geld, and 40 hides are in
demesne [exempt], and 10 hides are the king's own food rent and 28 hides and one-
third of a hide are waste.
To Warden Hundred belong 100 hides as was the case in King Edward's time, and
of these 18 hides less 1 yardland have paid geld and 40 hides are in demesne and
41 hides and 1 yardland are waste
To Egeiweardesle Hundred belong 100 hides, as was the case in King Edward's
time, and of these 16 hides and half a hide have paid geld and 40 hides are in
demesne, and from 6 1/2 hides at Norton not a penny has been received - Osmund,
the king's secretary, owns that estate - and 37 hides are waste
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Appendix 3
capitulate de WI/is vel curt/s Imp er/ailtus
Accounting Extracts (Loyn & Percival, 1975, pp. 68-73)
9 It is our wish that each steward shall keep in his district measures for modii
[units of volume] and sextaria [one sixteenth of a modius], and vessels
containing eight sextaria [ie. half a modius], and also baskets of the same
capacity as we have in our palace.
28 It is our wish that each year in Lent on Palm Sunday, which is also called
Hosanna Sunday, the stewards shall take care to pay in the money part of our
revenue according to our instructions, after we have determined the amount of
our revenue for the year in question.
30 It is our wish that from all the revenue they shall set aside what is needed for
our purposes; and in the same way they are to set aside the produce with which
they load the carts that are needed for the army, both those of the householders
and those of the shepherds, and they shall keep a record of how much they are
sending for this purpose.
3 1 That in the same way each year they shall set aside what is necessary for the
household workers and for the women's workshops; and at the appropriate time
they are to supply it in full measure, and must be in a position to tell us how
they have disposed of it and where it came from.
44 Two thirds of the Lenten food [i.e. food permissable during the Lenten fast]
shall be sent each year for our use - that is, of the vegetables, fish, cheese,
butter, honey, mustard, vinegar, millet, panic, dry or green herbs, radishes,
turnips, and wax or soap and other small items; and as we have said earlier, they
are to inform us by letter of what is left over, and shall under no circumstances
omit to do this, as they have done in the past, because it is through those two
thirds that we wish to know about the one third that remains.
55 It is our wish that the stewards should record, in one document, any goods or
services they have provided, or anything they have appropriated for our use,
and, in another document, what payments they have made; and they shall notify
us by letter of anything that is left over.
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62 That each steward shall make an annual statement of all our income, from the
oxen which our ploughmen keep, from the holdings which owe ploughing
services, from the pigs, from rents, judgement-fees and fines, from the fines for
taking game in our forests without our permission and from the various other
payments; from the mills, forests, fields, bridges and ships; from the free men
and the hundreds which are attached to our fisc; from the markets; from the
vineyards, and those who pay their dues in wine; from hay, firewood and
torches, from planks and other timber; from waste land; from vegetables, millet
and panic; from wool, linen and hemp; from the fruits of trees; from larger and
smaller nuts; from the graftings of various trees; from gardens, turnips,
fishponds; from hides, skins and horns; from honey and wax; from oil, tallow
and soap; from mulberry wine, boiled wine, mead and vinegar; from beer and
from new and old wine; from new and old grain; from chickens and eggs and
geese; from the fishermen, smiths, shield-makers and cobblers; from kneading
troughs, bins or boxes; from the turners and saddlers; from forges and from
mines, that is, from iron- or lead-workings and from workings of any other
kind; from people paying tribute; and from colts and fillies. All these things
they shall set out in order under separate headings, and shall send the
information to us at Christmas time, so that we may know the character and
amount of our income from the various sources.
63 With regard to all the things mentioned so far, our stewards should not think it
hard of us to make these demands, since it is our wish that they likewise should
be able to make demands of their subordinates without giving offence. And all
these things that a man ought to have in his house or on his estates, our stewards
shall have on our estates.
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Die v/urn Exempla
Extract from a Survey of Five Royal Estates
(Loyn & Percival, 1975, pp. 102-3)
Concerning the district of this or that mayor
We found on the crown estate of Asnapius a royal house, well built of stone, with
three chambers; the whole house surrounded by galleries, with 11 rooms for
women; underneath, one cellar; 2 porches; 17 other houses inside the courtyard,
built of wood, with as many rooms and with the other amenities all in good order;
I stable, 1 kitchen, 1 bakehouse, 2 barns, 3 haylofts ... Equipment: 2 bronze bowls,
2 cups, 2 bronze cauldrons and 1 of iron, 1 cooking pan, 1 pot-hook, 1 fire-dog, 1
lamp, 2 axes, 1 adze, 2 augers, 1 hatchet, I chisel, 1 scraper, 1 plane, 2 scythes. 2
sickles, 2 iron-tipped spades ... Produce: 9 baskets of old spelt from the previous
year, which will yield 450 measures of flour; 100 modii of barley. In the present
year there were 110 baskets of spelt; of these 60 baskets have been sown, and we
found the rest [in store]; 100 modii of wheat: 60 have been sown, and we found the
rest ... From the 5 mills, 800 smaller modii; 200 rnodii were given to the workers
on the home farm, and we found the rest. From the 4 brewhouses, 650 smaller
modii. From the 2 bridges, 60 modii of salt and 2 shillings. From the 4 gardens, 11
shillings, 2 nzodii of honey, 1 modius of butter in payment of dues; 10 sides of
bacon from the previous year, 200 sides of new bacon, along with the offal and lard
Livestock: 51 head of older horses. 5 three- year-olds, 7 two-year-olds, 7
yearlings, 10 two-year-old colts. 8 yearlings, 3 stallions, 16 oxen, 2 donkeys, 50
cows with calves, 20 bullocks, 38 yearling calves, 3 bulls, 260 older pigs, 100
piglets, 5 boars, 150 ewes with lambs, 200 yearling lambs, 120 rams, 30 she-goats
with kids, 30 yearling goats, 3 he-goats. 30 geese, 80 chickens, 22 peacocks
We found that the measure for inodii and sextaria were the same there as at the
palace
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Extract from the Gifts of Bishop EtheLwoLd to Peterborough
(Robertson, 1956, XXXIX)
From the two hundreds which owe suit to Norman Cross 350 acres of seed and
23 acres of clean wheat were given as tithes to Medeshamstede. From the two
hundreds out on the promontory on which Medeshamstede stands tithes were
rendered from six manors, as had always been done, in the ratio of a fother of corn
containing 8 thraves for every plough.
Then ... from the 24 manors 203 acres of seed were rendered to the monastery.
From Maxey 14 acres of seed as tithes.
From Ashton 13 1/2 acres and 5 quarter-acres of seed as tithes.
From Nunton 6 acres of seed and 5 quarter-acres of seed as tithes.
From the other Maxey 9 acres of seed as tithes.
From Ashton 17 /2 acres of seed and 14 quarter-acres and 3 roods of seed as tithes.
From Pilsgate 6 acres of seed as tithes.
This is the inventory of the stock at Yaxley: 13 able-bodied men and 5 women and
8 young men and 16 oxen, a stalled ox and 305 sheep and 30 swine and 100 flitches
of bacon and all the delicacies that belong to them, and 30 fothers of corn and 80
acres sown and 1 harrow (?) and 6 barrels and 2 tubs and 3 troughs and a cauldron
and a trivet and 9 year-old stallions and 1 fat pig
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Extract from the Extent of the Manor of Hodsock, 1324
Cfltow, 1969, pp.151-3)
[there] is there a certain Manor, surrounded on all sides with
a moat, in which [there] are: one hall (aula), three chambers
(camere), a pantry, a buttery, a kitchen, a bake-house, a
granary, two barns, one chapel, two stables, one chamber above
the bridge with portcullis and a drawbridge, one malt-kiln,
[and] two fish-ponds, which are worth nothing per year beyond
their own usefulness (ultra reprisam). [There]is there one
garden which is worth, with [its] produce and grazing, 6d a
year. [There] is there one dove-cote which is worth 2s a year.
[There] are there, outside the moat, two stables, [and] one ox-
shed, which are worth nothing beyond their own usefulness.
[There] is there one garden whose apples, produce, and grazing
are worth 2s a year. [There] is there a certain enclosure, with a
fence on the north side, whose grazing is worth 6d a year.
Demesne lands are not being evaluated because they are not
Total:	
measured. And [there] is there one plot of land (placia), which
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JOHN JOHNSON'S LETTERS: THE
ACCOUNTING ROLE OF TUDOR
MERCHANTS' CORRESPONDENCE
Abstract: This article examines the role that correspondence played
in the accounting systems of Tudor merchants. Merchants relied
heavily on letters as a means of controlling their businesses at a
distance by making agents accountable. Written accountability, as
well as information for business decisions, was encouraged by
agency relationships in mercantile enterprises. The system could be
undermined by the breakdown of communication through the negli-
gence of a Factor or the lack of involvement by the principal. The
time delays between the sending and the receipt of letters, on the
one hand, and the procurement and conve yance of goods, on the
other, were additional problems.
This article examines the role that correspondence played
in the accounting systems of Tudor merchants, taking John
Johnson as an example. It therefore approaches such issues as
accountability, control, and decision making from the wider
perspective of the total information available to merchants, be-
yond that contained in their books of account.
In this respect, the article concurs with Miller and Mapier
[1993, p. 631], who criticized traditional studies for taking too
narrow a view about what "counts as accounting." The records
of Tudor merchants are a case in point, as previous studies
have tended to focus on account books, such as journals and
ledgers [Ramsey, 1956; Vanes, 1967; Winjum, 1971, 1972],
whereas more portable sources of accounting information were
also necessary (i.e., abstracts and the post) because of the dis-
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tances over which merchants operated. Contemporary authors
recognized this correspondence as part of the accounting proc-
ess. Ympyn (1547), Weddington (1567), and Peele (1569) listed
the copy letter book among the merchant's other account books
[Yamey et al., 1963, pp. 21, 25, 44]. Wecldington in particular
referred to the need for abstracts and letters from factors in
order to manage the merchant's affairs [Yamey et al., 1963, pp.
48, 97]. He said that merchants ought to write on any letters
received:
the daie of the receat and from whom, and then the
daie of the answere, that don laie them up in pressus to
them apertaininge, and even yere ons, to sort out al
mens leteris severalli, and to binde them up in papers
writtinge upon them the yere of owre lorde, and -from
whom thei have byn receavid &c. and then to laie them
upon shelvez in your counttinge hous, or other ther
unto apertaininge and as you do this so male you do
withe all other accomptis and writtingis [Yamey et al.,
1963, pp. 48-49].
This practice was followed by Johnson, who annotated his cor-
respondence in the manner described. The letters were some-
times numbered in sequence, so that the correspondents would
know the order in which they were written, and whether any
were missing. Every letter dispatched was copied into a letter
book by an apprentice, who sometimes made a third copy in
case the original went astray [Winchester, 1955, pp. 233-234].
Merchants therefore exercised systematic control over letters,
which they retained with other accounting documents as part
of a unified information system. When Johnson went bankrupt
in 1553, both account books and letter books were impounded
by the courts to prove the interests of his creditors.
The main problem for accounting historians of the period
is the lack of documentary evidence, a fact that should be borne
in mind when forming general conclusions. Ramsey's [1956]
study was based on the accounts of Thomas Howell, John
Johnson, Thomas Laurence, and Thomas Gresham. Winjum
[1972] added to these the records of John Smythe [pp. 120-125],
a Bristol merchant, and Sir William Calley [pp. 147-155], who
was trading in the early years of the 16th century. The books of
John Isham, a London merchant between 1542 and 1572, are
another example [Yamey, 1963, p. 22 8] . Finally, Hooper [1995]
reviewed the Cely shipping accounts relating to a voyage from
London to Bordeaux in 1486-1487. The lack of'surviving evi-
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dence is not surprising given that trade was heavily concen-
trated through the port of London in the Tudor period
[Ramsay, 1982, p. 3 9], and that many of the records were de-
stroyed in the Great Fire of 1666. Johnson's letters are therefore
invaluable, and it is ironic that we owe a debt of gratitude to his
bankruptcy for their preservation. Following the conclusion of
the legal proceedings, the letters were stored in the Tower of
London until they were transferred to the Public Record Office
in London some 300 years later [Winchester, 1955, p. 14].
The collection covers the period 1543-1553. As a merchant
of the Staple of Calais, Johnson's main concern was the export
of raw wool and sheep fells (hides), although he felt impelled to
seek a profit wherever he foresaw the opportunity. In 1551, he
wrote that he wished:
it had pleased God so to have provided for me that I
might with less embracing of business have passed my
times in the world. But God having appointed me to be
a merchant (and such one as cannot live only to myself
or for myself) I am compelled to enter into much busi -
ness, and to take money and much things in hand
[Winchester, 1955, p. 285].
Thus, he traded in a wide range of other items apart from wool,
including wine, herring, grain, cloth, and canvas.
The collection has been considered before from a bio-
graphical perspective by Winchester [1955], and the present
study builds upon her work. Winjum [1972, p. 125] inaccurately
described Johnson's correspondence as "some scattered letters,"
whereas in fact it runs to several hundred documents. Its rel-
ative size and completeness make it a particularly useful source
for considering the accounting role of Tudor merchants' letters.
The article in the following sections reviews Hooper's [1995, p.
114] findings regarding the transition from dral to written ac-
countability in light of Johnson's later practice, before consider-
ing the accounting functions performed through correspond-
ence and attendant limitations.
AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE TRANSITION FROM
ORAL TO WRITTEN ACCOUNTABILITY
Hooper [1995, pp. 87-89] said that the diversification of
English merchants into overseas markets in the second half of
the 15th century prompted a transition from oral to written
accountability. The increased scope of operations necessitated
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the use of agents and written accounts to control them. Tradi-
tional oral procedures "became increasingly inappropriate" [p.
112 ], whereas written accounts enabled merchants "to exercise
more control over distant agents" and permitted greater ac-
countability among partners [ p. 93 ] . Evidence that written ac-
counts were new to merchants at this time was found in the use
of English rather than Latin [pp. 9 1-92], and in the repetition of
clauses to emphasize particular transactions [ p. 9 3] . Johnson's
letters, for their part, contain a good deal of information about
the writing process and network of agents, and, thus, provide
an insight into how the formative trends identified by Hooper
developed during the intervening 60 years.
The first half of the 16th century witnessed a surge in Eng-
lish exports, particularly woolen cloth. By 1500, woolen cloth
already accounted for about two-thirds of total exports [Clay,
1984, p. 104] . Cloth exports rose from an average of approx-
imately 56,000 cloths a year circa 1490 to about 126,000 in the
1540s [Clay, 1984, p. 13] . In 1560, the annual value of cloths
passing through the hands of exporting merchants in London
was estimated by contemporaries at about Lim, a "gigantic
sum" compared to the city and national finances of the age
[Ramsay, 1982, p. 53 ] . It follows that the internationalization of
English trade in the 15th century continued apace in the 16th,
widening the scope of merchants' operations and increasing
their reliance on agents. Johnson traveled frequently between
England, Calais, and Antwerp. While away, he corresponded
with his brother Otwell in London, Henry Southwick in Calais,
and Robert Andrew in Antwerp. His contemporary, Thomas
Gresham, managed his affairs through a wide network of fac-
tors, including John Elliot and Richard Candeler in London,
Richard dough in Antwerp, and Edward Hogan and John
Gerbridge in Spain [Burgon, 1839, pp. 106-108]. The papers of
Thomas Sexton (1555-1561), which are also housed in the Pub-
lic Record Office, London [PRO: SP 46/9], contain correspond-
ence with overseas factors in Danzig, Antwerp, Amsterdam,
Lisbon, Cadiz, and elsewhere. These merchants' letters illus-
trate the distances over which they operated, together with the
need for written reports to control their affairs and to make
their agents accountable.
The formal account books played a part in this process, and
the number of references in Johnson's letters to the account
books suggests .that the keeping of accounts by English mer-
chants had become commonplace by the 1540s. Johnson him-
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self seems to have been highly regarded as a bookkeeper; the
letters reference his associates asking him to put their accounts
in order [Winchester, 1955, pp. 229-232], confirming Winjum's
[1972, pp. 125-130] finding that he maintained his own ledger
with great care. The letters, however, were a more flexible and
timely information source than the account books, and were
more useful to merchants in managing their businesses from a
distance. This greater utility is illustrated both by the letters'
content, which is discussed in due course, and their frequency.
The brothers John and Otwell Johnson occasionally corre-
sponded twice a day or frequently several times a week [Win-
chester, 1955, p. 2 3 2 ] . In a letter dated May 6, 1547, Otwell
referred to three letters from John which had arrived in close
succession:
Your long lettre (Brother) from tykeford, & thaddicion
therunto in an other & last of all that of the next dayes
date, I have received [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 200].
This frequency was not atypical; for example, Johnson wrote
from Calais to his other partner, Anthony Cave, nine times dur-
ing the month from April 22 to May 22, 1546.
An important feature of the Cely shipping accounts (1486-
1487) was the use of Roman numerals, which made calcula-
tions difficult, and probably explains why payments and reve-
nues were simply listed [Hooper, 1995, pp. 91, 113]. It is
therefore interesting that the Johnson letters, which contain
calculations, made common use of Arabic numerals. Some cal-
culations were presented in columnar format, such as Otwell
Johnson's computation of the error in John Johnson's accounts:
Calculation of Moneys Due to John Johnson
for all the declara-
cion that you have taken paynes to sett fourth in your foresaid
writinges of your accompt & monneyes due & growen in Andwarpe
of your last sales, yett I perceave not but that you have overshotte
yourself with over charging of me: And that you may easely
perceaue in your first deduction I ffor you note thole sales that my
brother Richard made for you to Amonte to 	 945.10. 6 ales that is true
wherof deduct paid by him at callais etcetera
	 149. 0.10/so reste at
Andwarpe (say you), & that is vntrue	 841. 9. 4 / ffor if the sub-
atraction be truely made the rest is but	 796. 9. 8 / and of that
is due the 15th of this monneth & in the payemente
et cetera, 085. 8. 0 I which is also true
So than the Just rest hier is
	 711. 1. 8 / Of that was
due the last of the last to Master waren et cetera 380.16. 0 / & taken at
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so yourself in lent & dayes of payement past	 080.10. 0 / So your app-
tement than amonteth as it is true in dede 	 461. 6. 0 I And that de-
ducted owte of 711.1 .8 / abouesaid / your rest is
	 249.15. 8 I & therunto let
be added the payementes monney et cetera 	 085. 8. 0 / so boeth thies
somes anfontes & that is all that is due of your hole
sale 335. 3. 8
Source: PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 200
If Hooper [1995, p. 113] was correct that the use of Roman
numerals "inhibited accounting development," the regular oc-
currence of Arabic numerals in the Johnson letters, particularly
in association with calculations, implies an advance.
There were two main areas in which Johnson's letters per-
formed an accounting function. First, they were useful for con-
trolling operations at a distance by making agents/associates
accountable, and, second, they aided business decisions.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTROL
The letters promoted accountability and control by record-
ing stewardship, conveying instructions, remitting cash, con-
firming balances, generating prime data for the account books,
and providing legal evidence.
Record Stewardship: Absences necessitated the merchant's dele-
gating authority to his factors, which was made possible
through the letters acting as stewardship accounts. Johnson in-
structed Henry Southwick to sell fells and wool at his discretion
[PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 71], while monitoring his progress by post.
Thus, the merchant expected to receive a regular account of the
factor's transactions, such as sales [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 253],
receipts and payments [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 47-48], bills accepted
[PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 19-19d], etc. Otwell Johnson supplied John
with the following list of payments in May 1547:
Details of Payments Made in Antwerp
But yet brieffly vnderstond
that I have charged Robert Androwe in your name with thies paYe-
mentes following, sins your owne being hier; / Videlicet, ffirst
	
To Robert voytier pa yable the 19th in April last	 225. 0. 0 files I
To William gravener & Richard malory the last in merche payable
	
at sight	 120.10.10
To one lawrence bradshawe & his fellowe seruant with your cosin
	
sanders of harington for money hier received of them
	
006.11. 0
To laques prieuv of Andwarpe the 22th of April payable
-	 atsight	 053.15.0
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To peter bristo the last in April payable at sight - 107.10. Q
soma of thies parcelles at sight (besides my payement of 513. 6.10
80 libra f to Jehan lobell & compaigny of lylle in the cold maert last)
Source: PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 205
This was a type of charge and discharge accounting, which
Weddington (1567) said was needed by the merchant to "Se yf
in all thingis they be just" [Yamey et al., 1963, p. 97 ] . Both of
these themes were echoed in the above letter which stated:
So Sir by the promissis you may perceyve my hole
charge, & the discharge ... [and] ... Thus syr I trust
hierby & by my former writing you perceave suffi-
ciently thorder of your buysines.
Convey Instructions: Delegation to factors did not imply a lack
of intervention by the merchant; rather, Johnson relied on let-
ters to relay instructions on how he wished his factors to pro-
ceed. Thus, he directed Henry Southwick [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 75]
and Robert Andrew [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 78d] in what payments
to make. Other instructions dealt with the purchase price to pay
for wool [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 88], the consignment of goods, and
the receipt of money from debtors [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 74-74d].
Remit Cash: The transfer of cash from one location to another
was hazardous. Apart from the risk of highway robbery, mer-
chants faced the possibility of theft by the carrier. Letters were
used to reduce the latter risk by providing evidence of the
amount being sent. Otwell Johnson wrote:
This shalbe to declaire vnto you that by this berar your
seruant Richard preston I send you according to your
writing by him iiiixx libra sterling (I say) 80.0.0 sterling
[PRO: SF 46/5, Fo. 205].
The article has already commented on the common use of Ara-
bic numerals in 'the Johnson letters. They were not used exclu-
sively, however, and it is significant in the above instance that
the amount being remitted was written out in both Arabic and
Roman notation. Here the carrier of the letter was also bringing
the cash, supporting the contention that Roman numerals per-
sisted in accounting to guard ,
 against the fraudulent alteration
of numbers, as Roman numerals were more difficult to change
[Edwards, 1989, p. 47] . Other controls included the merchants
writing the letters themselves, handwriting being a proof of
authenticity, and using their own servants to act as carriers
[Winchester, 1955, pp. 233, 236].
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Confirm Balances: Because the ledgers were large and cumber-
some, merchants relied on slim folios or "abstracts" of ac-
counts, which they could carry with them [Winchester, 1955, p.
22 9] . Johnson's abstracts listed transactions in debit and credit
form in the manner described by Weddington:
The master or principall servant ought to have alwais
by hym a breffe ballans, or abstract out of his great
Boke, or lidger of all the accomptis Debitors and Credi-
tors, containinge in the same withe the dais of paiment
[Yarney et al., 1963, p. 48].
These abstracts could also be sent by post, making them useful
for confirming balances on personal accounts. In May 1546,
Johnson sent copies of such abstracts to Robert Andrew before
leaving Calais for England [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 102], and in Au-
gust 1547, Andrew reciprocated with some of his own [PRO: SP
46/6, Fo. 19-19d].
Source of Prime Data: Letters and abstracts constituted a source
of prime data for a merchant's account books. In a letter to
Anthony Cave enclosing copies of Mr. Smith's reckonings,
Johnson wrote that:
• ye shall perceive by them how Mr. Smith stood the
18th in March anno 1544 at my going to Calais, which
I think ye have entered.... Ye shall find most of Mr.
Smith reckonings entered in my memorial, and until
his last abstract sent me in February last [Winchester,
1955, p. 230].
Weddington said that merchants ought to write daily in the
memorial which formed the basis of the journal and ledger:
all suche businis, as is don by them, or ther servantis,
in ther feattis of marchandize, as recevinge payinge of
mony, takinge, and deliveringe of mony by exchange,
acceptinge of bulls by exchange, byinge and sellinge,
invoizes of marchandize recevid [Yamey et al., 1963, p.
24].
It is precisely this kind of information which was contained in
the Johnson letters and entered into his account books.
Legal Record: The intent that the accounts should show a com-
plete record of the merchant's affairs was recognized in con-
temporary textbooks and by the courts. "False bankrupts and
broken merchants" were condemned in Johnson's bankruptcy
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proceedings for keeping incomplete books in order to defraud
creditors [Winchester, 1955, p. 302] . Merchants' correspond-
ence formed part of this legal record, as witnessed by the
utilization of both letters and account books as evidence in the
case against Johi Johnson.
These findings relating to correspondence amplify the rea-
Sons advanced by previous authors about why merchants kept
accounts that emphasized accountability and control [Hooper,
1995, p. 113]. Accounts were intended to eliminate errors; to
prevent embezzlement; to establish the value of a business for
probate or similar purposes [Pollard, 1965, p. 212]; to keep
track of credit dealings, inventories, and partners' capital
[Winjum, 1972, p. 156; Chatfie].d, 1977, P . 58]; to serve as a
memory aid [Lee, 1990, p. 88]; and to provide evidence in
courts of law [Ramsey, 1956, p. 187].
DECISION MAKING
Although both account books and letters were intended to
facilitate accountability and control, the scope of the informa-
tion conveyed in the letters was wider, thereby forming the
basis of decisions about what commodities/currencies to buy
and sell, when to trade, in what markets, and on what terms.
Miller and Napier [1993, p. 638] argued that the concept of
decision making is a recent invention and its applicability is
"historically localised" to the present. Merchants made choices
about how to trade, however, and in that sense at least, the
notion of decision making is not anachronistic.
It follows that in addition to submitting stewardship re-
ports, the Factor informed the merchant about any significant
items that might require his intervention. Thus, news was
transferred concerning the arrival or loss of shipments [PRO:
SP 46/5, Fo. 245], the condition of the goods [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo.
193-194d], their market price [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 174], the gen-
eral state of the market [PRO: SF 46/6, Fo. 6], slow payment by
particular debtors [PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 105], the rate of exchange
[PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 103], the availability of loans [PRO: SP 46/7,
Fo. 17], and any newsworthy political or personal occurrences,
such as the shattering blow of the deaths of Otwell Johnson and
Henry Southwick in July 1551 through "sweating sickness"
[PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 112d, 182-183].
This process was a reactive one, involving decisions taken
by the principal in response to information received. It was
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particularly useful for merchants, such as Johnson, who were
willing to enter into speculative ventures if they could foresee a
profit. In May 1545, for example, Otwell Johnson advised John
that Dutch draperies were selling well in London. As a result,
John shipped over a further batch. In 1546, a consignment of
malt was shipped to Flanders in response to a letter from Henry
Garbrand informing Otwell of the good state of the market
there [Winchester, 1955, pp. 258, 263].
Authors have commented that the poor state of Tudor mer-
chants' account books potentially impeded decision making.
Ramsey [1956, p. 186] said that they often showed a "very el-
ementary technique and slovenly execution," together with a
lack of timeliness in their completion [pp. 190-191]. However,
despite these defects, he maintained that "the experienced Tu-
dor merchant undoubtedly had a perfectly clear idea of the
progress of his affairs" [p. 201 ] . If this statement is correct, the
merchant must have had accurate information in a complex
trading environment that involved imports and exports, credit
transactions, loans, interest, bills of exchange, and foreign cur-
rencies. This information was supplied through the post. Tudor
merchants were not in a position to uncover all of the informa-
tion in person, owing to the international scope of their opera-
tions which obliged them to rely on factors to represent them.
It follows that if written accountability was the product of
agency relationships, so too was information for decision mak-
ing. Yamey [1981, p. 133] realized the significance of distance
in decision making. One might exclude accounting altogether
from the decision process where the decision makers them-
selves witness the economic events. Conversely, where decisions
are made at a distance, the decision makers are dependent on
information supplied by others.
LIMITATIONS
Johnson's bankruptcy and subsequent imprisonment for
debt raises a question mark over the effectiveness of his corre-
spondence as a medium for accountability, control, and deci-
sion making. If the communication system was so good, why
did he fail? In order to answer this, it is necessary to under-
stand something of the economic crisis of the mid-1500s.
Various authors have described the crisis surrounding the
collapse of English exports in 1550-155 1 [Ramsey, 1972, pp. 66-
68; Clay, 1984, çp. 113-115; Loades, 1992, pp. 90-91]. Exports
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were heavily concentrated in woolen cloth traded through
Antwerp, the commercial capital of Europe, to markets in
northwest, central, and eastern Europe [Clay, 1984, p. 12 ] . Con-
fidence was riding high in the late 1540s when demand peaked,
only to be shattered in 1550-1551 when the market collapsed.
This pattern is borne out by analysis of the cloth purchases
recorded in the journal of Thomas Gresham, a major cloth ex-
porter, which revealed a sharp increase in the late 1540s, fol-
lowed by an abrupt decline and total withdrawal from the
trade:
Thomas Gresham's Purchases of Woolen Cloth for the
5 Years Ended December 31, 1551
1547	 1548	 1549	 1550 - 1551
Total purchases £7,568	 £10,986 £11,149 £3,450 £0
Antwerp became flooded with cloths, some of poorer qual-
ity. It was a crisis of overproduction, connected to the English
government's vacillating monetary policy. In 1549, the ex-
change rate of sterling fell as a result of the currency's debase-
ment, only to rise again suddenly in 1551, following a reduction
in the face value of the debased coin. The policy of debasement
was traced by Challis [1978, pp. 8 1-112] to a new issue of coins
for Ireland in 1536, followed by a series of debasements in
England between 1542 and 1546. The confusion in 1551 was
exacerbated by the government's giving four-month notice of its
intention to devalue the coinage [Challis, 1978, pp. 105-106].
The disruption caused by the crucial cloth trade failing, to-
gether with the instability and uncertainty surrounding the
value of sterling, produced financial chaos on a national scale.
Hundreds of merchants went bankrupt. In Johnson's case, the
situation was made worse by the death of his brother Otwell
(1551), who seems to have been the driving force of the firm,
and by the loss of cargoes through war [Winchester, 1955, pp.
273, 283-284]. It follows that Johnson was affected by circum-
stances beyond his control, which, coupled with a shortage of
capital to fall back upon [Winchester, 1955, p. 2 77], would
probably have caused his business to fail, irrespective of his
accounting arrangements.
The information contained in his letters of 1551 followed
the usual pattern. There were regular stewardship reports of the
state of trade [PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 100; SP 46/7, Fo. 32-33],
supplemented by special information that was relevant to the
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crisis. There were references to the bad state of trade [PRO: SP
46/6, Fo. 128-128d, 130d-131], the adverse price of wool, and
the problems caused by the currency fluctuations. In November
1550, for example, Richard Johnson supplied details to his
brother on the price of wool in Calais, and expressed his reluc-
tance to sell wool there for less than its cost [PRO: SP 46/6, Fo.
26]. In June 1551, Johnson himself wrote to Robert Andrew
from Calais concerning the price of wool, commenting that they
would be obliged to seek a new trade if prices continued to fall
[PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 109d, hod-ill]. In August 1551, Anthony
Cave expressed an opinion to Johnson that there would be no
stability in prices until order had been restored in money [PRO:
SP 46/7, Fo. 14]. Other symptoms of the crisis included a re-
fusal to hold sterling in case it was devalued, a scarcity of gold,
and a reluctance to grant loans or credit in case debtors de-
faulted. In May 1551, Otwell Johnson informed his brother that
he had accepted £200 from Thomas Gresharn, intending to
change it to gold, but that little was to be had [PRO: SP 46/6,
Fo. 103]. Shortly before his death in July 1551, Otwell informed
John that he had sent some money to Richard Preston in Calais,
and had advised him not to keep it as another devaluation
seemed imminent. If he could not distribute it all to John's
creditors, he was to use it to buy wool or fells [PRO: SP 46/6,
Fo. 181]. Ambrose Saunders, who wrote to Johnson in the same
month, observed that people were unwilling to sell for ready
money because they feared another devaluation [PRO: SP 46/7,
Fo. 7]. Finally, in September 1551, Henry Garbrand wrote to
Johnson that loans were unobtainable at Antwerp because of
bankruptcies, although he noted the capture by the French of
17 ships laden with merchandise for Spain as another reason
[PRO: SP 46/7, Fo. 17].
The crisis of the mid-1500s is significant from an account-
ing perspective because it sharpened the need for good infor-
mation. Were there inherent weaknesses in the information net-
work available to Tudor merchants? In the first place, the
system depended on the personal involvement of the merchant
and the integrity of the factor if it was to function effectively as
a control mechanism. Agents were not autonomous, and mer-
chants intervened either through correspondence or personal
supervision. One of the difficulties faced by Johnson's business
was his desire to spend an increasing amount of time away
from business on his country estate in Northamptonshire [Win-
chester, 1955, pp. 221-222, 273]. As early as May 1547, Otwell
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Johnson was writing to John, in response to criticism of his
own performance, that if:
• . . ever ther hadde benn anny, yrkesommes (as you
call it) in me towardes the parformance of your
appointementes, I am sure you shuld have made
mooviages to london, & longer abrodes ther with larger
coste than you have hietherto done, sins I could do
anny thing for you [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo. 205].
The breakdown of communication through the negligence of a
factor posed another problem. It was through an indirect
source that Johnson learned in May 1551 that the Calais busi-
ness was in a mess, due in part to his brother Richard's mis-
management [PRO: SP 46/6, Fo. 103]. This state of affairs ne-
cessitated an immediate journey to Calais to try to sort matters
out [Winchester, 1955, p. 276].
Second, information through the post could not guarantee
successful decisions, owing to the time delay of the postal sys-
tem. In March 1546, Johnson informed Mistress Baynam that
most of her wool had already been sold before her letter had
arrived, instructing him to send it to Calais [PRO: SP 46/5, Fo.
87]
.
 In June 1551, Johnson wrote to Robert Andrew regretting
that a shipment of wool could not be stopped, as it had already
been loaded [PRO: SP 46/6, Fos. hod-ill]. The implication is,
that had they known about the new fall in wool prices sooner,
they would not have shipped it. In the case of speculative ven-
tures, where the source of supply had not been organized be-
forehand, the opportunity described in a letter might vanish
before the goods could be dispatched. This scenario was true of
the 1546 purchase of malt, referred to above. By the time the
grain had been procured and dispatched, the market price had
fallen in Flanders, and the partners of the venture were left with
surplus malt on their hands [Winchester, 1955, p. 263].
CONCLUSION
English overseas trade developed rapidly in the first half of
the 16th century, widening the scope of merchants' operations
and increasing their dependence on agents. Tudor merchants
relied heavily on letters as a means of controlling their busi-
nesses at a distance by making agents accountable. The article
supports the contention that written accountability among mer-
chants was encouraged through agency relationships. Letters
promoted accountability and control by evincing agents' stew-
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ardship, conveying instructions, controlling the remittance of
cash, confirming balances on personal accounts, acting as a
source of prime data for the account books, and, finally, by
providing a legal .record of mercantile transactions. They were
also useful for business decisions about what commodities/cur-
rencies to buy and sell, when to trade, in what markets, and on
what terms. Tudor merchants were not in a position to uncover
all this information in person, owing to the international scope
of their operations. It follows that if written accountability was
the product of agency relationships, so too was information for
decision making. The system could be undermined by the
breakdown of communication through the negligence of a fac-
tor or lack of involvement of the principal. The time delay be-
tween sending and receiving letters and procuring and convey-
ing goods caused further difficulties.
What are the implications for future research? By examin-
ing the accounting role of merchants' correspondence, the ar-
ticle agrees that accounting records can be understood in a
wider sense than the account books. Thus, the scope is widened
for accounting historians of the period, since there are other
collections containing useful material on the types of informa-
tion available to Tudor merchants. The article referred to the
1551-1561 correspondence of Thomas Sexton [PRO: SP 46/9],
housed in the Public Record Office, London. Class SP 46 in the
Public Record Office also contains a good deal of material from
the early 17th century that may be relevant. It would be inter-
esting to compare the letters of English merchants to those of
the Italian merchant community that was resident in London in
the 16th century. In this connection, there is the mercantile
correspondence, 1558-1601, of Philip and Bartolomew Corsini,
Florentine merchants in London. Although the originals have
been dispersed to various locations, the London Guildhall Li-
brary holds copies of the entire collection.
Finally, the article has discussed the economic crisis of the
mid-l6th century, an event felt to have been a turning point in
economic history as it forced English merchants to seek mar-
kets outside Europe. English merchants stood on the threshold
• of a colonial expansion into new international markets, with
the joint-stock company as a new form of commercial organiza-
tion to share the increased risks [Ramsey, 1972, p. 66; Quinn,
1983, p. xi]. The article has described the information network
that was available to English merchants in a European setting.
More work, such as Roy and Spraakman's [1996] study of the
Oldroyd: Tudor Merchants' Correspondence 	 71
Hudson's Bay Company, tracing how that network developed in
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This article reviews the costing records of the Grand Allies', of whom George Bowes
was a founder member. It assesses the contribution of these records to our knowledge
of the development of cost accounting during the Industrial Revolution. It commences
with an examination of the costings in the Grand Allies' minute book, before
looking for evidence of dissemination in George Bowes' estate papers. It finds a body
of practice, devised by colliery viewers, which had become widespread comparatively
early in the north-east and which may have influenced costing methods in other
regions, as the influence of the north-eastern viewers spread outwards during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The findings in the article support other growing
evidence of purposeful cost accounting in pre-industrial Britain.
Keywords: coal; costings; eighteenth century; estates; north-east; viewers
Introduction
This article reviews the costing records of the influential and aristocratic coal
cartel known as the 'Grand Allies', of which George Bowes was a founder
member. It attempts to categorize the records by type, and to assess their
contribution to our knowledge of the development of cost accounting during
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the Industrial Revolution. In particular, it seeks to discover the extent to
which the Grand Allies were drawing on existing knowledge and/or their
association resulted in the dissemination of costing techniques among the
members. Throughout, various technical coal-mining terms will be used, a
fuller explanation of which can be found in the glossary in Appendix 1.
The findings in this article are drawn from two main collections of primary
documents: the Grand Allies' minute book (1727-40) and the Strathmore
papers. The former is part of the collection of the North of England Institute of
Mining and Mechanical Engineers, which is deposited in the Northumberland
County Record Office (hereafter NRO). The fact that it contains some account-
ing reports specific to Sir Henry Liddell, the Grand Allies' senior partner,
and that his residence, Ravensworth Castle, was a common meeting place,
suggests that the book was originally his property. The Strathmore papers,
which are the property of the Earl of Strathmore and Kinghorne, are housed
in the Durham County Record Office (hereafter DRO). They compris the
Durham and Yorkshire estate records of the Bowes and Lyon families, which
were united in marriage in 1767. The existence of these two Sets of records
allows us to examine the possibility of dissemination of costing techniques
between the Grand Allies and one of its members, George Bowes. Additionally
the article makes reference to the records of contemporary colliery viewers,
such as Amos and John Barnes, Stephen Drydon, Edward Smith (jnr), Nicho-
las Walton, Richard Peck and others.
George Bowes and the Grand Allies
In 1700, mining in the north-east of England was concentrated on the Tvne
itself, to the west of Newcastle and Gateshead, and astride the Rivers Derwent
and Team to the south. As the shallow and more easily worked seams near
the Tyne became exhausted, the geological configuration of the region resulted
in a south-westerly drift of mining towards Tanfield and Pontop (see Figure
l) . 1
 Centrally positioned within this region of colliery and wagonway develop-
ment and rich in coal-bearing lands were a number of estates, including that
of Gibside. In 1722, following the death of his two older brothers within the
space of two years, George Bowes, the youngest son of Sir William Bowes of
Streatlam and Elizabeth Blakiston, heiress to her father's lands at Gibside,
inherited both estates. It was Gibside, strategically placed, which was to
provide the source of his influence in the sea-sale coal trade to London, and
to ensure that, in the forty years or so until his death in 1760, Bowes would
not only be a major coal-owner in his own right, but an important member of
the Grand Allies (Durham County Council, 1980).
The Grand Allies were a grouping of three landed families (Liddell, Wortley
and Bowes) and a subsidiary party (Cotesworth). Their dual objectives were
to concentrate capital for the purpose of joint-stock mining and to raise the
price of coal. The Grand Allies achieved the latter by blocking entry to
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Figure i Portion of a plan of the collieries on the Rivers Tyne and Wear, taken from
Surveys by John Gibson in 1788 (DRO:D/MRP/77/24).
the Tyneside coal industry through a systematic policy of acquiring collieries,
wayleaves and the land necessary for constructing wagonwavs to transport the
coal to the River Tyne. Figure 1 illustrates the importance of wagonwavs as
the collieries moved further from the Tvne. The Grand Allies aimed to control
a large enough proportion of total output to force the other coal-masters to
agree to its regulation; and by 1750 they controlled sixteen of the thirty-one
working sea-sale collieries north and south of the Tvne (Ashton and Sykes,
1964: 212; Crumar, 1978; Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 40, 161, 256-8).
The attempt at regulation of the Tvneside coal industr y by the Grand Allies
was, however, nothing new. in the seventeenth centur y it had been practised
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by the Newcastle Company of Hostmen, and Flinn and Stoker (1984: 256)
have contended that the scale of coal-mining in the north-east coupled with
the high proportion of output sent to London encouraged monopolizing
tendencies both at the London end of the market and among the Tyneside
coal-owners. Another factor leading to restrictive practices was the relatively
small number of major producers. As with earlier attempts at raising prices
through restricting output by the Tyneside coal-owners, such as the first
formal 'Regulation' between 1708 and 1715, the Grand Allies (c. 1726-1771)
were not always successful in achieving their aims. The Regulation periodically
collapsed, since major coal-owners such as the Ridley-White partnership chose
to stay out, and the members themselves were prone to disagreement. In 1730,
for example, George Bowes unilaterally cut prices. Despite such set-backs,
regulation of output remained an important theme throughout the eighteenth
century, not least because of the need to safeguard prices as deeper mining
increased the scale of investment required.
Over the years 1727, 1732 and 1733, the Liddells and Wortleys accounted
for between 18 and 27 per cent and 16 and 18 per cent respectively of the
coal trade of the River Tyne (Grand Allies' minute book (part 1: 16, 78, 82)).
For George Bowes, whose share over these years was between 13 and 15 per
cent, coal constituted the greatest part of his income (Ellis, 1976: 208). Thus
the three families making up the Grand Allies would appear to lend support
to Ashton and Sykes' (1964: 9) comment that, in Northumberland, Durham
and Cumberland at least, 'coal-mining was the main business of the landed
proprietor and not merely one of many preoccupations'. This view belies that
which sees English landowners as a 'class of consumers' (Habakkuk, 1953:
100), whose estates exhibited a lack of a 'business-like approach' (Thompson,
1963: 153).
The accounting records of the Grand Allies are of interest, therefore,
because of these families' significance in the coal trade during the first half of
the eighteenth century. They are also of interest because of the potential effect
that techniques developed there might have had both on other industries in
the north-east and on the coal industry in other regions of the country. In the
north-east it is generally accepted that the coal industry was a major catalyst
in industrialization and, although the pace of industrial development in the
north-east was outstripped by that of other regions during the course of
the eighteenth century, industrialization nevertheless occurred relatively early
(McCord, 1979: 15). Authors are agreed that it was the access to London via
the sea which made Northumberland and Durham the largest and best
developed coalfield in Britain (Ashton and Sykes, 1964: 194; McCord, 1979:
36). Furthermore, the north-east's collieries enjoyed a high reputation for
technical progress and business organization (Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 18),
which others clearly followed.
The influence of developments within the coal industry on other industries
would have been facilitated through common ownership and organization,
such as the colliery and salt interests of William Cotesworth, one of the Grand
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Allies, where the small coals unsuitable for domestic consumption were used
in the extraction of salt from sea water (Ellis, 1976: 139). Links also existed
to the iron industry, with some local collieries being leased by the Crowleys
in 1702 to supply their iron factories in County Durham (Flinn, 1962: 117).
Though it was not until the second half of the eighteenth century that methods
of smelting pig iron with coke began to displace the use of charcoal (Scrivenor,
1854: 84; Flinn, 1962: 4), resulting in the widespread development of large-
scale iron production in Great Britain, prior to 1750 coal was nevertheless
used in the secondary production processes. Thus, although the Crowley
works, which were exceptional in the eighteenth century in terms of their size
and organization, did not generally smelt iron, relying instead on imports
from Sweden, they nevertheless consumed large quantities of coal in the
secondary processes such as smith-work. The firm was even involved in
the sale of coal, shipping surplus stocks to London (Flinn, 1962: 101, 106,
116-18).
In addition to influencing developments within other local industries, due
to its pre-eminent position in the coal trade, the north-east also had an
influence on other coal-mining districts. In 1709, for example, the sixth Earl
of Mar sent his colliery manager to Newcastle to obtain drainage plans while
in 1724, Sir John Clerk of Penecuik travelled from Edinburgh to see how
mining was carried on around Newcastle (Atkinson, 1966: 16). More generally,
Duckham (1969, 1976) has traced the involvement of Tyneside 'viewers'
(mining consultants) north of the border, concluding that a significant feature
in the development of coal-mining in Scotland during the eighteenth century
was 'an ultimate dependence on English experience'. Thus, in 1754, the
Tyneside viewer William Brown supervised the installation of an underground
railway at Bo'ness Colliery on the Duke of Hamilton's estates. Much of this
interchange of information concerned the dissemination of technical knowl-
edge, but it is no less probable that accounting techniques, including costing,
could have been disseminated in a similar fashion. Financial expertise was
certainly available. In 1750, for example, Amos Barnes, who had been appointed
viewer at Heaton by the Grand Allies in 1730 (NRO: 3410, GA/2, part 1:
63), estimated the cost of winning Grange Colliery, near Bo'ness, at 1,557
(NRO: 3410, WAT 1/5/1).	 -
Pre-eminent in the dissemination of knowledge were the colliery viewers,
whose influence spread outwards from the north-east to other parts of Britain
and overseas during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Pollard,
1965: 127; Hiskey, 1979: 17). There was a notable growth between 1550 and
1700 in the number of these professional mine experts, who acquired their
knowledge through first-hand experience, and were not permanently attached
to particular enterprises (Nef 1932: 421-2). Although relatively little is known
about them in the early eighteenth century, the activities and influence of later
viewers such as John Buddle (1773-1843) are well known, their notability and
expertise causing them to be surrounded by schools of apprentices (Hiskey,
1979: 8-9; Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 57-9). Among the many tasks which they
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performed was the provision of expert opinion for forecasting, including
costing, and it is in this respect that the records of the Grand Allies are of
particular interest to accounting historians.
Among the records are a number of costings. These are particularly signifi-
cant, not only because they represent an early example of such costings but
also, due to the roving nature of the viewers who generated them, they possibly
provided a source of ideas which may have influenced the development of
costing throughout the British coal industry and possibly in other industries.
It follows therefore that these records have a wider significance to accounting
historians beyond their regional interest in the search for multi-variable expla-
nations of the historical origins of cost accounting (Edwards, 1989). While the
possibility of links between costing in the coal industry and that in related
industries like iron, such as those at Carron examined by Fleischrnan and
Parker (1992), is an area which will have to await further research, the records
of the Grand Allies are none the less able to throw light on the extent of
knowledge of costing ideas within the eighteenth-century coal industry and
their possible diffusion.
The article thus proceeds by examining the costings in the Grand Allies'
minute book, before turning to George Bowes' estate papers to examine
evidence of dissemination. It then considers the role of the colliery viewers
and the incidence of costings in the viewers' records. Finally, avenues for
future research are suggested.
The Grand Allies' costings
The Grand Allies' partnership was formally constituted by a ninety-nine year
agreement which provided for the mutual working of collieries and the granting
of wayleaves (DRO: D/ST/Bl/6/l & NRO: 3410, GA/i). Signed on 27 June
1726 and commencing on the 11 November 1726, the principal features
included: (i) with the exception of the partners' estate collieries, such as
Gibside, all of their colliery interests were to be divided into three equal parts;
(ii) the partnership collieries were to be worked jointly at a joint charge,
although the coal was to be transported to separate staiths and sold by the
individual partners on their own account; (iii) the capital costs of building
bridges, making wagonways, acquiring or winning collieries, in addition to any
costs of litigation were to be borne equally between the three partners; (iv)
the partners' shares of total annual output were specified; (v) the right of each
partner to inspect the others' books weekly; (vi) the year end was fixed on the
Wednesday following Christmas day, thereby establishing the period of account
for financial accounting purposes.
The agreement is mainly significant from a financial accounting perspective,
because it determined to a large extent the partnership's financial accounting
arrangements. Thus George Bowes' estate papers contain accounts which
established parity between the partners in relation to costs and output (DRO:
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D/ST/B1/6/77). Two points relevant to cost accounting emerge from the
agreement, however. First the December year-end reflected the seasonal nature
of the coal trade: It wa not until 1760 that the Tyne coal-ships began to make
the voYage to London all year round (Ashton, 1961: 72). Previously the sale
of coals had taken place 'chiefly in summer by reason of the weather, which
makes it hazardous for ships to sail in winter on those coasts' (J.C, 1708: 46).
It is probably not coincidental, therefore, that many of the Grand Allies'
costings were prepared between the months of October and February, looking
ahead to next year's sales. Second, the agreement reflected a separation of the
production and selling functions, as coal was produced jointly but sold separ-
ately by the partners. The practice of treating these two functions separately
may have been customary throughout the north-east, as it was not confined
to the Grand Allies. It is also evident in George Bowes' other partnerships,
for example, such as the ones with Edward Gilbert at Northwood (DRO: D/
ST/B1/2 - 170/1; 170/3; 174 & 176/1) and Lady Clavering at Bucksnook
and Bucksfield (DRO: D/ST/B1/5/2/7). The separation of production and
selling was possibly encouraged by the common use at this time of subcontrac-
tors for production, such as in George Bowes' estate mines at Gibside (DRO:
D/ST/B1/2/7), though subcontractors were not used by the Grand Allies.
However, as the coal was produced jointly by the Grand Allies, but sold by
the partners individually, one would expect the emphasis of the partnership's
costings to be on determining production costs rather than selling price. There
is no evidence in the minute book that the costings were used in pricing
decisions. The selling price of coal seems to have been a function of the
market, both when it was regulated and when it was not.
The Grand Allies' minute book (NRO: 3410, GA/2) contains a large
number of colliery 'views' (viewers' assessments), computations and accounts.
The most common type of computation is the calculation of cost/profit per
unit of output, measured in 'tens', which was the standard measure used in
the production of coal in the north-east in the eighteenth century. There are
thirteen occasions in part one of the book where unit cost/profit calculations
were presented to partnership meetings between 1727 and 1736. Part two of
the book, which consists of further colliery views and computations, records
twelve instances between 1728 and 1738. In 1734 (part 1: 90), for example,
the cost per ten was calculated for Cawsey Colliery and compared with the
selling price to yield a figure of unit profit (Table 1). This type of calculation
was based on estimates of output, initially derived from colliery 'views'. An
example is John Barnes and John Bullocks' proposal in 1727 for winning
Heaton Colliery, which involved an engine and an engine pit (part 1: 34). The
capacity of the mine was estimated at 8,000 tens for the first working, with a
further 4,000 tens if the supporting walls could be worked. This capacity was
then used to calculate the unit cost of sinking (Table 2), and the resulting
figure of 12d per ten was incorporated into the computation of unit profit
which followed. Unit profit took depreciation into account, therefore, as the
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Table I A computation of the charge of working and leading [Cawsey colliery in
1734] and the profit it will yield
Working L1.13.6, Leading 34s 10
	 L3.	 8.	 4
Way and wagons 14s 6, Rent 12s 6
	 1.	 7.	 -
Contingency charges 2s, Staith 2s 6
	 -	 4.	 6
Wayleaves, staith rents and water courses	 -	 10.	 -
	
5.	 9.	 10
Will make 19 4/so chaidrons at 9s 9
	 9.	 9.	 11
Profit	 £4	 -
Table 2 Computation of the sinking cost of Heaton colliery, 1727
Sinking first pit at Heaton	 45
100 yards of drift to the second pit 	 100
Sinking second coal pit and water drift 	 200
Cribbing and stopping	 45
Drawing water whilst sinking at 15 fathoms 	 80
below Tyne level
£470
Cost per ten on 8,000 tens 	 15d
If walls can be worked on 12,000 tens this would become 9d per ten. But it would
not be above l2d per ten.
capital costs of the mine were apportioned in proportion to output over its
estimated useful life.
There are other examples of the calculation of the various components of
unit cost. Table 3 (part 1: 90), for example, details the calculation of the lOs
charge for wayleaves, staith rents and water courses, noted in Table 1 above
for Cawsey Colliery.
This emphasis on unit cost is perhaps not surprising, bearing in mind that
Table 3 Account of wayleaves, staith rents and water courses chargeable annually of
Sir Henry Liddell and George Liddell share of partnership collieries above bridge
on south side of Tyne 1734
Mr Shaftoe	 20.	 - -
Mr Clavering of Cawsey 	 166.	 13.	 4
Mr Hardings	 100.	 -	 -
Sir Francis Clavering	 166.	 13.	 4
Mr Davisons	 33.	 6.	 8
	
£486.	 13.	 4
On 2,000 tens is called 	 -	 5	 -
Wayleave through Whickham Manor 	 5 -
-	 10	 -
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mine rents ('tentale') charged to subcontractors were traditionally based on so
much per ten. A subcontracting agreement between George Bowes and John
Dunn and Brian Davison, for example, indicates that Dunn and Davison
agreed to work two of the estate pits at North Banks in 1725 in exchange for
35s per ten of coal led (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/7). Though there is no evidence
that the Grand Allies used unit cost calculations to determine mine rents, other
documentary material relating to the north-east suggests such a connection. An
cx ante computation of the unit cost of working Virgin pit at Byker, which
was prepared by the viewer Stephen Drydon on behalf of the mine-owner
Richard Ridley, was appended to a subcontracting agreement, and formed the
basis of the tentale rent of L2/10 (NRO: 3410, FOR 1/5: 8). Ex ante unit
cost/profit calculations were also included in a report to the owner William
Carr by the viewer Richard Peck on the prospects of leasing his colliery to
Mr Donnison (NRO: 3410, PECK 1: 5).
In all but two cases these calculations of unit cost and profit in the Grand
Allies' minute book were used in cx ante projections, contradicting Parker's
(1980) observation that early cost accounting was mainly a matter of cx post
recording rather than cx ante planning. Some were based on projected annual
rather than total output, suggesting that the original estimates were periodically
revised. At a meeting in December 1730 (part 1: 62) the partners, having
considered estimates of unit cost and profit based on projected annual output
of 600 tens, decided to carry on the Stella Colliery for another year. It seems
to have been common practice to determine annual output in advance, and
not just when the Regulation of the coal trade was holding. At a partnership
meeting on 18 November 1730 (part 1: 63), at a time when the Regulation
had faltered (Cromar, 1978), it was noted that 'the viewers have made their
report how the several collieries are to be wrought in the year 1731, which is
as followeth'. The numbers of tens to be worked were then specified for each
of the various collieries.
In the two instances where cx post costings were prepared, the actual
quantities of coal mined rather than the actual production costs formed the
basis of the computations. The first is a calculation of Henry Liddell's total
profits for 1734 (part 1: 93), which is shown in Table 4 below. This document
attempted to quantify the annual profits of the proprietor's different colliery
interests and to produce a total. Estimates of unit profit were incorporated
into an cx post statement by multiplying them by the number of tens actually
led from the mine during the year. This calculation includes that of the unit
profit of 4/0/ 1 for Cawsey Colliery detailed in Table 1. Unit profit was
also used to price the revenue derived from the sale of last year's closing stock.
The comment at the foot of the page regarding the four previous years suggests
regular annual reporting. The second example concerns a computation made
on 6 November 1735 of the expense of working Heaton Colliery (part 1: 99),
where the projected unit cost was revised in the light of the number of tens
actually led. Water and contingency charges were shown as 13s 9d on the basis




















Table 4 A computation of the profits of Sir Henry Liddell's collieries for the year
1734
Partnership Collieries








Cawsey	 41 19	 194/10 4-13
Spearmans
1,579. 19
Resting at Redheugh [staith] at the end of year
1733 which are or will be vended in 1734. 3,527
chaidroris which at 19 4/10 to a ten is 181.12 [tens]
at L3. 16. 53
Team ship coal
899.13 [tens] at 21 at 5. 3. 113
Resting at Team Staith at end of year 1733 which
are or will be vended in 1734. 1,592 chaldrons
which is 75.17 [tens] at 21 at 5. 3. 113
[Salt] pan and glass house [coal]
resting 31 December 1733
[Other income:]
Mr Bowes rent for 1/24 Blackburn Colliery
Sir H Liddell's interest in Farnacre Colliery
H Liddell's moiety of Heaton Colliery this year
is 706.1 [tens] at 19 4/10 L2. 16. 6
Deduct
H Liddell annual sum out of Ravensworth Colliery
G. Liddell annual sum Out of several collieries
Charge for contingencies on the trade
NB The wetness of the season occasioned this year's vend to be short of the 4 former
years in an average of 577 tens 9 wagons which would have added to the profit
2,426. 2. 4.
was only 1,728 tens, 8 wagons vended in 1735'. The resulting unit profit
figure then formed the basis of a projection of total annual profits after interest
over the remaining term of the lease.
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In reviewing Jones' work (1985), Edwards (1989: 309) noted the use of cost
estimates rather than actual costs, which he surmised was probably due to 'the
absence of detailed record-keeping, and the lack of any conviction that
the benefit obtained from such information would justify the work involved
in its preparation'. The Grand Allies too were concerned with cost estimates
rather than detailed build-ups of actual costs incurred, although in some cases
the estimates may have been based on past actuals of particular enterprises,
rather than the viewers' experience of mining costs in general. It is difficult
to tell from the minute book which was the case. General experience presum-
ably formed the basis of the costings of new ventures where there was no
track-record of historical costs. Historical data about the costs of existing
operations were available from the financial accounting records. Detailed annual
statements of the profits of George Bowes' estate mines at Marley Hill (DRO:
D/ST/B1/2/125), for example, were prepared from a ledger which was
updated once or twice a month (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/126). The ledger
was totalled annually on 31 December. It classified the expenses under headings
of 'working charges', 'contingent charges', 'stable charges' and 'wagonway
charges'. The working charges comprised the bill of Abraham Laverick, a
subcontractor, for working the various pits. The contingent charges seem to
have been any additional working expenses. If costings were prepared from
this ledger, none have survived. Similarly detailed annual accounts made up
to 31 December exist between George Bowes and Henry Liddell for the period
1728-52, recharging George Bowes with his share of the partnership's expenses
(NRO: 3410, WAT 4/20). It follows that, whatever the basis of the cost
estimates, the complete absence of detailed cx post costings in the Grand
Allies' records cannot be explained by a lack of record-keeping.
An alternative explanation of the absence of cx post calculations is that the
costings and the financial accounts were prepared by different parties. If this
were true, it would support the view that in this instance, at least, cost
accounting and financial accounting grew from different roots. This was
observed by Fleischman and Parker (1990) at the Carron ironworks in Scot-
land, where the pre-1786 records 'reflected all the correct instincts about cost
accounting methodologies but a failure to integrate costing with acceptable
financial reporting'. A review of twenty-five sizeable British firms, mainly in
iron and textiles, between 1760 and 1850, revealed that 'costing activities were
rarely reported in financial accounting records' (Fleischman and Parker, 1991).
By way of contrast, one of the main findings of an investigation of ironmaking
in Sheffield between 1690 and 1783 was that 'an integrated system of financial!
management accounting was in use in 1690' (Edwards and Boyns, 1992). If the
Tyneside viewers prepared costings, did they also prepare financial accounts?
Unfortunately, the answer is not clear because in some cases viewers acted as
consultants, whereas in others they were resident at particular mines, and may
well have been involved in preparing accounts as part of their overall manage-
ment responsibilities. William Leaton is a case in point. The Grand Allies'
minute book refers to him as a viewer, and he regularly presented reports to
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partnership meetings. On the other hand, he also acted as one of George
Bowes' principal stewards in his estaEe mines, and in 1726, for example, we
see him inspecting and counrersigning the fortnightly presentments of coal
worked by the subcontractors (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/15).
The accuracy of the Grand Allies' projections of costs and profits depended
on the economic conditions and, in particular, on whether the major coal-
owners agreed to the Regulation. The awareness that costs and revenues would
vary in different markets was not unique, and was noted by Jones (1985: 21),
for example, in relation to the Welsh copper industry during the eighteenth
century. In a 'fighting trade' the selling price of coal in the north-east would
be lower and the production and selling costs greater. For instance, the fitters,
who transacted the sale of coal from the mine-owners to the ship's masters,
would require a greater measure of coal for the same price. Wayleaves would
be dearer, and the London coal-dealers would command a premium to secure
an ultimate market for the coals. The minute book contains some sensitivity
analysis, taking these factors into account. The negotiations with Lady Claver-
ing in April 1727 for the allies to lease Collierly, Barker's Closes and Tanfield
West Field collieries at 30s per ten are an example (part 1: 10). Computations
were produced which contrasted her profits under this arrangement favourably
with the unit cost and profit if she worked the collieries herself in a fighting
trade. The partnership's unit cost and profit were also calculated on the basis
that it worked these collieries and paid her the 30s rent. In October 1727 the
unit profit of working and leading Urpeth colliery was projected at J3/17 in
a Regulation, and 3/2/10 without (part 1: 25). Profit calculations for 'contest-
ing', 'fighting' and 'peaceable' trades were produced at the further negotiations
in November 1727 with Lady Clavering, which also involved Richard Ridley
(part 1: 26). Finally, the minute book contains a projection, dated October
1733, of the profits of Sir Henry and George Liddell's partnership collieries
'out of/in a regulation', in which the relative merits of both were quantified
(part 1: 74). The projection noted, for instance, a saving of L2,635 premium,
presumably to the London coal-dealers, if the Regulation held.2
The frequency with which the calculations of unit cost and unit profit
appear, together with their ex ante basis, indicates their importance in business
decisions, rather than in controlling costs. It has already been noted that the
minute book provides no evidence that they were used in pricing decisions.
In the majority of cases the decision under consideration seems to have been
whether to continue working a particular colliery. Similarly costings were
prepared to indicate whether a new working was viable, which entailed the
subsidiary decision of the best means of gaining access to the coal. In 1732,
for example, the viewers John Barnes and John Bullock Set out two alternative
means of gaining access to coal at the east end of Killingworth Moor, and
concluded which would be the least costly (part 1: 89). Unfortunately, the Cost
calculations are not included in the report. The other major decision which
has been identified was whether to persist with the Regulation.
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Estate papers - costings
The business association between the Grand Allies raises the question of
whether their meetings were a medium for disseminating costing techniques.
It was, after all, not just George Bowes who attended partnership meetings,
but also his resident viewers at Gibside, Anthony and William Leaton. The
significance of the meetings in disseminating costing techniques is related to
the separate question of whether these techniques were already well known.
If the Grand Allies were drawing on an existing body of knowledge, it would
be difficult to tell whether the meetings contributed to its dissemination, even
if there were indications of similar costings in George Bowes' estate records.
The main configuration of his estate collieries was at Gibside, variously
described as Gibside, North Banks or Marley Hill collieries. Brian Davison,
a subcontractor in the 1720s and 30s, compiled a list of pits at NQrth Banks
containing approximately sixty entries (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/30). The large
number of pits suggests relatively shallow mining, with minimal site-prep-
aration costs. Sinking itself was not particularly a major outlay, the whole work
being done manually; and it was not uncommon to sink another pit in order
to minimize the cost of underground haulage (Atkinson, 1966: 9; Flinn and
Stoker, 1984: 190). The costs of sinidng a shaft at Northwood in 1753, for
example, amounted to 74 only (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/154).
The most notable feature of the estate costings is their scarcity. George
Bowes' estate papers contain a large amount of accounting information, but
most of it is of a financial accounting type, with the emphasis on controlling
his colliery operations and safeguarding the interests of the various parties.
The lack of costings for the estate mines is perhaps a reflection of the lower
level of capital investment involved in shallow mining. The corollary of this
is that the concentration of costings in the Grand Allies' records could be
explained by the higher amounts of capital which they invested. Although
each of the Grand Allies was a major coal-owner in his own right, the extent
of the resources which they commanded as a combination was much greater,
enabling them to invest on a larger scale (Cromar, 1978). The forty-two miles
of the Grand Allies wagonways alone in 1739 were said to have involved a
capital outlay of j50,000 (Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 157), and 21,000 was
expended in acquiring Whickham Manor in 1738 (NRO: 3410, WAT 4/20).
If the level of investment was higher, so were the potential losses should
collieries fail. Authors are agreed on the high risks of coal-mining in this early
period (Ellis, 1976: 67-8; Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 49), which necessitated the
involvement of professional viewers to reduce the risks of failure (Flinn and
Stoker, 1984: 59-63). The effectiveness of the viewers' costings is a separate
question, but it seems reasonable that the scale of the Grand Allies' operations
encouraged their use.
Despite the lack of costings for George Bowes' estate mines, those that are
to be found exhibit similar features to those found in the Grand Allies' minute
book. Examples include a survey made by Anthony Leaton of the coal
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Table 5 Charge of working North Banks Pits 1749
Quarry Pit
13 tens underground charges
Light underground galloways [8 pit ponies]. 2 weeks
oats at 3 bushels each is 24 bushels at l8d
Ditto hay at 28 stone each 2 weeks 224 stone at 2d
4 gin horses 2 weeks oats at 6 bushels each
Ditto hay at 28 stone each 112 stone at 2d
[Divided by 13] is 2. 4s. 6d per ten








remaining in the Letch and Barn pits at North Banks in 1726, which converted
the thickness of coal (measured in yards) left in the supporting pillars into
tens (DRO: D/ST/B 1/2/22), thereby providing an output figure which could
be used to calculate unit cost. An occasion where unit cost was calculated
occurred in 1749. The cost per ten was computed at five of the North Banks
pits in relation to a fortnight's workings, and then extended by the quantity
worked in the year to give a total cost (DRO: D/ST/B 1/2/28). The calculation
for Quarry pit is reproduced in Table 5. Similarly, the cost per ten was
calculated at various of the North Banks pits on the basis of the costs incurred
during the fortnights ending 17 August, 12 September and 22 December 1753
(DRO: D/ST/B1/2/29). These instances are particularly interesting in view
of the previous comments regarding the absence of ex post costings in the
Grand Allies' records because they seem to have used the ex post costs of a
fortnight's workings. The subcontractors were required to make fortnightly
presentments to the estate's stewards (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/7), and it is possible
that the two are linked. The shortage of costings in the estate records, however,
prevents us from forming a general conclusion.
The closest parallels in the estate records to the Grand Allies' minute book
are two computations of George Bowes' total coal profits for 1735 and 1736
(DRO: D/ST/Bl/6/96-97). The 1736 computation is included in Table 6.
Their close proximity both in type and time to the 1734 computation of Henry
Liddell's profits, which has already been discussed (Tabl-e 4), is perhaps the
most certain indication in the records of the transference of accounting tech-
niques between the partners.
The costings in George Bowes' and the Grand Allies' records are not
unique. The late sixteenth-century costing records of Daniel Hechstetter the
younger, for example, contained Statements focusing on the cost per unit in
copper mining (Edwards et al., 1990). From his observation of Welsh industry
in the eighteenth century, Jones (1985: 199-200) concluded 'that the recording
of cost estimates was a natural pursuit of those leading industrial development
before the industrial revolution'. In 1770, for instance, the unit cost and unit
profit of smelting lead ore in Cardiganshire were calculated. Edwards (1989)
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Table 6 Profits in the coal trade for the year 1736
Profit by Hutton ship coals. 376 tens.
produces neat profit £6. 8 - per ten is
Profit by Hutton glass house coals. 270
tens . . . . produces neat profit of J5. 3 -
per ten is
Profit by Hutton pan coals. 270 tens.
produces neat profit of £2 per ten is
Profit by Hutton fire [land-sale] coals. 60
tens at £1. 16 - per ten
Profit by difference in price of coals sold
the beginning of the year.
Total Hutton [Gibside] profits
[Partnership collieries:]
By doing strict calculaon making 1,800
[tens] per annum, allowances for dead rents
of £1,000 per annum of which will be
repaid again of partners' collieries, will
clear £4 per ten of coals sold for £10. 8.
9 3/4. . . . The vend this year 1,717 tens
at £4 neat is
Total profits this year in the coal trade
By saving of the premium [to the London













identified a range of business decisions which were the subject of financial
analysis in the eighteenth century, including whether and how much to pro-
duce. The Darby and Carron iron-works 'were clear leaders in generating cost
analyses to aid decision making', such as whether to forgo unprofitable product
lines (Fleischman and Parker, 1991). Decisions by the Carron Company in the
1770s to abandon certain iron-fields were based on monthly reports of
the differential costs of extracting iron ore (Fleischman and Parker, 1992).
Thus, although they are not unique, the Grand Allies' costings are signifi-
cant for two reasons. First, as will become apparent from a review of the
records of contemporary colliery viewers, they reflected a body of practice
which was widespread in the north-east of England at a comparatively early
date. Hatcher (1993: 265) has surmised that this was probably the case from
the early seventeenth century. Second, they are significant because they were
prepared by colliery viewers who, as has already been suggested, were instru-
mental in disseminating mining expertise to other areas.
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Colliery viewers
A review of the records of contemporary viewers in the first half of the
eighteenth century, some of which predated the Grand Allies' partnership,
confirms that the Grand Allies were drawing on existing costing techniques
rather than inventing them. There is a variety of examples of costings at non-
Grand Allies mines in the records of contemporary viewers. John Barnes, who
was later employed by the Grand Allies, prepared cx ante unit cost/profit
figures for Fenham colliery in September 1717. Similar computations were
prepared by Amos Barnes in 1734, 1735, 1736 and 1738 for various collieries
(NRO: 3410, F 1/4: 1, 15, 17-18 & 32). The 1735 computation was prepared
jointly with William Dagleish, and the 1738 one with Stephen Drydon and
William Hepple. Richard Peck prepared cx inte unit cost/profit estimates in
1718, 1723 and 1726 (NRO: 3410, PECK 1: 7 & 55; FOR-1/5: 27). The 1726
computation was prepared jointly with Stephen Drydon. Nicholas Walton
prepared cx ante unit cost/profit calculations in support of an estimate of
working Long Benton colliery 1745-7 (NRO: 3410, WAT 3/54: 15). The
notebook of Edward Smith (jnr), a viewer at Houghton Colliery between 1749
and 1751, contains similar calculations of unit cost and profit, in addition to
estimates of output over the remaining life of a pit (Robertson, 1970: 9, 27-9,
45). These techniques were enduring and can be found in the works of later
viewers. John Buddle's papers, for example, contain similar estimates, based
on annual production, such as the calculation of the unit cost of working
Harraton Moor Colliery in 1798, which was used to calculate total cost and
total profit (NRO: 3410, BUD 14: 70). These examples by no means comprise
a comprehensive list.
It has already been noted that the calculations of unit cost and profit were
based on estimates of output, initially derived from colliery views, suggesting
that these types of costings originated in the body of practice developed by
the viewers. However, there is no evidence that these costing techniques were
set down in a written form, whether published or not, for general dissemi-
nation. This is in marked contrast to the 'numerous eighteenth and early
nineteenth century textbooks [which] dealt almost exclusively with merchant
accounting techniques' (Fleischman and Parker, 1990). Works relating to coal-
mining in the eighteenth century do exist, but these generally dealt either
with technical matters, such as J.C.'s The Compleat Collier (1708), or were
arithmetically based ready reckoners, possibly drawn up by viewers themselves,
designed to help them carry out their calculations (e.g. the colliery memoranda
book mentioned in Appendix 2).
The emphasis of coal-mining literature on technical issues rather than
costing, and the absence of any costing works in the accounting literature,
possibly reflects a pragmatic approach to such issues, in particular that of
learning by doing. It may also reflect the fact that, while cost estimation in
relation to physical measures of output might have been an integral part of
viewing, it nevertheless comprised a relatively small part of the viewers' total
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work. Most of the viewers' records examined dealt with the technical problems
of mining, rather than the financial. This is illustrated by a viewer's leather-
bound notebook, dated 1774-95, which is contained within the Mining Insti-
tute Collection. The book commences with a series of hand-written rules of
mathematical calculation to assist the viewer in estimating weights, measures
and capacity (NRO: 3410, WAT 4/14). A full list of the contents is included
in Appendix 2. Page 15, for instance, details 'the rule to find how many tens
of coals there is contained in an acre of ground'. The viewer is instructed to
'multiply the square yards in one acre (which is 4,840) by the height of coal,
and that by 8, being the boils contained in a solid yard, and that divided by
418 gives the content in tens'. Pages 12 to 14 contain tables for converting
the thickness of coal into measures of volume and weight. Although this
information underlay the calculations in the Grand Allies' costings, it is listed
alongside other instructions for estimating the capacity of pumping machinery.
A factor which emerges from the viewers' records is that they worked in
association with each other and, in particular, that they learnt their trade as
apprentices with established viewers. In this way the succession of knowledge
based on practical experience was assured, perhaps reducing the need for
textbooks. John Watson (snr), for example, served his apprenticeship with his
cousin William Newton of Burnopfield, 'who was one of the most eminent
viewers of the day' (NRO: 3410, WAT 2/4). Nicholas Walton became first
acquainted with Heaton colliery in 1725 when he served as an assistant to his
predecessor John Bullock. John Bullock was in the service of Sir Henry
Liddell, and regularly undertook work on behalf of the Grand Allies (NRO:
3410, WAT 3/43: 2/3). Edward Smith (jnr) succeeded his father Edward
Smith (snr), and in turn had five sons who were also brought up as colliery
viewers (Hiskey, 1979: 12).
A contemporary published textbook on coal-mining, The Compleat Collier;
written by the anonymous author 'J.C.' for estate owners in the north-east,
while containing no calculations, confirms the importance of viewers in compil-
ing costing reports. The Compleat Collier is a guide to the various techniques
involved in coal-mining, such as boring, sinking and drawing water. Its orien-
tation is technical rather than financial, therefore, but it contains evidence of
the way in which the viewers' practical experience underlay the calculation
H of unit cost. The author, for instance, speaking in the first-person of a fictitious
viewer, records that drawing 420 corves (baskets) a day from a pit sixty fathoms
deep is 'as much as most collieries of that depth, can, or do constantly work'.
This will require at least eight horses 'which is, as always customary', to
work four shifts at two at a time. The horses 'in these parts' will cost six or
seven pounds each; and the viewer recommends purchasing ten to prevent
production being halted by animals going lame. In relation to the hewing of
coal, one miner would require a working seven yards wide 'in these parts'.
This would allow three yards of coal for working, and four yards to act as roof
support. One hundred and fifty yards of coal would therefore support twenty
miners. One barrow-man would be able to propel seventy corves a day. Having
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worked 200 yards 'to the east, west, north and south of the pit shaft, then it
is time to have another shaft at that distance sunk for another new pit'. One
viewer earning fifteen to twenty shillings a week would 'serve three or four
working pits'. Each pit would be serviced by an over-man, earning about eight
shillings a week, who was responsible to the viewer (J.C., 1708: 32-3, 42-4).
Such information established the relationship between the cost of the inputs
and the physical quantities of output, and lent itself to the calculation of unit
cost.
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the minute book of the Grand Allies in addition to
the estate records of George Bowes, a founder member. The forther contains
a variety of costings of strategic significance, concerning both new and existing
mining operations, while the latter contains very few examples of costings.
This imbalance perhaps reflected a higher level of capital investment among
the Grand Allies compared to George Bowes' estates, where relatively low-
cost shallow mining seems in evidence.
The basis of the costings was the calculation of unit cost and profit, derived
from colliery views yielding estimates of total or annual output. The emphasis
on cost per ten is not surprising, since the ten was traditionally used as the
basis for fixing proportional mine rents. Although the Grand Allies do not
appear to have used unit cost calculations for calculating rents, positive con-
firmation of such a connection is found in other sources.
The Grand Allies' costings were prepared from an cx ante perspective and
therefore made use of cost estimates rather than detailed build-ups of actual
costs incurred. Viewers were concerned with future workings and drew on
their general experience of the costs of mining rather than historical accounts
to draw up their costings. This does not, however, appear to have been
due to any deficiency in the accounting s ystem since the historical accounts
were sufficiently detailed for the actual costs to have been determined in the
same format as the costing estimates, had the viewers or anyone else so wished.
The lack of cx post costings therefore appears not to have been due to a
deficiency in the records, but possibly reflects that the costings and accounts
were prepared by different parties, supporting the view that in this instance
they may have originated separately.
Calculations of Unit cost/profit were used to estimate future total profits.
In some cases sensitivity analysis was undertaken to reflect the different
economic conditions of a regulated or non-regulated market. The frequency
with which the calculations of unit cost/profit appear indicates their import-
ance in business decisions, such as whether to dispense with a colliery or to
continue it for another year. In this respect one could see the accounting
information as being a determinant of business activity, a view which supports
other growing evidence presented during the last two decades leading to a
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'rehabilitation of Industrial Revolution managerial accounting' (Fleischman
and Parker, 1990).
The business association between George Bowes and other estate owners
and their agents through the Grand Allies, or through negotiations with non-
partners such as Richard Ridley over the regulation of the coal trade, afforded
the opportunity for dissemination of these techniques. Certainly there are
traces of them in George Bowes' own estate records. A review of the records
of contemporary colliery viewers, however, confirms that the techniques were
well known rather than invented by the Grand Allies, and that their origins
lay in the practices developed through experience by the professional coal
viewers. The Grand Allies' records are siguificant, therefore, because they
reflected a body of practice, devised by the viewers, which was widespread in
the north-east of England at a comparatively early date, and which may have
spread to other regions, as the influence of the viewers spread outwards from
the north-east to other parts of Britain and overseas during the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.
It remains to consider possible future lines of enquiry. Two spring clearly
to mind. First, more work needs to be done on the issue of the origins of the
costing estimates and their relationship to the accounting records, to see
whether or not they were separate and, if so, why. Second, the possibility that
the costing methods examined in this paper spread to other regions and to
other related industries, such as iron, through the influence and expertise of
Tyneside colliery viewers needs to be examined. In this second sphere, work
is presently being undertaken at Newcastle University to map the eighteenth
and nineteenth century viewers' costings contained within the Mining Institute
Collection chronologically both by type and location, in order to trace patterns
of development. Additional work needs to focus on identifying the individuals
who prepared the costings in Tyneside and other regions, in order to construct
genealogies of masters, apprentices and associates. It may be possible to detect
their presence not just from the viewers' records themselves, but also from
the accounting records of enterprises such as those of George Bowes, whose
estate cash books recorded both the viewers' names and fees.
The University of Newcastle upon Tyne
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Notes
1 Even by 1750, most mining activity was still south of the Tyne, in the area between
the Derwent and the Team, with only four of thirty-one working sea-sale collieries
to the north (Cromar, 1978; Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 21-2).
2 If the Regulation faltered, there would be more coal on the market at a lower price,
and competition among the coal-owners would increase. In this situation the coal-
owners would be forced to pay the London coal-dealers a premium to secure an
ultimate market for their coal. If the Regulation survived, this would not be necessary,
and the coal-owners would make a saving. 	 -
Appendix 1: glossary
CHALDRON A coal measure based on the ditnensions of a coal wagon. A
Newcastle chaidron weighed approximately 53 cwts.
CORVE A basket for transporting coal from underground.
DEAD-RENTS A basic rent which would be due to the landlord whether
or not the mine was worked. This sum would be payable where mines were
acquired, but left unworked, merely in order to prevent others from working
them.
FITTER Shipping agent employed by the mine owners, who uansacted the
sale of coal from the owner to the ship's master.
LEADING (LED) Transporting coal from the pit-head to the staith.
STAITH Construction for storing coal at the riverside prior to it being
rowed downstream to the rivermouth in keels, where it was loaded into ships.
TEN A coal measure, which was often used as a basis for fixing proportional
mine rents ('tentale').
VIEWER Mining consultant or chief mine manager.
WAGON WAY Horse-drawn railway for transporting coal from the pit-head
to the staith.
WAYLEAVE Rent for allowing coal to be transported over a landowner's
property.
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Appendix 2: colliery memoranda book 1774-95 (NIRO: 3410, WAT 4/














Rule to find the weight of a column of water.
Rule to find the power of any cylinder.
Rule to find the diameter of the cylinder having the length and diameter
of the pumps.
Rule to find a proper cylinder to work a given pump freely.
Rule to find what water any engine discharges at a stroke.
Rule to proportion a boiler having your cylinder diameter.
Rule to find what quantity of water a cask will hold.
Rule for measuring cistern troughs.
Dimensions of a chaldron wagon.
Rule to gauge milk bowls and the like.
Rule for measuring a hay stack.
Coal measure.
A table of Newcastle coal measures.
Rule to find how many tens of coal there is contained in an acre of
ground.
Tables of weights and measures.
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Through a glass clearly:
management practice on the
Bowes family estates c.1700-70
as revealed by the accounts
David Oldroyd
Abstract
Through the accounts, the article examines the management practices employed on
the Bowes estates in order to ascertain whether they were managed as profit centres
to be exploited, and whether accounting aided managerial activit y at this earl y stage
of industrial development. The majority of the estate accounts were designed to keep
track of rights and obligations. The survival of cost anal ysis, profit statements and
planning data indicates that the estates were not treated simply as units of
consumption and that the accounts played an important facilitating role. There are
indications that a knowledge-power mechanism also existed within the estates, casting
doubt both on the mutual exclusivit y
 of Economic-rationalist and Foucauldian
explanations of accounting activities and on the notion that a relevant distinction
exists between modern and pre-modern business organization.
Keywords: eighteenth century; accounts; mineral industries; stewards; managerialism;
Bowes estates
Introduction
Through the accounts, this article examines the management practices employed
on the Bowes famil y 's estates c.1700 to 1770. The Bowes estates are unusual in
the continuity of the business records over such an extended time-scale - c.1700
to 1940 - and in the large quantity of data surviving from the earl y part of the
period) Accounts pervaded every aspect of the estates operations, from the
housekeeper's groceries to the lead and coal mines, and thus provide direct
David Oldro yd is a lecturer in the Department ol Accounting and Finance at the University
of Newcastle-upon-Tvne (e mail: l)avid.Oldrod@)ncl.ac,uk).
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evidence of the underly ing management systems. The accounting records are
also significant in what they reveal about the technical state of accounting
knowledge, and the role and status ol accounting within the organization.
Although there are man questions relating to estates in the eighteenth
century, two have tended to dominate the economic and accounting history
literature. The first concerns their productivity: were estates managed as profit
centres to he exploited? The second question is connected with the first: did
accoLinting aid managerial activit y at this early stage of industrial development?
These are the central questions which this article attempts to answer by
examining the nature and function of accounts within the organization.
Economic historians have tended to regard estates as non-productive
investments. Flinn (1966: 45-6) argued that 'reverse investment' of merchants
buying into land had a negative influence on capital fbrmation during the
Industrial Revolution, because it sterilized savings that would otherwise have
been used more productivel y elsewhere. Crouzet (1972: 178) spoke of a net
outflow of capital from industry to land-owning. However, the productivity of
estates could be influenced by the attitudes of the individual landowners.
William Cotesworth, a north-eastern merchant and landowner, is a case in point.
On the one hand, his appetite for increasing his land-holdings left him seriously
short of cash. As a result he decided to cut his investment in salt (Ellis, 1981).
On the other, he set about improving his new properties at Shipcote and
Gateshead with vigour to increase the value of his rents (Manders, 1973: 128-9).
The answer to the question of whether particular estates were productive
investments or not might lie in their accounts, as one might expect concern for
efficiency and productivity to be evidenced by some kind of planning and
profitability analysis. Perhaps this is anachronistic, although it is the absence of
such data in previous case studies, coupled to the predominance of charge and
discharge accounting, that has led commentators to conclude that estates were
not managed 'as profit centres to be exploited' (Napier, 1991: 165).
Regional variations make generalizations difficult. Industrialization occurred
relatively early in the north east of England (McCord, 1979: 15). Coal was the
most significant output, with shipments to London rising from around 250,000
tons per year in 1600 to 650,000 tons in 1700. The fleet of colliers undertaking
the two-week voyage down the east coast increased from around 400 in 1615 to
over 600 in 1703 (Levine and Wrightson, 1991: 9). As far as other industries
were concerned, the region was producing more than half the national output of
steel in 1750. The Crowlev iron works in County Durham were exceptional in
the eighteenth centur y in terms of their size and organization (Flinn, 1962). Salt
output had risen to 15,000 tons annually by 1720, and shipbuilding, glass making
and lead mining were also expanding (McCord, 1979: 13-15). According to
Wood (1910: 106), there were four factories operating in Newcastle in 1737 that
manufactured glass bottles. Chartres (1977: 25, 28, 35) described how the butter,
meat and fish trades were boosted by the increase in salt production, as was the
demand for draught animals by the growth in cgal. Newcastle became a principal
port for the trade in copper and lead (Chartres, 1977: 35). Wood (1910: 70, 140)
added rope making and tanning to the list of early industries. Rope was needed
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both for shipping and mining; and trade between Russia and Newcastle led to
the establishment of tanneries on the Tyne.
The early nature of these developments was matched by the recent origins of
many north-eastern landowners, such as the Cotesworths, Lidddlis, Carrs,
Ellisons, Ridleys and Blacketts, who had made their fortunes in trade. Forty-one
per cent of the fathers of Merchant Adventurer apprentices in Newcastle could
describe themselves as gentlemen', which was 'a far higher proportion than in
any other corporate town' (Bennett et a!., 1990: 20). The progression from
merchant to landowner was typical of many regions, but it seems to have been
'accelerated' in the north east (Hughes, 1952: xvi—xviii). The traditional view is
that the older Catholic families of Northumberland and Durham were
supplanted by merchant land-holders as a result of debts or sequestrations
following the Civil War and Jacobite Rebellions (e.g. Hughes, 1952: xvi—xviii;
Cromar, 1978).
Established landed families, such as the Bowes, shared the commercial interest
of coal with the newcomers. At the start of the eighteenth century, the north east
possessed the largest and best developed coalfleld in Britain (Ashton and Sykes,
1964: 194); and at the forefront of this dominance were the landowners: 'The
motor [driving industrial activity] was Newcastle trade, and industrialization was
the outcome of using' its profits to exploit the landed resources tradesmen
acquired' (Clavering and Rounding, 1995: 265). The sea-sale coal trade to
London was the catalyst of new industry, and the landed estate the key to its
exploitation. Estates provided 'long-term planning, supplies of timber, fodder
and manpower', the strategic control of access to the Tyne and, above all, a
financial cushion'. In consequence, 'industry grew as fast as markets expanded,
constrained in general neither by insufficient technology nor lack of capital'
(Clavering and Rounding, 1995: 265). The business orientation of the landed
community in Northumberland and Durham poses the question of whether
there was more of a tendency here, than elsewhere, for estates to be managed as
profit-making investments. We shall argue that the Bowes estates were managed
as profit centres, as evidenced by the systematic nature of the accounting and
management arrangements and the focus in the accounts on making activities
profitable.
The question of whether accounting encouraged or assisted managers and
entrepreneurs in exploiting the new opportunities arising through the techno-
logical, demographic and market changes of the British Industrial Revolution
has generated much debate. Despite a tendency over the last ten years to
question its perceived shortcomings, Fleischman and Parker (1997: 8) describe
how most authors still take the view that accounting was an ineffective
management aid. This negative view of British Industrial Revolution accounting
also applies to estates. Indeed, Napier (1997) argued that eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century concepts of land ownership on estates held back the
development of industrial accounting. In an earlier article, he wrote that
'the basic form of estate accounts as late as th nineteenth century had changed
little from that developed in the Middle Ages for controlling and reporting on
the activities of manorial bailiffs and reeves' (Napier, 1991: 16-I .). He maintained
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tluit CstdtC dcCoLiflts enabled landowners to control their agents, and provided
them with the cash-lo\v inh)rrnation the y
 needed to flicilitate the day-to-day
operations 1)1 the estate. Cash-fldw iniormation was particularly useful in a
situation vheic the landowner wished to develop his propert y, hut borrowing
waS constrained. Notwithstanding these advantages, Napier argued that estate
ICCoUntS were vhollv inadequate for the 'more directl y commercial activities',
that required 'both careful planning and more accurate monitoring of perform-
ance' (1991: 174).
The debate over the managerial utility of British Industrial Revolution
accounting has been complicated by disagreements over terminology. For
example, Miller and Napier (1993) argue that the concept of decision making in
business is'aieccnt innovation, and criticize previous studies for reading too
mLich of the present into their interpretation of accounting practice during the
British Industrial Revolution. Fleischman and Parker (1997: 22-3) disagree,
stating that qualitative judgements are necessary when one is seeking the
foundations of 'purposeful' and 'sophisticated' managerial accounting, and that
present methodolog y
 acts as a useful reference point for defining these
adjectives. Hoskin and Mac ye (1988) maintain that managerial accounting
originated in the US industrial environment of the 1840s. However, following
Foucault, the term 'managerialism' is used by these authors in quite a narrow
sense to describe the exercise of disciplinary power over labour through
accounting, whereas economic-rationalists, such as Tyson (1992, 1993), define it
in a wider sense to encompass all rational management activity in pursuit of
profits. Boyns and Edwards (1996a: 45) have argued in favour of a broad view
of managerialism and, in this vein, we shall argue that the B owes accounts were
managerial in orientation despite the absence of a disciplinary s ystem of labour
control, and that, by implication, the economic-rationalist/Foucauldian dichot-
omv is too simplistic.
The article proceeds b y discussing the estates, together with the underlying
organization of their activities, and hence the need for, and knowledge of
accounting by those involved, before moving on to consider the extent to which
the estates were managed as profit centres to he exploited, and whether
accounting aided managerial activit\ through detailed examination of the
function of accounting data within the organization.	 -
Estate organization and reporting structure
Role oJ the proprietor
For most of the period under consideration, George Bowes was the proprietor in
question (Gill, 1980). Ward (1971: 104) described him as the prototype of the
'swashbuckling tycoon'. To his contemporaries he was known as the 'count' or
'csar' (Wills, 1995: 11). Bowes inherited the estates in 1722 at the age of 21,
following the premature deaths of his two elder brothers. According to Wills
OIIro )/(I. F!! i'oiiIi i	 /i1S. L/'d Ii)' 	 1?)
He's about six thor in Height,
\Vnd he walk hut upright
I us COflhI)leXiOfl is good
His .\ louth & \ose small
His Eves grevas a car
Hansorne Legs, Aurre Chose
And his name is George l3owes.
(WiUs, 19Q5: 6)
Plate I Portrait o George Bu es, b y Enoch Seernan, 1744
(19')5: 8), he 'had looks, personalit y, and a taleht for business affairs', together
with an overbearing and autocratic temperament plus all the 'rashness of
\Outh.
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The picture is of an arrogant and strong willed man, all the more determined
to get his own wa y because of his extreme youth, and who would stop at
nothing to get what he desired - at least in business.
(Wills, 1995: 11)
During the next fort y years, until his death, he played a major part in the
Newcastle coal trade, on his own account and as a foLinder member of the Grand
Allies cartel which tried to control the entire trade (Cromar, 1978). It was the
single most influential coal-owners' association in the eighteenth century, and
during Bowes' lifetime controlled most of the output on the Tyne. According to
calculations contained within the estate papers, Bowes' total profits from coal
amounted to £9,778 in 1735 and £10,588 in 1736, indicating the scale of his
interest (DRO: D/ST/B1/6/96-97). Coal represented only one portion of his
income, and the family were also involved in a range of other business activities,
such as lead mining and smelting, salt panning, forestry and farming. George
Bowes left his only child, Mary Eleanor, property valued upwards of £600,000,
which was adjudged by contemporaries as sufficient to make a prospective
husband Lone of the great peers of the Realm' (Wills, 1995: 63, 65).
How active a manager was he? Bennett et al. (1990: 133, 158) characterized
him as an absentee landowner who preferred London society to industrial
concerns. His brothers' deaths had reluctantly 'dragged' the young socialite away
from London in 1722; and he returned at the first opportunity According to
these authors, he fully merged all of his collieries with those of the Grand Allies
after 1736, leaving himself free for a life of politics and culture.
It is true that George Bowes retained life-long passions for architecture,
music, fox-hunting and horse-racing, and served as a Member of Parliament for
County Durham from 1727 until his death (Wills, 1995: 7-9), but to portray him
as disinterested in estate business is inaccurate. In the first place, the survival of
separate accounts for his collier y interests after 1736, such as at Cow Close
(1742), Marley Hill (1750s), North Banks (1749) and Noithwood (1750s), shows
that the y continued to be managed separately from the Grand Allies (DRO: D/
ST/B1/2/28, 99, 101, 116, 146, 170). Ka y Coats, the manager at Cow Close,
was directly accountable to Bowes. The Grand Allies were not involved in the
partnership at Northwood. Second, Bowes' correspondence indicates that he
took a proactive role in the management of the estates. I-Ic received continual
progress reports from his stewards when he was awa y in London, and replied by
sending them instructions (DRO: D/ST/C2/3/21/7, D/ST/C1/3/52, D/
ST/C1/3/58-60, D/ST/C2/1/5/4). The numbers of letters and degree of
detail do not diminish after 1736 when he is supposed to have opted out of
business life. Finall spending time in London was necessary for business. As an
MP, Bowes was able to lobb y Parliament on behalf of the Newcastle coal-owners
(Wills, 1995: 8). He banked with the London firm of Francis Child and Co., and
some of the bank statements are annotated: 'Cop ye. The original Mr Bowes took
with him to London' (DRO: D/ST/C1/3/6Z/7-8). Newcastle coal was traded
through Billingsgate in London. In 1730 Leaton wrote to Bowes concerning
the pa yment of he premium to the London coal dealers. He feared that non-
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payment would be a 'very great prejudice' to his trade if Bowes' 'neighbours'
Paid it, and concluded: 'When you are at Billirigsgate you there will he able to
judge what is necçssary to be done' (DRO: D/ST/C1/3/39/2). These
references are not suggestive of a proprietor who eschewed control of his
business affairs. Furthermore, Bowes was an itinerant rather than absentee
landowner, who travelled frequentl y between his homes at Gibside and London,
and rented a house at Ledston, to act as a staging-post on the journey (Wills,
1995: 9).
Whether or not the estate business depended on his active involvement at an
operational, as opposed to strategic level, is a separate question. The continuance
of procedures following ownership changes implies that it did not. Bowes
acquired an established manner of practice, organization and accounting when
he inherited the estates in 1722; and the same applied to his successors. The
lease of the Gibside coal mines to Charles Montagu outlived several prQprietors,
yet the format of the estate accounts remained the same (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/2).
This was also true of the colliery partnership at Northwood following Bowes'
death (DRO: D/ST/Bl/2/170/2-6). The estate officials too remained un-
changed. William Leaton, John Sedgwick, Richard Stephenson, Thomas
Colpitts II, John Gibson and Nathan Home among others, all survived their
master's death. The fact that Nathan Home could be criticized b y John Gibson
for working the lead mines instead of letting them (see below, p. 195), implies
that such decisions lay within a steward's responsibilities. Another example is a
decision to sell lead ore rather than process it (see below, p. 191), which was
taken by William Leaton without recourse to the proprietor.
Reporting network
The three main estates were located at Gibside in the north of County Durham,
Streatlam in the south and Wemmergill in the west. Each of the estates acted as
the centre of a pool of industrial activity. Gibside was George Bowes' principal
residence, and headquarters for all the estate operations. His active involvement
in the day-to-day operations of his estates, coupled with the geographical spread
of his activities and his distance from events, necessitated a centralized
organizational structure that was capable of delegating responsibility to stewards
in key areas, while, at the same time, retaining control at the centre. This was
achieved through a unified reporting network. Returns from all the various
activities and estates were ultimately channelled through the estate office at
Gihside; and William Leaton and Richard Stephenson, the chief stewards there,
were able to determine what they expected to receive. Their correspondence was
wide-ranging, and included advising on the accounting procedures. The division
of responsibility between these two stewards is unclear, although Leaton seems
to have been in ultimate command. AccoLintable only to the proprietor, they
were in a position of considerable power. Their ability to influence procedures
was enhanced by the length of their tenure, as they each held office concurrently
for more than thirty-five years.
182	 1ccouniin', Biisi'iiess	 /iiianciu/ fusion'
This centralized s ystem of organization and reporting probably explains why
management and accounting practices were high1' integrated over different
acti ities. For instance, the firm tenants and collier y subcontractors at Gibside
were dealt with in a similar way. l3oth made use of the estate's horses, and were
recharged through control accounts. Just as the subcontractors' accounts were
charged with equipment provided b y the estates, so too were the farm tenants
(DRO: D/ST/E5/ 10/3, D/ST/E5/ 14/6). Another factor encouraging in-
tegration was the tendenc y to assign management responsibility by location
rather than activity. Thus John Sedgwick, the manager of Northwood Colliery,
also managed the farms•it neighbouring Toft Hill and Ramshaw, and accounted
for both colliery
 and firms together. Whether this kind of doubling-up of role
was possible ma y have been influenced b y the size of the undertakings, as it was
not universal. At 'vVemmergill, for instance, the lead mines and smelting mill
were managed separateh despite the common location.
Tec/i i ica / cIii ra cteristics
Generall the accounts were based on the bilateral recording of cash receipts
and payments, with adjustments for opening and closing debtors, creditors and
stocks as appropriate. There are many examples. The 1740 charge and discharge
accounts of Thomas Colpitts I, agent for the estates at Streatlam and
\"Vemmergill, were adjusted fbr the rent arrears owing by tenants (DRO: D/ST/
E1/6/1). The 1754 charge and discharge accounts ofJohn Sedgwick, manager of
Northwood and Cragwood colliery, took into account moneys due in respect
ofcoals sold on trust [credit]' (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/164). Stock was included in
the calculation of the profits of Niarley Hill colliery for 1772 (DRO: D/ST/B1/
2/125). Physical stock checks and stock reconciliations were carried out
regularly, which is not surprising given the importance of mineral extraction to
the estates.
The only
 unequivocal evidence of double-entry bookkeeping on the estates is
a pro-forma scheme of partnership accounts for lead mining and smelting,
compiled around 1741 in double-entry format (DRO: D/ST/B2/159). It
contained ledger accounts for cash, debtors, mill and mine charges, profit and
loss (lead account) and partners' capital, and the following note was written on
the final page:
A good for nothing paper de[livered] to Streatlam as a curious precedent for
keeping a smelt mill account per R.E.
Approved of by T Colpitts [chief steward at Streatlam] and recommended by
him to the study and perusal of EQ.
Although such exemplars were not uncommon for merchants - Parker (1991)
talks about the dangers of mistaking them for the real thing - the y were unusual
for industrial enterprises. This particular exemplar is doubly rare, as there are
few known instances where British industrial concerns used double-entry
accounting piioi to the nineteenth century (Edwards, 1989: 56-8). The rare
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exceptions include the Cvthrthfa ironworks in South Wales and the Duke of
Norfi)lk's and Stavelev ironworks near Sheffield (Jones, 1985: 127; Edwards and
Bovns, 1992). The survival of annual profit and loss accounts for the Bowes lead
operations (DRO: D/ST/B2/105), presented in a similar format to the
exemplar, indicates that the scheme was applied in practice between 1741 and
1746.
Double-entry accounting appears to have been the exception, however. The
bilateral recording of cash transactions was probably preferred because it was
simpler and more versatile. A variet y of statements could be prepared from the
cash hooks, in addition to the traditional charge and discharge account. Such
accounts recorded the charge and discharge of a steward's obligations, and the
balance for which he was still accountable. All of the Bowes stewards kept charge
and discharge accounts, although they were not the most common type of
report. As we shall see, the complexity of the estates' business arrangements
necessitated a range of other accounts to control the activities of lessees,
employees, subcontractors and partners.
Kiio whet/ge base
The existence of a centralized reporting network that was capable of dealing
with different types of activity raises the question of who prepared the accounts,
and from where they acquired their knowledge. Most of the accounts were
prepared by the stewards. What sources of guidance were available to them?
First, a number of contemporary printed guides were available, although none of
them encompassed the full range of accounts used on the Bowes estates. Charles
Snell's Accompts for Landed-men (1711) was based on the bilateral recording of
cash receipts and pa yments, and included a survey or rental, showing details of
the tenants, propert y and annual rents. Snell was described in his text as a
'teacher of writing and accompts at the free writing-school in Foster Lane with
whom young gentlemen may board', suggesting the existence of formalized
tuition in accounting procedures. Thomas Richards' The Gentleinans Auditor
(1707) set out a method for keeping charge and discharge accounts, supported by
a double-entry ledger. Both of these guides produced annual summaries. Edward
Laurence's The Dittj ' and Ojjice of a Land Steward (1731) was mainly concerned
with non-accounting matters. It did incorporate a pro-forma survey, containing
the names of the tenants, their farms and annual rents, in addition to pro-forma
charge and discharge accounts. These were produced in bilateral form, and were
analysed under a range of headings. Rents were accounted for on the basis of
moneys received; so, unlike the Bowes accounts, arrears were not included.
Perhaps the most comprehensive guide was Roger North's The Gentleman
Accoinpiant (1714), which produced a full double-entr y
 scheme with accounts
that mirrored the organization of the estate. It also contained a dictionary of
accounting terms (Parker, 1997).
In addition to printed handbooks, there vee also hand-written exemplars.
The article has alread y referred to the exemplar for lead mining and smelting. 'A
method of a salt pan account', dated 1754, has also survived. This was based on
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a bilateral cash account, containing total figures for coals, wages, incidents and
salt delivered. Separate schedules listed the transactions that made up these
figures in chronological order (DRO: D/ST/B3/ 11). The account for coals
analysed the deliveries over the various pits and quantified the keel dues. As with
the pro-f orma lead accounts, actual accoLints have survjved that were prepared in
the same format as the salt pro-forma, indicating that it was applied in practice
(DRO: D/ST/B3/14).
Stewards also followed the practice of their predecessors. There are cash books
for the Gibside estate covering the period 1728 to 1792, which were kept in the
same format, despite a succession of different stewards (DRO: D/ST/E5/
1-13). Fmi1y dynasties of stewards were quite common; and one generation was
able to teach the next. For example, Thomas Colpitts II succeeded his father,
Thomas Colpitts I, as principal agent for the estates at Screatlam and
Wemmergill in 1755. Anthon y Leaton (snr) was a chief steward-at Gibside
(c. 1721-5), as was his son William (c. 1734-70). William's brothers Anthony
(jnr) and John were also agents on the estate.
Fina1h a body of accounting expertise existed in the hands of colliery viewers,
who were highly paid professional engineers. Edward Smith senior's terms for
serving as a viewer at North Biddick colliery in 1728 were L50 a year plus
settling on a farm in the owners' possession (DRO: D/ST/B1/6/233/4). The
Smith family were 'celebrated mathematicians', and viewers in general were well
grounded in mathematics as part of their training (Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 64;
Harris, 1976: 170). They had been providing cost data for forecasting the
profitability of mine workings from an early date (Hatcher, 1993: 265; Oldroyd,
1996), and some of the Bowes' stewards came from a viewing background.
William Leaton, the chief steward of the whole operation, was himself a viewer.
His father, Anthon\ before working for the Bowes, had originally served as chief
viewer to Charles Montagu, who leased the coal mines at Gibside between 1692
and 1723 (Levine and Wrightson, 1991: 66). The involvement of viewers in the
management of the Bowes estates was not unique. Newcastle viewers were also
employed by the Lumlev estate in County Durham and the Duke of Norfolk's
estate in south Yorkshire (Beastall, 1975: 25, 30; Medlicott, 1981: 183-8). Their
role as change agents in the dissemination of accounting technology awaits further
research (Oldrovd, 1996: 19). Boyns and Edwards (1996b) describe a similar
phenomenon in Wales.
Function of accounts within the organization (1): safeguarding the
interests of the proprietor
Organizational link
Most of the records are of a financial accounting tYpe, because they were
designed to keep track of rights and obligations. For instance, accounts
were necessar y
 to ensure that the proprietor was not being cheated about the
amount of coal produced	 the expenses attaching to it. This need to enforce
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rights and obligations meant there was a close linkage between the form of the
accounts and the mode of organizational control. This is most clearl y illustrated
in relation to coal, where diIkrent methods of organization were used at
different times, and the accounts responded accordingly. There are examples
where the mines were leased, subcontracted, mined directl y
 by the estates or
mined in partnership.
Leasing The 1692 lease of the Gibside mines to Charles Montagu specified that
he was obliged to pay the estate a fixed annual sum in addition to a proportional
rent, dependent on the quantity of coal led' (transported) from the mine,
measured in 'tens', the standard unit of coal production. From the estate's point
of view, accounts were required which kept a tally of the quantities of coal led
each year and the amounts of rent received. This information was supplied in
the form of weekly and annual summaries over the thirty-one years of the lease
(DRO: D/ST/B1/2/2).
Subcontracting The accounting arrangements became more complex after 1723,
when the lease was replaced with subcontracting agreements. A subcontracting
agreement, dated 8 December 1725, between George Bowes and John Dunn and
Brian Davison in respect of two of the North Banks pits at Gibside has survived
(DRO: D/ST/B1/2/7). The salient features are as follows: Bowes agreed to pay
them 35s per ten of coal led. He would employ the miners. Dunn and Davison
were to work under the direction of William Leaton, Bowes' chief steward and
resident viewer. Dunn and Davison would use George Bowes' horses for drawing
the coals, for which they were obliged to pay Leaton. They were required to
discharge all the expenses of working and drawing the coals to the surface.
Finally, every fortnight they were to present daily reckonings of coals worked
and coals led.
The accounting records indicate that there were other subcontractors at
Gibside, such as 'William Barras and Partners, who were presumably controlled
by similar agreements. Subcontracting on Tyneside seems to have been
commonplace in the early eighteenth centur y. Oldroyd (1996: 7) was incorrect in
stating that the Grand Allies did not use subcontractors - a tentale men's
account book shows that they did (DRO: D/ST/B1/6/277) - and they were
also used by the Ridley family at their Jesmond colliery (NRO: ZR1/35/13).
Such overmen were only semi-independent contractors. The miners were
employed by the estate rather than the contractor, and the contractors used the
estate's equipment. By the nineteenth century they had evolved into paid
employees.
Various examples exist of the t ypes of reckonings mentioned in the agreement
with Dunn and Davison (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/31-2). Also, there was a control
account for each subcontractor which summarized the various charges. The
physical verification of coal stocks played a major part; and coal seems to have
been measured twice, once when it came out of the ground and once when it was
led away from the mine. The subcontractors were paid on the basis of the coal
led, and it was important to ensure that none went missing beforehand.
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Consequentl y, the quantity of coal led was reconciled to that of coal worked,
taking into account the closing stocks resting at the pit (DRO: D/ST/B 1/2/21
& 35). The overs and shorts were priced, and ultimately the subcontractor was
charged with any shortfall. In the case of Dunn and Davison, their control
account for 1735 was debited with a shortfall of L82/ 19/1.
Direct ,iii,iint Although out-Sourcing of at least some part of the production
process seems to have been the norm, direct mining did take place at Cow Close,
near Streatlam. Here a manager, Kay Coats, was directly responsible to George
Bowes. The absence of the intermediar y subcontractor simplified the accounting
problem. Charge and discharge accounts sufficed, such as the ones prepared by
Coats during the period 1742 to 1746. These recorded the colliery expenses and
coal sales, taking into account the arrears owing for coal sold on 'trust' (credit).
They were prepared from sales ledgers and bound weekly cash books on a
calendar-year basis (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/146, 148-53).
Partnerships George Bowes was involved in various colliery partnerships, and
accounts ensured he received his dues in line with the agreements. This was the
case at Northwood and Cragwood colliery, near Streatlam, which from 1752 he
worked in partnership with Edward Gilbert, who was also his father-in-law. The
colliery was managed by John Sedgwick, who received cash advances from
Thomas Coipitts, Bowes' agent at Streatlam, and was responsible for meeting
colliery expenses and the land-sale of fire coals. The two partners bore an equal
share of the colliery's expenses and output, and retrospective statements exist to
prove this (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/ - 170/1 & 3; 174; 176/1).
Although collieries were worked in partnership, the output was divided
between the partners, and sold by them individually. The reasons for this are
unclear, except that the practice was customary on Tyneside. As a result, the
production and sale of coal were treated as separate functions, and it was
common accounting practice to apportion expenses and output separately
between the partners, rather than to apportion a figure of profit. Output was
determined by physical stock checks. In the partnership between George Bowes
and Lady Clavering at Bucksnook and Bucksfield collieries, these inventories
also determined the apportionment of expenses, which was done in direct
proportion to the number of tens led by each partner (DRO: D/ST/B1/
5/2/7).
Legal underpinning
An important feature of the accounting procedures, therefore, is that they were
flexible enough to respond to the different forms of organizational control that
applied at different times. Another is that the contractual obligations of third
parties were underpinned by written agreements, such as the subcontracting
agreement referred to above. The legal underpinning of the business arrange-
ments, combined with the use of accounts to monitor compliance, was typical of
all the Bowes estates' business activities. There are many examples. Agreements
0/droyd: Tliro ugh a glass clearly 187
for hiring gangs of labourers in return for stipulated wages, were controlled by
weekl y time sheets (DRO: D/ST/E5/23/l). Fitters' contracts obliged them to
provide George Bowes with regular accounts of coal sales and shipments (DRO:
D/ST/B1/21/33). Tenancy agreements stipulated annual rents, and rent rolls
and ledgers ensured the y were paid (DRO: D/ST/E5/9/1-3, D/ST/E5/10).
Subcontracting to partnerships of miners was common practice in the lead
industry, and the contracts were entered in bargain books. In 1762 John Bourn,
a mine manager, wrote:
I told them [the subcontractors] that I was advised for the safety of Mrs Bowes
[George Bowes' widow] as well as my own satisfaction to keep a bargain book,
and enter all agreements made betwixt party and party and signed by us both;
and that the said book of agreements might be produced upon any emergency,
before you [\'Villiam Leaton] or lVlrs Bowes to determine any dispute that
might hereafter arise.
(DRO: D/ST/C2/3/39/1)
The most common type of bargain was the bingtale, whereby the mining
partnership was paid according to the number of bings (standard unit of lead
production) of ore produced (Hunt, 1970: 39). Accounts which reconciled the
payments to the quantities produced at the agreed rates ensured they were
correct (DRO: D/ST/B2/103/4).
Internal audit
Internal audit checks increased the effectiveness of the accounts as a control
mechanism. The 'presentments' of third parties were audited by estate stewards,
who were themselves subject to audit by their superiors, which was common
practice at the time (Medlicott, 1981: 186). Checking was evidenced by ticks,
comments and signatures. For example, the coal-subcontractors' presentments
were signed by the subcontractor, and countersigned by an estate agent (DRO:
D/ST/B1/2/15). Similarly, both subcontractor and agent signed the subcon-
tractor's control account to attest that it was 'right' (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/69/4),
and the reports that compared the quantities of coal worked and coal led
contained auditors ticks (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/34/7).
The need for stewards to justify their accounts meant that supporting
documentation had to be retained. This is illustrated by the annual charge and
discharge accounts of John Sedgwick, the manager of the partnership colliery at
Northwood, where there was a visible audit-trail (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/164 &
173): a pocket-sized notebook contained rough weekly accounts of his ex-
penditure at the mine (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/168). A two-sided cash book listed
receipts and payments. It was closed off on 31 December; and the last page of
the year was certified with the word 'examined' (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/154 &
1S6). A debt book listed credit sales as they arose, which were totalled at the end
of the year. Receipts from debtors were also listed as they arose, and the relevant
sales ticked off (DRO: D/ST/B1/2/155-6). Finally, the total debtors' balance
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was calculated from a listing of the individual accounts (DRO: D/ST/B1/
2/156).
Ultimately, stewards would not be paid the moneys owing to them if they
fiuiled to produce the necessary receipts and vouchers. William Thompson, an
agent at the South Shield salt pans (c. 1760-73), seems to have been particularly
lax in this respect. In March 1761 he wrote to Richard Stephenson, chief
steward at Gibside, informing him: 'According to your desire I have sent up the
books [to Gibside], but it has not yet been convenient for ye Widdow [Mary
Bowes] to pay the balance'. The problem seems to have been a lack of vouchers,
and in September he wrote: 'I believe I should get settled with the widdow
provided I had the ticketts sent down for the coals you charged her with' (DRO:
D/ST/C2/3/80).
Do the above observations indicate either that the estates were managed as
profit centres to be exploited or that the accounts aided managerial activit y ? The
answer to both these questions is only partly in the affirmative. The main
purpose of the accounting procedures so far identified was to safeguard the
interests of the proprietor. The fact that these procedures were extremely
systematic as well as being versatile enough to accommodate a range of different
situations shows that management were efficient in pursuing this aim, but does
not necessarily imply that they were also efficient in terms of maximizing profits.
Similarly, although the accounts were an indispensable aid to management in
that without them the estate operation would have been unable to function,
given its size and diversity, this is not the same as saying that the accounts aided
managerial activity, if nianagerialism is defined in terms either of the rational
pursuit of profits or of exercising disciplinary power over labour. However, we
have not as yet presented the full picture. A range of other accounting data has
survived that was more managerial in orientation, and less concerned with
tracking rights and obligations.
Function of accounts within the organization (2): improving
profitability
Was profitability an important issue on the estates? The survival of cost analyses,
profit statements and planning data seems to indicate that it was. Although these
types of account are in a minority compared to the number that were concerned
with safeguarding the proprietor's rights, the fact that they are not restricted to
particular dates or industries suggests they are not merely exceptions.
Cost analysis
Despite the near total absence in the estate papers of the type of colliery costings
used by the Grand Allies partnership (Oldroyd, 1996), the analysis of
expenditure in some of the estates' cash books shows that the stewards were
interested in tracking and monitoring expenses. Fleischman and Parker (1997:
29) identified this as the 'necessary first step' in the development of an effective
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costing system. It focused the attention of management on the relationship
between costs and profitability, and provided the data that were needed for other
costing activities such as product costing, cost comparisons and decision
making.
There are many examples in the Bowes papers where expenses were analysed.
The Marley Hill cash book listed the colliery's expenses under headings of
'working charges', 'contingent charges', 'stable charges' and 'wagonwav charges'
(DRO: D/ST/B1/2/126). Weekly staith bills analysed the costs relating to the
transportation and storage of coal at the staith (DRO: D/ST/B1/20/38). The
pro-forma scheme of lead accounts referred to above incorporated cost analysis.
The costs charged to the mine and mill accounts were recorded under separate
headings, and the final page of the exemplar appears to be a weekl y or monthly
cost analysis sheet relating to the following year. The actual lead accounts also
analysed costs; and schedules have survived showing the build-up of the figures
of ore carriage, sinking and drifting, winning ore and contingent charges that
were included in the account for 1742 (DRO: D/ST/B2/105). This account
pros ided a profit summary of the whole operation, taking opening and closing
stock into consideration, and the schedules were a means of monitoring the
individual costs.
Projit statements
The survival of cx post profit statements for coal, lead and salt demonstrates an
interest in the profitability of these activities. These schedules were not financial
accounts of the proprietor's rights and obligations. the article has shown,
other types of account served that purpose, and the notion of using profits to
calculate dividends did not apply.
Summary profit and loss accounts were prepared for Marley Hill colliery for
the years 1772 to 1773 and 1775 to 1778. These summaries were derived from
detailed annual profit statements, which took closing stock into account, together
with accruals for 'notes given in since and not included in the working charges'
(DRO: D/ST/B1/2/125). The latter shows an appreciation of the need for an
accurate cut-off. Calculating profits on an accruals basis was advanced for the
time, as was showing them on an annual periodic basis (Edwards, 1989: 80, 89),
although this did not always happen. We have already referred to the profit and
loss accounts for lead. In addition to these overall profit statements, an cx post
analysis has survived (c. 1740) that showed the unit profit of a batch of lead. The
unit cost of mining, smelting and delivery was calculated at £11/lOs, which,
compared to a selling price of £12/lOs, resulted in a net profit of Li a fother
(DRO: D/ST/B2/91/2). A profit statement for Middleton's salt pans showed a
loss of £199 for the period 1757 to 1760, and calculated that this loss would have
been reduced b y
 £151, had it been possible to maintain a selling price of 40s a
ton, instead of the actual prices which ranged from 28 to 40s (DRO: D/ST/B3/
9/3). Profits or losses on salt were calculated either on an annual basis, or over
an extended time period (DRO: D/ST/B3/9/1, 6 & 9).
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Previous authors have questioned the ability of estate accounts to measure
profits accuratcl Pollard's (1965: 211) criticism that estate accounts were flawed
because they did, not group together incomes with the appropriate expenditures
does not appl y. His contention that they were ineffective because the y confused
capital and revenue expenditure is less easy to refute, as the Bowes accounts
tended to treat both in the same way. Whether distinguishing capital from
revenue mattered as far as measuring profits was concerned depended on the
length of the reporting period and the size of the outlay. The difference between
capital and revenue expenditure disappears over the full life of an undertaking,
as ultimately all assets are consumed or sold, and translated into profits or losses.
Therefore, the longer the reporting period, the less relevant is the distinction
between the two. As noted above in relation to salt, the profit statements
sometimes covered a period of several years. Furthermore, in a Situation where
most of the work was undertaken manually or by horse, the distinction between
capital and revenue expenditure was less significant still. Coal mining at Gibside
was not capital intensive, owing to the availability of plentiful coal reserves at a
shallow depth (Hatcher, 1993: 61; Oldroyd, 1996).
plannilig data
A wide range of planning data has survived relating to the Bowes estates. Some
of it quantified the future cash or capital requirements. Other documents
appraised the future profitability of particular operations or investments,
calculated the present value of future cash flows or evaluated the outcomes of
alternative actions in order to decide on the optimum course.
One of the earliest surviving planning schedules was compiled by Charles
Montagu, who leased the estate mines at Gibside from 1692 to 1723. It is a cash-
flow forecast for the summer of 1696 that attempted to quantify the mine's cash
requirements (NUL: i\ISS/i\'IISC/85). The statement commenced by estimat-
ing the cash outflows arising from the new season's mine workings, and then
went on to consider how these would be funded. Most of the expenditure would
come out of the rents received by the agent, George Baker, although Montagu
identified slow payment by the tenants as a potential problem. This schedule is
characteristic of the very systematic approach that Montagu applied to mine
management, which routinely involved quantifying future outcomes (Hatcher,
1993: 266-7).
Planning data have survived, covering a range of activities. Output was
projected at North Banks colliery in 1725, 1735 and 1737 (DRO: D/ST/B1/
2/22, 24-5). William Leaton wrote to George Bowes in 1728 concerning Beckley
colliery, which neighhoured the estate mines at North Banks. He calculated the
cost of draining Beckley via a drift out of Gill pit in Cawsev colliery to be
L227/lOs, compared to the then current annual cost of drainage which
amounted to L600. Furthermore, the proposed drift would allow the estate to
mine the hitherto inaccessible part of North Banks that's under ye Dvke out of
Beckle y '. On this basis, he urged that the work should be undertaken (DRO: D/
ST/C 1/3/39/1).
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A valuation of woodland in 1763 was based on estimated future cash flows
from timber, discounted using compound interest tables to their present value
(DRO: D/ST/E5/17/l/4). Discounting in firestrv valuation was not Un-
common on eighteenth-centur y estates and, in 1730, John Richards, a surveyor,
produced a guide for estate owners which provided examples that could be
applied in different situations (Scorgie, 1996). In this particular instance, the
valuation was connected to the purchase of the wood by Mar y Bowes (George
Bowes' widow). There seems to have been some double-counting, as the terms of
the sale were that Mrs Bowes would pay L4,925 on signing the deed, and L2,087
at the end of the firt y years. However, the residual value of L2,087 had already
been taken into account in the present value calculation of L4,925, suggesting
that, although the technique of discounting was known to the estate stewards, it
was not perfectl y understood.	 -
In 1762 the unit cost of producing lead at Birkdale and Lunehead was
projected, with a 2/3d difference in favour of Birkdale (DRO: D/ST/B2/H0).
Apart from the difference in the cost of extracting the ore - forty-nine shillings
compared to fort y-five - less ore would be needed to produce a saleable fother
at Birkdale because it was of a better quality, whereas the cost of carriage to the
mill would be greater as it was further away.
There are a number of examples relating specifically to lead smelting where
projections underlay business decisions. In 1763 the decision was taken to sell a
consignment of lead ore, rather than smelt it and sell the finished product at
Nevvcastle, on the basis of a computation that showed the total cost of the lead
at 17/10s per fother if it were processed and transported to Newcastle, which
figure exceeded the market price there (DRO: D/ST/C2/3/39/4-6). In 1742
the decision under consideration was whether to build a new mill at Isabell
Meah Hill where the lead was mined, or to continue to use the existing mill at
Boylup, the main difference being the transportation costs. Taking into account
the capacity of the mine and the differential costs of carriage, a computation
showed that a new mill would result in a saving of L59/8/4 on 600 bing of ore.
Other computations compared the unit operating costs of mills at Staindrop, 'ye
Mind' and Hoiwick to see which would be the cheapest to run (DRO: D/ST/
B2/135/l-2). These computations were related to the decision about where to
build a new smelting mill. In this respect, estimates were made of the capital
costs of construction at the various locations (DRO: D/ST/B2/135/9-11). In
contrast to the ex post profit statements, there was a clear distinction in these
projections between capital and revenue expenditure, with the costs of building
the new smelting mills and the ongoing running expenses being treated
separatel y. Furthermore, the explicit exclusion from one of these schedules of
the cast iron that had already been bought shows an appreciation of the
distinction between sunk costs and incremental costs. Comparing the incre-
mental costs arising through alternative courses of action was characteristic of
the financial estimates prepared by colliery viewers. It is not therefore surprising
that two of these computations are noted as having been prepared by the
eminent viewer, Nicholas Walton, in conjunction with a Mr Boag, confirming
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that viewers were instrumental in disseminating costing methods to related
industries (DRO: D/ST/132/ 135/4, ii).
'ihese hndings run contrar y to Pollard's (1965: 248) observations regarding
the inadequacies of Industrial Revolution accounting. The surviving cost
anal yses, profit statements and planning schedules show that the profitability of
activities was an important issue on the Bowes estates - they were not simply
treated as units 01 consumption - and that the accounts pla yed an important
facilitating role.
Function of' accounts within the organization (3): exercising power
The debate over the managerial utility of Industrial Revolution accounting has
cry stallized into two main theoretical paradigms. The first tries to explain
acc6unting behaviour and accounting change in terms of the pursuit of wealth
through rational decision making. Those authors supporting the view that the
British Industrial Revolution was an important formative epoch in the
development of modern accounting practice have tended to come from this
school. This economic-rationalist perspective has been challenged by followers
of the social theorist, Michel Foucault, who interpret accounting as a
'disciplinary technolog y' that controls the lives of people within organizations
through detailed surveillance (Loft, 1986: 139). Accounting becomes a source of
pow'er through its ability to 'articulate' their performance.
The key development in this process for industry was the imposition of
performance standards on the workforce (Hoskin and Macye, 1988: 68), and the
explanation of why performance measures were transferred from materials and
machines to labour has become the main focus of disagreement between the two
schools. The Foucauldians disagree that their introduction was 'a rational
response to the needs of economic development' (Fleischman et a!., 1995: 164).
According to them, the preconditions' for this change were social rather than
economic. They had more to do with the spread of grammatocentrism (centrality
of writing) and calculability (examination and grading) within American society
in the first half of the nineteenth century than the increased opportunities for
making profits afforded by the British Industrial Revolution.
Furthermore, it is not just the nature and function of accounting activity that
are up for debate, but also the issue of continuit y and discontinuity with the
past. The economic-rationalists tend to stress the continuous nature of
accounting development - Scorgie (1997) found progenitors of modern
management accounting concepts on English medieval estates - in contrast to
the Foucauldians who see it as more discontinuous (Miller and Napier, 1993).
According to 1-loskin and Mac ye (1988), a clear dividing line exists between the
modern and the pre-modern accounting worlds, with accounting first being used
as disciplinary technology in a modern sense at Springfield Armory in the
United States in the 18-i-Os. In l3ritain, the change max' not have occurred until
after the First World War, when scientific management s ystems were introduced
from America (Edwards ef (ii., 1995).
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Is there any
 evidence of a Foucauldian type knowledge—power relation in the
Bowes estates? If this is interpreted to meat-i a s ystem which imposed
performance norms on the workforce, against which 'each individual's cOmmit-
ment and omissions were constantl y evaluated' (I luskin and Mac ye, 1988: 41),
the answer is no. This can be illustrated in relation to coal, which was the largest
industrial source ot emplo yment in the region, and also the one with the most
clearly delined control pi-ocedures. F-Iere, Fleischman and Parker (1997: 118)
found a lack of attention to labour-cost control, despite the relative sophistica-
tion of the costing records in the Tyneside coal industry compared to other
regions or industries in Great Britain (1760-1850). The y wrote that researchers
seeking the origins of modern managerialism in accounting systems that
establish discipline over labour would he disappointed in the Tyneside archives.
The same was true at the Dowlais ironworks where management accounting was
used for administrative co-ordination and strategic decision making, hut not for
labour control (Bovns and Edwards, 1996a: 54).
The s ystem of labour control adopted by most Tyneside coal owners,
including the Bowes, has been described in detail by Fleischman and Macye
(1998). Its two main components were paying miners on a piece-rate basis and
ty ing them to a particular employer for a year by a pitman's bond. While the
piece-rate records provided the necessary data for managers to evaluate
individual performance, Fleischman and Parker (1997: 118) and Fleischman and
Macye (1998) found no evidence that they were used in this was: Some of the
paybills did compare the fortnight's production to that of the previous period,
hut it was done 'on an aggregated, rather than an individual basis'. The
accounting system was lacking from a Foucauldian point of view, therefore,
because it did not establish disciplinary control over individual workers in a
modern sense. However, the significance of this omission is unclear. Would
efficienc y
 gains necessaril y have resulted from imposing performance standards
on labour, compared to the s ystem adopted of paying miners on a piece-rate
basis, and tying them to particular emplo y ers through legal constraints, such as
the miner's bond? Arguably the system could not have been bettered. The piece-
rate method gave the miners the incentive to produce more without alienating
them through unnecessary management interference. One of the difficulties that
owners faced in a period of escalating production - according to Flinn and
Stoker (1984: 340—i) it increased ten-fold between 1700 and 1830 - was labour
shortage, and experienced miners being 'poached' by other owners after their
year as Out. Harris observed that
a skilled coal-face worker was a very valuable man; in good times his pay was
high though, as in a number of trades, peak earnings were achieved for only
part of his working life, since a close combination of skill and strength was
required. Good men were able to get more sizeable, saleable coal by skilful
under-and side-cutting, sometimes avoiding the waste of slack and dust by
cunning wedging and use of natural roof pressures to break up the coal.
(Harris, 1976: 171)
194	 - 'Ic'oiiiiiiiu, 13u.ciness	 1'i,ia,icial history
The 'rapid increase' in the coal trade had produced such a scarcit y
 of skilled
pitmen by 1764 that some mine-owners were offering binding money of two to
four guineas in place of the customary shilling (1 lammond and I lammond, 1919:
13). The owners responded to this situation by agreeing not to hire colliers
unless they could produce a certificate of release from their last employer. By
striking successfull y in the following year in response to this move by the owners
to reduce their freedom of employment (Hammond and Hammond, 1919:
12-17; Flinn and Stoker, 1984: 351), the miners demonstrated their support for
the traditional system, which, in a situation where skilled labour was scarce,
restricted the ability of the owners to discipline' the workers any further,
because it allowed them to walk awa y to another employer after their year was
out. A similar situation prevailed in the mid-nineteenth century at the Dowlais
ironworks where labour was controlled by non-accounting means. Bovns and
Edwards (1996a: 55) observed that the adoption of an accounting system to
control and discipline labour at Dowlais 'in conditions of labour shortage, high
worker turnover, etc....would most probably have led to widespread unrest,
and would therefore have proved counter-productive'. The scarcity of skilled
labour in an expanding coal market, coupled with the low level of technology and
reliance on manpower, explains why the Newcastle coal-owners were unable to
regulate the labour market in the mid-eighteenth century. Fleischman and
Macye (1998) describe how by 1805 they were in a much stronger position.
It could therefore be argued that the economic circumstances on Tyneside
prior to the late eighteenth century rendered it inappropriate to use accounting
as a disciplinary technology over labour in a Foucauldian sense, thereby lending
support to the economic-rationalists. However, the absence of performance
standards over labour does not mean that accounting knowledge could not
function as a power mechanism in other areas of the Bowes estates' organization.
One might even expect this from a Foucauldian perspective. As we have seen,
accounting permeated every aspect of the estates' operations, suggesting a high
degree of grammatocentrism, which Hoskin et a!. (1997: 3) identify as one of the
main dynamics driving the Foucauldian 'power—knowledge interaction'. Indeed,
the lack of performance standards despite the presence of this dynamic shows
that a linkage between the two is not inevitable. Is there any evidence of the
interaction of knowledge and power in the accounts?
First, the ubiquity of accounting suggests that it enjoyed a high status within
the Bowes estates, which is confirmed by its common use in arbitration. The
article has already referred to keeping bargain books in lead mining in order to
resolve disputes between the proprietor and subcontractors. George Bowes'
heads of proposal for reconciling differences between himself and the other
Grand Allies in 1736 included the drawing up of accounts (DRO: D/ST/B1/
6/22/1). An internal memorandum at Gibside in 1725 shows an appreciation of
accounting's potential for gaininganadv•ntage over the other party in a
bargaining situation. The point at issue was the fixing of the London
lightermen's premium, which was a matter of negotiation between the coal-
owner and the lightermen. Lightermen owned the lighters, a type of vessel that
was used to transfer coal between the moored colliers and riverside wharves.
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The also acted as the principal intermediaries in the disposal of ships' cargoes
in London, and could command a high premium from the Newcastle coal-
owners kr accepting their coal in a 'fighting trade', when the coal-owners were
in all out competition. 'ihe memorandum began: 'NB The accounts of fitters'
reports Sent Mr l30\VCS ought not to he exposed neither to crimps [a type of
selling agent at London] nor lightermen l)ut purely for his own information and
guide on setting ye premium with them' (DRO: D/ST/B 1/22/60). The owner
was in a position of superior knowledge because he had access to detailed
information about the Newcastle end of the coal market from the fitters'
accounts, and it was important to ensure they did not fall into the wrong
hands.
Second, the quality of the accounts was itself an issue: the better the accounts,
the greater the credit reflecting on the person who had prepared them. This is
illustrated b y correspondence in 1758-60 between Richard Stephenson, one of
the chief stewards at Gibside, and John Gibson, the manager of the lead-
smelting mill at Wemmergill (DRO: D/ST/C2/3/77/5-7, D/ST/B2/93/4).
The hone of contention was Gibson's salary of £10 per annum, which he said
was insufficient to supply him 'with the necessaries of life'. He threatened
to resign unless the salary were increased to £20, which was the sum paid to
Nathan Home, the manager of the lead mines there. Stephenson rejected his
request, countering that he had heard that Gibson was not giving 'due
attendance at the mill'. Gibson's first line of defence was the quality of his
accounts. Suspecting Home as the informer he wrote:
would [he] but look at home; he would have no reason to accuse me. He gets
a great part of his accounts made up from the work people's memoranda,
hence he has nothing to rely on, but their word. I write down daily what is
transacted at the mill and I keep such accounts as I know in my own
knowledge to be right.
The fact that he kept a dail y record proved his attendance, in contrast to Home,
who was content to rely on the presentments of third parties.
Finall\ the performance of stewards could be judged from the accounts.
Gibson sought to demonstrate his O\Vfl accounting expertise, and Home's
inefficienc y, by quantifying the losses that had resulted from Home's misman-
agement. Going back over the recent figures of price and output, he prepared
detailed schedules of the profit that had been forgone by working the mines
instead of letting them (Figure 1).
Further schedLiles quantified the loss of revenue caused by Home's dismissal
of the hushers at Birkdale. Hushers used the water pressure built up by
damming a stream either to prospect for new ore, by clearing avav the surface
soil and rock, or to extract worked ore from the mine wastes. According to
Gibson, the total profit that had been forgone since the hushers had been
discharged four years previousl y
 amounted to L807/10/7 (DRO: D/ST/B2/
93/4). The high status of accounting within the organization meant that it could
he used to promote the interests of individuals. In this particular case, although
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Figure 1 Schedule of the profit forgone b y working the lead mines instead ol letting
them, 175S
Gibson did not get his salar y
 increase, Home was dismissed for bail
management. Accounts had been used to make visible his performance. and he
was disciplined a a direct result.
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It is true that this is not the same as creating large populations of calculable
persons. Home. and Gibson were stewards whose significance had been
identilied before the accounts were prepared. 1-lowever, as we have seen, an
important feature of the estate organization was a reporting and management
structure that existed independently of the identity of individual stewards - cf.
the continuity
 of the records (see above, p. 184) - or indeed of the proprietor
himself (see above, p. 181), and essentially the stewards were no more prominent
than managers today.
To sum up, it is argued that the economic-rationalist and Foucauldian
dichotomy is too simplistic. In reality, there may have been several reasons for
preparing accounts, which varied from Situation to situation. The correspon-
dence between Gibson and Stephenson is a case in point. On the one hand, it
demonstrated Gibson's understanding of differential costs and revenues, and
how one could use this information to determine the optimal course of action -
Fleischman and Parker (1997: 127) cited the letters as an example of rational
economic analysis, and so they were - whereas, on the other hand, Gibson's
prime motive was to promote his own interests in the estates at the expense of
his rival. The previous section of the article highlighted cases where economic
decisions were based on planning data. The same system also generated
information for controlling the operation of contracts, evaluating past perform-
ance, monitoring costs and exercising power, all of which are characteristic of the
modern organization. These findings cast doubts both on the mutual exclusivity
of particular explanations of accounting behaviour and on the Foucauldian
notion of a relevant distinction between 'pre-modern' and 'modern' business
accounting, with the latter beginning in the mid-nineteenth century.
Conclusion
Through the accounts, the article has examined the management practices
employed on the Bowes family estates in the first three-quarters of the
eighteenth century, in order to ascertain whether they were managed as profit
centres to be exploited, and whether accounting aided managerial activit y at this
early stage of industrial development. The answer to both questions is yes.
George Bowes was the estate proprietor for most of the period in question. His
active involvement in the day-to-day operations of his estates, coupled with the
geographical spread of his activities and his distance from events, necessitated a
centralised organizational structure that was capable of delegating responsibility
to stewards in key areas while, at the same time, retaining control at the centre.
This was achieved through a unified reporting network which ensured that
management and accounting practices were highl y integrated over different
activities. Generall y, the accounts were based on the bilateral recording of cash
receipts and payments, with adjustments for opening and closing debtors,
creditors and stocks as appropriate. Charge and discharge accounts did not
predominate. Most of the accounts were prepared by the stewards. The majority
of the estate accounts were designed to keep track of rights and obligations.
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ihere was a close linkage between the form of the accounts and the mode of
organizational control, and the accounting procedures were flexible enough to
respond to orgaiizational changes. Written agreements underpinned the
contractual obligations of third parties, and accounts were used to monitor
compliance. Internal audit checks increased their effectiveness as a control
mechanism. The survival of cost anal yses, profit statements and planning data
indicates that profitability was also an important issue - the estates were not
treated simply as units of consumption - and that the accounts played an
important facilitating role. Colliery viewers were instrumental here. There are
indications that a knowledge-power mechanism operated within the estate
organization, despite the absence of labour standards. In this instance, the
absence of a disciplinar y
 system of labour control is of doubtful significance.
These findings cast doubts on both the mutual exclusivity of economic-
rationalist and Foucauldian explanations of accounting behaviour, and on the
notion that a relevant distinction exists between modern and pre-modern
business organization.
Are there any implications fir future research? By questioning the conven-
tional view that estate management and accounting were essentially un-
productive, the article affirms, at a time when the value of such work has been
queried, the need for more archival studies to build up as complete a picture as
possible (Miller and Napier, 1993; Fleischman and Tyson, 1997). In particular,
the question was posed as to whether it was more likely for estates to have been
managed as profit-making investments in the north east than elsewhere, given
the business orientation of the local landowners. Comparative studies of the
accounting procedures employed on other estates in the north east and elsewhere
would therefore be useful. Much work has already been done, including Jones's
survey of Welsh estate accounting (Jones, 1985: 39-74). The Strathmore
collection forming the basis of this study is itself unusual in the large volume of
business data that has survived over such a prolonged period. The present study
has merel y scratched the surface. The estate and business records extend to the
Second World War, and it would be interesting to trace how the systems
identified in this article developed in response to technological, organizational
and other changes.
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Developed and Developing Countries
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Discusses and applies a general framework for
services quality to make a comparative evaluation
of ten dimensions of service quality between
developed and developing countries. Derives
specific hypotheses for each of the service quality
dimensions based on the relevant environmental
factors characterizing developed and developing
economies. Discusses managerial implications of
the hypotheses that are derived, and proposes the
empirical investigation of these hypotheses as a
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Marketing regards them as intrinsically valuable
strategic devices which reduce the risks of
products failing. Accounting sees them as
intrinsically misleading, because they increase the
risks of reporting unreliable information. Unlike
marketing, therefore, financial accounting can
ignore the perceived economic benefits of brands
on the grounds of uncertainty, and by so doing
preserves its own reputation for integrity.
Inevitably the claims of accounting will prevail
because it controls financial reporting.
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There is a paradox within some markt economies
that accounting appears to enjoy superior power
and status to marketing. This is significant
because of the close working relationship between
the two professions, and can be linked to
accountings key role in market regulation. Brands
allow us to consider this in a single issue, by
juxtaposing the accounting and marketing
rationale applied, with illustrations from practice.
A fundamental difference of focus is observed in
their attitudes to the uncertainties of brands.
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Introduction
Through the subject of brands, this article explores the subordination of
marketing as a profession to accounting, which has been said to exist in some
market economies. Piercy (1986), for example, spoke of the declining corporate
status of the marketing department, and the danger that the marketing
viewpoint will be heard less in developing corporate strategies, because of the
lack of a suitable language. Accounting, for its part, is able to express its own
viewpoint through its role as "score-keeper" within the organization. This lends
power to accountants, and Wilson (1981) linked accounting's hypothetical
superiority to this.
The shrinkage of Communism in Eastern Europe and Asia has raised the
profile of market forces, and the importance of markets and marketing to the
world economy. Free markets for their part depend on good information in
order to function successfully. Where asymmetric information is present this
can seriously inhibit the well functioning of markets, by discouraging trading.
The regulation of information is of prime importance, therefore, and this has
been addressed in different ways. In Germany, for example, there
are internal regulatory structures within organizations (Nobes and Parker,
1991, pp. 12, 197), whereas in Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia regulation
tends to be carried out externally through public institutions (Nobes and
Parker, 1991, pp. 52-69). In the latter case accounting has a monopoly
in providing information, which offers further explanation of the paradox
that in these economies, which are market-based, accounting appears to enjoy a
superior power and status to marketing. Therefore it is not just that
accountants measure the marketing effort within organizations, but also that
they play a key role in regulating information. This is relevant to brands, which
themselves have become a regulation issue.
Not all authors agree that marketing is subordinated to accounting.
Wilson (1981), for instance, quoted from empirical studies casting doubts
on this. Militating against it is the emergence in the last 40 years of
the "marketing concept", in which marketing has played a more central role
in company policy formation (Harrison, 1981); and in which the solutions
proposed by management accountants have been seen as inappropriate, with
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their traditional orientation towards production costs (Mallen and Silver, 1981).
A recent report by the Henley Centre for Forecasting, which was commissioned
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1993, para. 9),
identified the declining participation of accountants at top board level in
the UK as a danger for the future of the accounting profession. There are
doubts, therefore, but in any competition between marketing and accounting
"to determine whose view of the world will prevail" (Piercy, 1986) accounting
starts off with an innate advantage through its control of internal and external
financial reporting.
This issue is significant for marketers because of the close working
relationship between the two professions, which results in accounting
information being used for decision making at both operational and strategic
levels of marketing activity. Field and Gabhart (1981) wrote that "efficient
marketing is impossible without a continuing flow of salient data about costs,
cost consumptions and profits", and "management cannot make rational
decisions regarding the marketing function without knowledge of marketing
costs and profitability". This could, for example, affect the allocation of
marketing efforts and expenditure to marketing segments (Piercy, 1986).
One means of evaluating the performance of marketing segments might be to
calculate return on investment; and Wilson (1986) quoted from various studies
urging this. He then went on to explain the extent to which this measure is
affected by the way in which the accountant deals with marketing outlays.
There might be disagreement betweerr accountants and marketers, for example,
over whether marketing outlays should be treated as expenses or marketing
assets. If the accounting view takes priority, there is cause for concern for
marketers, if this impacts on marketing decisions.
The debate in Australia and the UK over the accounting treatment of brands
provides an ideal opportunity to question the apparent subordination of
marketing to accounting, because it brings them together in the one issue. This
article is able to contribute to previous studies, therefore, by examining the
interrelationship of the two professions in microcosm; and the issues which it
raises are fundamental to a wider understanding of both disciplines. In
particular the subject of brands enables us to compare the truth claims of the
accounting profession, on which its reputation for arbitrational expertise is
based, with those of the competing organizational culture of marketing.
Marketing reality is concerned principally with attaining competitive
advantage, whereas accounting reality concentrates on the reliability of
information. Thus the marketer is interested in the distinctive competences of a
brand that can be used to attain added value in the minds of the buyers,
whereas the accountant focuses on asset characteristics derived from economic
theory, and recognition criteria grounded in accounting practice. By
juxtaposing the accounting and marketing rationale, with illustrations from





The article starts by considering financial accounting's claim to represent
the truth, which lends it superiority over other organizational cultures such
as marketing. It then turns to the subject of brands specifically. The political
implications of recognizing brands in the balance-sheet are considered
from both marketing and accounting perspectives, as are the underlying
characteristics of brands, and the problems associated with their recognition.
Accounting Truth
Following Foucault, who emphasized the close connection between knowledge,
truth and power (Loft, 1986), it could be argued that financial accounting gains
integrity and thereby power from its claims to represent the truth. Thus the
accountant holds the status of a type of witch-doctor within the organization,
dispensing truths in order to accommodate "awkward facts" (Gambling, 1977).
This emphasis on truthful representation enhances the social credibility of
accountants, which itself can become an issue in arbitration disputes (Power,
1992). Also it contrasts with marketing, which, by focusing on consumer
behaviour through concepts such as added value, is perhaps more able to accept
truth in terms of perceptions rather than reality.
Accounting's truth claims are backed by company law, which states that
a company's annual accounts should represent a "true and fair view" of its
activities; and have been accepted internationally by accounting standard
setters, through the adoption of "faithful representation" as a key reporting
concept. Faithful representation is both a reporting concept and an affirmation
of the neutral position of the accountant in society as an unbiased reporter of
economic events. A definition of the term, therefore, includes such precepts as
valid description, freedom from error or bias, and according with the substance
of economic reality (ASB, 1991, paras. 28, 30). This view has both its champions
and detractors, and one might cite Solomons (1991) and Tinker (1991)
respectively as representatives of the opposing ends of the argument.
Opponents have challenged the implication that economic reality can exist
independently of the manner in which it is reported, and questioned whether
accounting truths are absolute, or merely determined by the established body of
accounting practices and beliefs (Hines, 1991). Such doubts pose one of the most
important challenges to accounting's search for a conceptual framework for
financial reporting based on the principle of faithful representation, and are not
easy to refute. If we accept the argument that accounting truths have no
intrinsic meaning, but are reflexively constructed from practices and beliefs,
any subjectivity gap between financial accounting and the other social sciences,
such as marketing, is reduced. What then if two conflicting sets of reality,
constructed from different cultures, exist within an organization? Although this
might be quite normal, it will be the accountant's view which prevails as far as
information for market regulation is concerned. Let us then consider the









First there are conflicting political considerations.
Aside from any vested interest of professional brand valuers, there is a
political issue for the marketing profession as a whole, which concerns the
acknowledgement of the contribution of marketers to the long-term health
of the business. Branding is a powerful concept to marketers "that does not
just focus on one element of the marketing mix, but represents the
result of a carefully conceived array of activities across the whole spec-
trum of the marketing mix" (de Chernatony and McDonald, 1992, p. 15).
De Chernatony and McDonald (1992, pp. 31-41), for example, identified eight
different brand strategies employed in practice, each utilizing different
marketing competences, and de Chernatony and McWilliam (1990) proposed a
matrix defining the dimensions of a brand, to enable marketers to determine
the optimum combination of marketing resources necessary to sustain it.
The resources needed are not static, but will change through time as the brand
progresses through its life cycle (de Chernatony and McDonald, p. 220). Brands
are crucial, therefore, to the marketing process as a whole; and from a
marketing perspective the recognition issue does not simply concern the
recognition of brands in accounts, but also the recognition of the role of
marketers within the organization.
Indeed some companies have followed the marketing perspective and
recognized the value of their brands in the balance-sheet, although the main
impetus for this has come from the strategic implications of the alternative
accounting treatments. The strategic benefits of capitalizing brands and not
depreciating them are well-rehearsed, and have been dealt with elsewhere
(Egginton, 1990; Fans, 1989; Mather and Peasnell, 1991; Power, 1992). Briefly, it
is probably not coincidental that accounting for brands came to public attention
during the late 1980s at a time of intense take-over activity in the UK, and was
pioneered by acquisitive companies, such as Grand Metropolitan plc and Rank
Hovis McDougall plc. This is because of the significant effects on reported
earnings and net assets of either writing off purchased goodwill to reserves, or
amortizing it in the profit and loss account, both of which have either real or
perceived implications for acquisitive companies. There was speculation, for
example, that the recognition of brands in accounts, coupled with their
non-depreciation, has enabled UK companies to pay larger premiums in take-
over bids than their US competitors. This accounting treatment would be
unacceptable in the USA; and it has been suggested that the size of bids by US
companies has been restricted by the expectations of their investors in terms of
earnings per share (Brown, 1989).
Whether this type of speculation is valid or not has little to do with the nature
of brands. Possibly it has fostered the suspicion of the accounting profession
that by capitalizing brands companies are "warming up the books" if not
actually "cooking" them. This has not been helped by companies continuing to
capitalize brands in the face of Accounting Standards Committee Technical




standard. Moreover the timing of the issue is significant, occurring during a
period of public disquiet following the collapse of companies such as Polly Peck
International plc, whose accounts, prepared in accordance with accounting
standards, may have appeared to reveal a picture of financial health (Financial
Reporting Council, 1991, para. 5.34). The sincere desire of both Government and
accounting profession to restore public credibility is apparent in the
establishment of a new regulatory framework backed by the 1989 Companies
Act. In such a climate there might be a political inclination towards curtailing
an accounting practice seen to be governed by expediency, in order to re-enforce
both the credibility of accounts and the status of accountants as guardians of
the truth. The tendency, therefore, would be towards restoring the status quo
and not allowing brands to be capitalized. Indeed this was one of the rñain
thrusts of the Accounting Standards Committee (1990, paras. 19-25), albeit
justified on theoretical grounds. Possibly there is a distinction here between the
"nominal" and the "real". Accounting issues may be put forward for nominal
reasons which the majority perceive as real, whereas the hidden agenda is
apparent only to a few. "Although often formally advocated in the name of the
user's interests, the articulation of accounting standards has continued to reflect
the dynamics of the institutional context of which they are an outgrowth"
(Burchell et al., 1980). In a political climate where the accountancy profession is
under attack, the nominal case might be presenting information useful for
decisions, and the real the maintenance of the profession.
Asset Characteristics
Turning now from the politics to the rationale, this has centred on the benefits
associated with brands. There is a consensus among accountants that a major
characteristic of "assets" is that they produce future economic benefits, which
has been accepted in the USA by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(1980, para. 19), and internationally by the International Accounting Standards
Committee (1989, paras. 53-55), and is supported by a body of economic and
accounting theory. The first consideration of the financial accountant, therefore,
must be whether brands do in fact produce a future stream of benefits.
Although marketing for its part is not concerned with asset recognition in the
accountant's sense, it does set limits about what constitutes a marketable object.
In the case of a brand these depend on an assessment of the ability of its various
attributes to influence consumer behaviour, and ultimately to determine its
position in the market. In this way brands are strategic devices, used by
companies to develop and sustain competitive advantage.
It follows that the economic benefits associated with brands are relevant to
both marketing and accounting. Brands, however, are ambiguous entities in
both marketing and accounting literature, and the future economic benefits
which they engender are not so clear as one might suppose. It has been stated
that the long-term success of a brand lies in the number of consumers who
become repeat purchasers (Jacoby and Chestnut, 1978, p. 1). This is partly
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International	 attributed to brand loyalty, and encourages the view that brands exist as assets
'Iarketing	 for the continuing benefit of a business. However, the degree to which brand
Review	 loyalty influences repeat purchase behaviour remains uncertain. Jacoby and
11	 Chestnut (pp. 2-5) cited a variety of other possible causes, such as price, quality,1L,	 location, the amount of available time or personal involvement in brand choice,
loyalty to particular stores or suppliers which may limit the range of brands,
38 and the number of choices between brands which are available to the consumer.
Ehrenberg (1972) in fact concluded from empirical observation that in general
neither these factors nor the brand itself matter explicitly under stationary
no-trend conditions. Instead the key determinant of the pattern of repeat
purchase behaviour is the average purchase frequency per buyer of an item.
There is uricertainty therefore, about the causes of repeat purchase behaviour,
which is complicated by the variables changing over time. An example of this is
consumer preference. During the 1980s there was a persistent swing in favour
of own-label goods at the expense of manufacturers' brands, which to some
extent has undermined the existing perceptions of marketers concerning their
brands. This has been particularly apparent during the present recession when
it has been increasingly common to see brand manufacturers promoting on
price at the expense of brand advertising (de Cherriatony et al., 1992).
From an accounting perspective there are doubts also. In the first. place, there
is uncertainty because the accountant is dealing with the future nature of the
benefits associated with brands, in order to assess whether they are assets.
In this a distinction can be drawn between purchased and home-grown brands,
with the latter being more uncertain. This is because purchased brands have an
exchange value, which implies a greater degree of certainty over their future
economic benefits than is the case for home-grown brands, which merely have
a production cost. Second, in the case of those home-grown brands which are
recognized in the balance-sheet, it is possible that some double counting is
taking place. This is because the fixed assets which facilitate their production
are also included in the accounts. Finally, it is necessary for the accountant to
consider whether branded products have "added value" above that of non-
branded goods. One might view this as the "super-contribution" attributable to
brands (Blanchet and Tweedie, 1989). The concept of added value was seen by
de Chernatony and McDonald (1992, pp. 8-10, 18) as crucial to understanding
the nature of brands, and the difference between brands and commodities.
They argued that "to be successful it is necessary for firms to have a very clear
view about precisely what added values their brands offer as well as
understanding the relevance of these added values to consumers" (p. 157); and
proposed a four-level model to enable companies to identify possible added
values (pp. 161-6). From an accounting viewpoint, however, the question of
whether brands have added values, depends, in a standard investment setting,
on a quantification of the additional cash flows and the risk. Neither of these
areas has yet received adequate consideration.
Despite the doubts, the economic potential of brands has not been a major




Standards Committee (1990, para. 19) concluded that "there is no doubt that
brands and branding under skilful management can add significant value to
commercial operations, and are a major force in modern commercial practice".
In this respect the ASC was accepting the marketing reality that brands
are economically valuable. Whether this reality is absolute, or whether it has
been reflexively constructed from company practices and beliefs may be
questioned, but it is not a major area of conflict between accounting standard-
setters and those marketers who advocate the value of their brands. Indeed the
brand accounting debate has tended to reinforce the perception of marketers
that their brands are valuable, through the interplay which has taken place
between accounting and marketing. The application of accounting technology
to value brands through concepts such as present value, for example, lends
them credibility. Returning to the accounting profession's claims on truth, one
could argue that marketing has used this to legitimize its own claims. This was
noted by Power (1992) in the juxtaposition of terminology in the marketing text
entitled, Brand Valuation: Establishing a True and Fair View (Murphy, 1989).
Strategic benefits are perceived in a number of areas, such as in using
established brand names to minimize the risks of new products failing.
In March 1989, for example, it was reported that, despite an explosion in new
product launches in the UK, fewer than one-third were likely to survive for more
than two years (1vVhelan, 1989). Such failures result in "significant financial and
resource losses to the companies which developed them, and brought them to
market" (Goldsmith and Flynn, 1992). Companies, therefore, use established
brand names to minimize the risks of failure. In September 1988 Beecham
Bovril Brands planned to use the "Marmite" label for a new range of savoury
spreads, and Scottish and Newcastle plc, the "IVIcEwan's" name for its new
lagers. In April 1989 the Unilever Group company Van den Bergh was forced to
drop one of its key brands just 18 months after it had been launched. The low
fat "Latta" spread, which had been successful in some Scandinavian countries,
did not achieve the same potential in the UK. A problem was in communicating
that it was both low in fat and high in polyunsaturates, which the company
hoped to overcome by replacing it with a similar product under the name of
"Flora Extra Light".
In addition to the initial risk of products failing there are also risks associated
with their continuation. In particular there is the risk that consumers will
switch either to other brands or to own label goods. Applying the financial
management concept of market risk (J, one might expect brands to be more
risky than cheaper non-brands, through a consumers' switch into or out of
brands at the top or bottom of the business cycle. Indeed we have already noted
some evidence of this in brand manufacturers' pricing policies in the current
recessionary climate. There is, however, a counter-argument that companies are
able to use branding to insulate themselves against the risk of this type of
behaviour. Thus de Chernatony et al. (1992) found evidence that a brands-price
differential still exists in the minds of consumers when they are encouraged
through advertising to think in these terms. An example of this is the successful
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International	 launch of the relatively chunky "Yorkie" bar against a background of escalating
Marketing	 cocoa prices in the mid-1970s. Careful market research and sUccessful branding
Review	 of the product enabled Rowntree Mackintosh plc to capture a share of the
112 market from "Cadbury's Dairy Milk", which had been made thinner in order to
restrict price increases (Watkins, 1986, pp. 38-9). It is in fact argued that brand
names/concepts act as heuristics for the consumer, by encapsulating a pool of
40 available information at the point of purchase to the exclusion of all external
sources (Jacoby arid Chestnut, 1978, p. 114). From the consumers' viewpoint,
purchase of the brand can become a risk aversion strategy which avoids the
risk of dissatisfaction with the alternatives (Watkins, 1986, p. 23).
Another area of perceived strategic benefit lies fri the purchase of established
brands as a vehicle for diversification into new markets. Again this is associated
with the risks of failure of the alternative course of action of launching new
products. Thus, by acquiring Rowntree Mackintosh, Nestlé also acquired its
brands, the strong position of which in the UK confectionery market was
reflected in the size of the premium offered for the shares (Murphy, 1992).
Finally branding is an important means for companies to promote
their image, not just to increase sales, but also to encourage investment.
The advertising campaigns in support of privatizations are examples. Another
was the decision of British Petroleum Co. plc in 1989 to rebrand its petrol
stations in the USA under the "BP" name in place of the local names. This was
intended to raise the "BP" profile with US investors, although fears were
expressed at the time that US petrol sales might suffer as a result.
Recognition Criteria
Although the two professions are not in opposition over the perceived economic
benefits associated with brands, a problem between the two lies in the
accountant's desire to present useful information which is "reliable" (ASB, 1991,
para. 26). In an environment of uncertainty this requires evidence, expressed in
terms of recognition criteria, before asset recognition can take place.
For example the International Accounting Standards Committee (1989, para.
89) proposed that assets should not be recognized if they are incapable of
reliable measurement. Uncertainty is inevitable if one accepts the future nature
of the benefits stemming from assets, and in this regard recognition criteria are
necessary to make information more reliable. There is, however, a counter-
argument that recognition criteria may actually impede reliability by placing
boundaries on reality, to the potential detriment of valid description and faithful
representation. To make use of the type of physical analogy sometimes found in
accounting literature, one might liken this to photographing a landscape with a
narrow angle lens. This may lead to sharper definition at the expense of not
revealing the full picture.
Apart from reliability, "relevance' is proposed as the other key characteristic
of accounting information which is useful (ASB, 1991, para. 23). This is
associated with the decision-making needs of accounts' users, which must




importance. Inevitably there is some trade-off between concepts such as
relevance and reliability (ASB, 1991, para. 27), and sometimes they are in open
conflict. Faced with such a dilemma, accounting practice, firmly grounded in a
tradition of conservatism (Chatfield, 1977), will err on the side of reliability in
order not to mislead (ASB, 1991, paras. 27, 29). This has been described by the
Accounting Standards Board as a sceptical attitude of mind about the results of
uncertainty (1991, para. 40), and is a reflection of the unwillingness of the
accounting profession to embrace the notion of probability. It also reflects a
fundamental difference of focus between accounting and marketing in their
attitudes to the risks associated with brands. Marketing, as we have seen, tends
to regard brands as intrinsically valuable strategic devices, which help develop
and sustain competitive advantage, and thereby reduce the risks of products
being rejected. Although accounting does not necessarily disagree, it tends to
focus on brands as being intrinsically misleading, because they increase the
risks of reporting information which is unreliable. Returning to the argument
that accounting truth is reflexively constructed from accounting practices and
beliefs, one might see this as a case in point. Thus the Accounting Standards
Committee (1990, paras. 23-24) stated that, while information about brands
is useful and should be presented in the notes to the accounts, brands should
not be capitalized because they fail the asset recognition test of "separability".
We therefore come back to the asset recognition criteria which lie at the heart of
accounting reasoning in relation to brands. Let us now consider these as they
have been applied.
The accounting problem is that the characteristics of brands are difficult
to distinguish from those of goodwill, and indeed of other potential marketing
assets such as product image and reputation (Guilding and Pike, 1990).
This is because they produce similar benefits in the form of increased
earnings potential, and are constructed from common elements such as
company history, advertising, regional loyalties, quality control, technology,
staff training (Bryant, 1989). The distinction between brand and goodwill is
particularly nebulous in the case of a differentiated product such as a famous
malt whisky which is synonymous with the brand (Blanchet and Tweedie,
1989). Indeed the uncertainties are increased by the difficulties in defining a
brand, which is perhaps indicative that the accounting debate is as much about
what brands are, as how to account for them. In these circumstances then it is
not surprising that the separability issue has assumed a prominence in brand
accounting.	 -
There is uncertainty, therefore, over the separate identification of brands,
which in turn may prevent them from being measured with reasonable
certainty. Thus, although accountants may be willing to value brands in
internal management accounts, they are less willing to do so externally
(Guilding and Pike, 1990). This is contrary to the stance of marketers that, "if
valuations are credible for internal management purposes, then surely they
must also be credible for external purposes" (Power, 1992). A possible







accounts, is to require the separability of brands to be evidenced by their
saleability, although this is inconsistent with their marketing purpose, in that
they are not generally developed or acquired with the intention of resale (Rank
Hovis McDougall plc, 1989, p. 4). In 1984 the Accounting Standards Committee
(para. 22) introduced the criterion that an intangible asset should not be
recognized in the balance-sheet separately from goodwill unless it is capable of
sale without disposing of the business as a whole. In 1990 the ASC (para. 38)
made the test more stringent by stating that separability should be evidenced
by an active market in the intangible asset, separate from the purchase and sale
of business segments. It is too early yet to assess what stance will be taken by
the Accounting Standards Board, successor to the ASC. However, in a recent
discussion paper on Goodwill and Intangible Assets (1993, paras. 32.4-32.6), the
ASB reiterated the saleability criterion, and expressed the view that brands are
so similar in character to goodwill that they cannot be separated.
Paradoxically the saleability of brands is evidenced by companies trading
in them either as parts of business segments or separately. There are
many examples of the former in group reorganizations following takeovers.
Thus following Kohlberg Kravis Roberts' takeover in 1989 of the US
foods and tobacco group, RJR Nabisco, it auctioned several of the Nabisco
European biscuits and snacks companies. Examples where the name was
sold independently include BBC Enterprises granting a licence to Nova
International in 1988 to use the BBC Sports logo in a range of sportswear; and
Cadbury Schweppes licensing Premier Brands UK to use the "Cadbury" name
in a variety of products (Bryant, 1989). Evidence therefore exists to support the
saleable nature of brands; an impression corroborated by the readiness of
professional brand valuers to accept saleability as a legitimate asset recognition
criterion. Cameron-Smith and Mattiussi (1989), for example, who were directors
of Hambros Australia Ltd, stated that it is only those intangible assets that are
saleable independently of any pre-existing management infrastructure which
can be valued individually. However, to seek evidence of saleability and in
particular of an active market conflicts with the marketing reality of the types
of economic benefit which companies are looking to achieve from their brands,
such as increased market share and competitive advantage. This is reflected in
the longevity of brands, allied to the careful way in which they are nurtured
over long periods of time.
The anomalous nature of the accounting reasoning can be illustrated in
Figure 1.
	 -
In order to gain assurance that brands are measurable one must confirm
first that they are independently saleable and second that they are separable
from goodwill. However, the logic of this enquiry is mono-directional, because
confirmation of brands' saleability does not necessarily imply that they are
separable from goodwill - it may be a portion of goodwill which is being
disposed of - and confirmation of their separability is not the only factor
in deciding whether they are capable of measurement. There may be other




para. 3.2.12). It follows that, while the answer to any one of these questions need
not depend on the outcome of the others, accounting practice would tend to
accept this only in the one direction of restricting asset recognition.
Further illumination is provided by the diversity of factors affecting a brand's
measurability. Rank Hovis McDougall plc (1989, pp. 6-7), for example, adopted
a methodology encompassing the key factors of brand leadership, stability,
market, internationality, trend, support and protection. These are relevant to
both acquired and home-grown brands, because the carrying value of the
former in the balance-sheet might vary through time from the cost originally
allocated in a fair-value exercise. Variations might result from changes in the
marketplace, such as the swing in favour of supermarket own-label goods, or
from economic changes, such as European economic union (de Chernatony and
McDonald, 1992, pp. 196-7). It follows that the measurability of brands is
intrinsically complex and touches on more issues than saleability and
separability; and various valuation techniques have been devised to take
cognizance of these uncertainties (Murphy, 1989, pp. 23-5; Power, 1990; Rank
Hovis McDougall, 1989, pp. 3-10). It might be reasonable to consider these in
detail, and to criticize them for being too subjective, or lacking in consistency,
for example, Barwise et al. (1989); yet the type of accounting reasoning we have
seen would reject them on the narrow grounds of saleability alone.
The question remains whether there is scope for accounting to change.
The separability of brands and other intangible marketing assets was
discussed by Guilding and Pike (1990) from a management accounting
perspective. They noted that management accounting, following a financial
accounting orientation, has not yet developed a methodology for recognizing
these assets. They contended that a redefinition of intangible marketing assets
is essential for this to take place; and proposed a typology, highlighting the
inputs and outputs associated with intangible marketing asset management,
as a first step to solving the segregation problem. The conclusion was
that, while this would be useful from an internal reporting viewpoint, it might
not provide sufficient objective verification to enable these assets to be
recognized externally. Many issues in accounting, however, involve the
jointness of costs, and attempts are made to deal with them. Moreover the
existence of management accounting systems is crucial to the recognition of
other assets, such as long-term work-in-progress and development expenditure,
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International	 in financial accounts, and serves to provide the auditor with an additional
1arketing	 source of evidence that is susceptible to testing. It foflows that the establishment
Review	 of management accounting systems which recognize brands, following a
112	 redefinition of the related constructs of marketing assets, may yet lead thefinancial accountant towards an alternative solution to the separability
problem. This would entail a shift of emphasis by the financial accountant
44	 towards the internal management planning involved in the production of
brands, and is an important area warranting further investigation.
Conclusion
There is a paradox within some market economies that accounting appears to
enjoy a superiority to marketing with regard to power and status. This can be
linked to the key role which accounting plays in market regulation. The debate
over the recognition of brands in accounts has allowed us to consider this in
relation to a single issue.
Financial accounting's assertion that it is capable of faithfully representing
reality has been shown as susceptible to challenge on both political and
epistemological grounds. The accounting profession does not accept this,
however, and seeks to preserve its status as arbiter of the truth by requiring
"objective verification" to counteract uncertainties. This was apparent in the
prescriptive nature of the accounting reasoning applied to brands.
Marketing is also confronted by uncertainty regarding future patterns
of demand, and in this sense shares the concern of the accountant over the
future benefits stemming from brands. The article, however, observed a
fundamental difference of focus between the two cultures in their attitudes to
the uncertainties of brands. Marketing regards them as intrinsically valuable,
as strategic devices which help develop and sustain competitive advantage by
creating added-value in the minds of the consumers, and thereby reduce the
risks of products being rejected. Accounting, on the other hand, tends to see
them as intrinsically misleading, because they increase the risks of reporting
information which is unreliable. Financial accounting can thus ignore the
perceived economic benefits of brands on the grounds of uncertainty, whereas
marketing cannot because they are too fundamental.
Inevitably the claims of accounting will prevail because it controls financial
reporting; and, if it is indeed true that marketing as a profession is subordinate
to accounting in power and status, the article has seen the brands issue as
perpetuating this. By keeping brands off the balance-sheet and dismissing the
claims of marketing concerning the fruits of its labour, the accounting
profession succeeds in preserving its own reputation for integrity, at the
expense of the integrity of marketing. It would be naïve to see this in terms of a
deliberate conspiracy. Effective regulation depends on reliable information, and
in this accounting is inevitably constrained by the uncertainties of the world
which it represents. But perhaps it does illustrate how accounting can misuse
the power it gains from control of financial reporting, when the recognition tests




The question remains whether a change of accounting orientation towards
brands is possible. Previous authors have considered this from a management
accounting perspective, where change seems feasible. The establishment of
management accounting systems which recognize brands would also benefit the
financial accountant, however, by providing an additional source of objective
verification; and the article considers this a useful area for future research.
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